It is important to remember that this action is occurring within a strategic, multidimensional, interconnected global chess game and the shift from this MOU to UNCLOS marks just one move on one domain in the strategic competition between Thailand and Cambodia.
Putting it a different way, the Cambodian government’s action is just one action in response to the Thai government’s recent decision to withdraw from the MOU, and separate from the Cambodian government’s specific action here, there are multiple other connected events, circumstances and moves being made by both parties relative to the law of the sea that reverberate and influence each other. For example, the shifting and positioning of military forces along the border, readiness of forces, etc. are actions that feed into the relationship of both countries. Separate from acting or responding to the other party, sometimes decisions are made to address or respond to internal matters or interests. It is plausible that the Thai government’s actions with respect to the MOU were more motivated by catering to Thai elite than circumstances surrounding Cambodia.
This is also likely, or perhaps definitively the case, with Thailand’s military aggressions against Cambodia (in the run up to Thai national elections.) Once one stops looking at the Thai government’s actions in isolation from everything else that is happening and realizes that they are all interconnected and part of a broader narrative or possibly even a larger strategy, “Thailand’s ‘strategy for all strategies’ or ‘strategic narrative””, (see article by Dr. Pattajit Tangsinmunkong, “Reframing a Genocide: Strategic Narratives and the Legitimasation of Thailand’s support for the Khmer Rouge,”) then one sees the proverbial “forest for the trees.”
YOUK CHHANG
Director
Documentation Center of Cambodia
May 5, 2026
