

Table of Contents

Number 11, November 2000

Letter: In the Eyes of Buddha1

DOCUMENTATION

Tuy Pheng Reports His Anti-CPK Activities3

Genocide Sites In Battambang7

Ten-Fold Characteristics of The Party10

Biography Comrade Kong13

Secret Two-Way Radio Contact16

HISTORY

Voices from S-2119

Destruction Of Family Foundation22

LEGAL

Case Law24

Universal Jurisdiction27

A Sampling of Documentary Evidence30

PUBLIC DEBATE

Black Paper34

Cambodia: Justice Delayed38

Cambodia: Ruling with Impunity41

FAMILY TRACING

The Vietnamese Search For Lost Relatives44

Grandmother of "Fertilizer"45

The Beginning of Separation47

KHMER ROUGE ARTS

Poem: We Are GratefulBack Cover



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Letter:

IN THE EYES OF BUDDHA

The ancestor holiday (Ph'Chum Benn) is near, and with it, the former Khmer Rouge leaders, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, and their associate, Long Norin, will likely be visiting the Svay Por Pe monastery in Phnom Penh, which they are known to attend. I wonder what they think about while praying the statues of the Buddha in the presence of the monks, both of which they sought to eliminate completely during their regime between 1975 and 1979. If they now pray to Buddha and the monks, does it make them any different from what they were two decades ago? Would Buddha and the monks relieve them of their responsibility for the heinous crimes they and their co-conspirators committed against millions of Cambodian people? Would Buddha forgive their sins? The Khmer Rouge leadership are still with us today, and their crimes against the people of Cambodia are also still with us. They are not about the past, but today. Long Norin claimed that he joined the revolution because he wanted to make the country independent and developed. Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith shared the same view. I wonder what they meant by saying so, as I compare their claimed objectives with the experience I had under the Khmer Rouge regime. I witnessed a family killed by the Khmer Rouge cadre in a public commune meeting in Battambang province. I saw hundreds of people die of starvation, including my own sister, and I have documented the millions of others who died by execution, torture, forced labor, disease, and starvation under the Khmer Rouge regime. They (Long Norin, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith) claim that they do not believe that more than one million Cambodians perished under the Khmer Rouge. I wonder, have they ever visited their own secret prison, S-21, now known as the Tuol Sleng museum, where almost 20,000 prisoners were tortured and executed? Van Nath, a survivor of S-21, and a dozen former prison guards who are now living in Kampong Chhnang and Kandal provinces can certainly testify to what happened at S-21. Long Norin has asserted that he and the Khmer Rouge leaders do

not oppose the establishment of a Khmer Rouge tribunal. I wonder if they understand the concept of justice. Justice under the Khmer Rouge regime meant that those who dared to express independent ideas or views were judged to be enemies of "Angkar" and were subject to elimination. Over and over again, the Khmer Rouge leadership stressed this idea that the good of the nation required the pitiless slaughter of Cambodians by Cambodians. And they certainly implemented their belief with a vengeance. Justice under the Khmer Rouge regime also meant that you had to be pure (Khmer). As in all other things, the Angkar set themselves up as the judges of this quality as well, concluding that those with education, or light skin, or who dwelt in cities, were all enemies. If you fell into one of these categories, the Khmer Rouge would kill you or starve you to death. I picked for wateriness my pregnant sister, who had had no real food to eat for months. This act was considered criminal under the Khmer Rouge regime, so they hit me with an ax, pushed me to the ground, tied me up with rope, and put me in jail for weeks. My mother was afraid to cry in front of them while they were torturing me. Crying was also a crime under Khmer Rouge regime. They (Long Norin, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith) have said there will be turmoil if the Khmer Rouge leadership are ever brought to trial. I wonder why they think so? Under the Khmer Rouge regime, people were forced to keep quiet. To speak out was to invite death. At the same time, they forced us to make up lies about ourselves and about others so that they could justify their cruel regime. I wonder how they understand the meaning of change and development in a democratic society. The Khmer Rouge leaders now talk of national reconciliation, of striving to consolidate peace and progress, and of resolving people's poverty. The gall of such talk from the same people who wreaked havoc on Cambodia defies comprehension. How can you reconcile with the people who killed your own family members without a fair trial? What kind of "peace" can be "consolidated"

in a nation where such matters remain unresolved? Did the Khmer Rouge regime ever seek to reconcile with those of us who lived with or “served” the previous regime, and who were simply city dwellers, or students, or merchants? Where was their talk of letting ‘bygones be bygones’ then? Where was the interest in national reconciliation or the consolidation of peace then? The Khmer Rouge leaders talked about progress, and then proceeded to close the country off from the rest of the world, making everyone work in the fields without food and without medicine to treat the sick. (What was it that they knew better than to permit the outside world to see, and that they deny having had any knowledge of now?) The Khmer Rouge leaders talked about solving poverty and hunger, and I wonder why we did not have enough clothes, no proper shelters for people to live in, and not enough food to eat under their regime, while in fact they were exporting our national resources- gold and rice- to China and Viet Nam. Perhaps they were too busy killing the almost 5,200 prisoners they murdered during every week of their 3 years 8 months and 20 days in power to worry about the millions left to die without food and medicine. One of my sisters died because she had no food to eat for 4 months and her daughter died because my sister could not breast-feed her. My niece who survived the Khmer Rouge regime wrote to me: For my uncle Youk: Unfortunately my way of thinking has become, somewhat not clear or maybe too clear. The

way I view the world. I believe that every country has its own tragedy. For example, the United States of America had Slavery, the Jews had the Holocaust and we the Khmer people had this, and I believe that this was a Holocaust just like the Jew’s, so maybe somehow history does repeat itself, doesn’t matter what part of the world we live in.. Yes, sometimes I wonder what it would be like if there had been no war, and what it would be like if my parents were still alive, including my brother and sister. How my life would be different from what it is now. My daughter Jordyn sometimes asks me how come I don’t have a Mom or a Dad like the rest of her friends’ parents. Then I proceed to try to explain to her what happened to her grandparents, and this is very hard. It is sad knowing that my daughter and son will never get a chance to know their grandparents and I will never get to see my parents again. You know what the saddest part is? I can vaguely remember them myself. I was about five years old when they died. There’s this strange thought as I remember when my parents were buried. I had this thought, or maybe imagining, that they were pretending that they were dead, so they can be buried and then they would dig this underground tunnel that would lead them to another world and they will return to retrieve me and my sister (strange)? PS: I don’t believe that justice is enough for what happened to my family. No justice in the world will bring my family back. We should be asking

ourselves how we as human beings can prevent this from ever happening again. Love always, your niece, Theavy The Khmer Rouge leadership are still denying knowledge of the slaughter under their regime between 1975 and 1979. On what basis should I believe the Khmer Rouge leaders now? Why should I believe Long Norin, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith? Do they really look straight in the eyes of Buddha when they pray? Are they really respectful when they greet the monks? Do they really ask for forgiveness? *Youk Chhang*



Ieng Sary

Long Norin

TUY PHENG REPORTS HIS ANTI-CPK ACTIVITIES TO ANGKAR

By Sophearith Choung

History of anti-CPK activities before 1970

Tuy Pheng, alias “Phai”, born in Kanleng Chak Village, Sangkat Mean O’Reang Ov District, Region 22 of the Eastern Zone, was Secretary of So Tin District, also in Region 22. His father’s name was Hem Phin; and his mother’s name was Tuy Yim. According to his “confession”, written under torture at Office S-21 (Tuol Sleng Prison), Tuy Pheng had watched Khmer Rouge cadres come into his village, spreading revolutionary guidelines to the people at “the base”. Among the cadres were Chan Samuth, alias So Phim, and Taing Leng. It was after these propaganda missions that Tuy Pheng became aware of the situation of the revolution.

Cadres Kol and Chan Samuth came later, educating Tuy Pheng by saying, “The reason I come to educate you comrade to join the CPK is because I could not grasp you [your standpoint]. If I could, and especially could understand that you were active, I would have suggested that you do not follow the ‘silly so-called theory’. That is why I admitted you into party membership. No matter if you are revolutionary or not, it depends on your standpoint with which you can always see things”. “Free Khmer are people in the world that bear the ‘Free Elements’”, Kol continued, adding that everybody therefore has to have “free elements”, considering their elements. “That is why ‘Free Khmer [Movement]’ was established”. “We must not object that we join the Free Khmer since Son Ngoc Thanh who is also patriotic, previously considered the Free Khmer as treschorous. So, the problem is the turning from black to white and from white to black. In other words, there was not yet an

armed conflict in Cambodia in 1963, but there were already armed confrontations with use of B-type firearms in Viet Nam. However, we could never fight even though we were equipped with weaponry since we did not have the strength of soldiers. Thus, all we need to do is find a way out by either going to any place or joining Free Khmer soldiers so that it will make it easier for us to ask for foreign weapon aid. People all over the world are ‘Free’. The people of Cambodia as well as the peoples of other countries want to be ‘Free’. So, how about you”? Tuy Pheng replied, “I leave that to you to decide since I rest under your leadership”.

After being admitted into the Free Khmer Movement, Tuy Pheng contacted spies at Chup rubber plantation, intending to carry out Free Khmer acts. He was to spy on activities of the Khmer Rouge until 1966. Later, he knew Tum, Secretary of Region 22, Eastern Zone. Tum is the person that made Tuy Pheng pledge allegiance in front of a CIA flag (American flag) by repeating his words; “1) All of us in the CIA group pledge we will absolutely protect our group as well as the people to the end of our lives, 2) We will keep secrecy to the utmost for our group, 3) we pledge that we will maintain solidarity among the people who fled with us and hide ourselves within the party in order to succeed in fulfilling our common goals as proposed by our group”.

In 1969, Tuy Pheng contacted Tum via letters to other CIA sub-groups and instilled base people to hold up with the Khmer Rouge. This plan was aimed at instilling hatred among the people for the Khmer Rouge. As for building up their strength, he

successfully convinced Sam-ol, Chief of O Reang Ov District, Region 22, to join his group. The way he educated and indoctrinated Sam-ol into the CIA was by saying:

“Our Cambodian country will be at war again, then the authorities will fall into the hands of the Khmer Rouge. And when the authorities fall into the hands of the Khmer Rouge, we will all die because we can never live along with them. Therefore, we have to understand and think for ourselves; each of us must understand and consider building the country by finding and following prosperous paths ahead. If we keep this in mind, surely our society will evolve into something better. If it evolves to become a society similar to the Sihanouk regime, that will be better for all of us. In contrast, if it evolves to be one like the Khmer Rouge, then we will be maltreated, compelled to work endlessly while the results are all collected by and belong to the state. As citizens, we have to think carefully about this matter.

History of anti-CPK activities from the 1970 coup until the 1975 Liberation

Soon after the coup d'état, Tuy Pheng said in a propaganda address to his trusting people, “Do not be happy yet, it is thanks to Lon Nol that the coup was a success. If it were not for Lon Nol, it would have taken years for the Khmer Rouge to achieve victory. Now, you uncles and aunts, please wait and see, remain calm, and don't do anything hasty”. He also added :

“Those who formerly joined the revolution were expelled; for example, some ministers' names were sometimes off and sometimes on. So, who is who is not yet known. The appointed government seems to have no principal objectives. It is heard that this person was appointed Minister, and that person Council Minister. Furthermore, there was no clear picture concerning how the Khmer Rouge organize things. For instance, in appointing ministers and promulgating the establishment of the government, some Sihanouk people are appointed, among which are notably Penn Nouth, Duong Sam-Ol. Thus, we cannot grasp this situation, and cannot keep pace with it as it changes quickly like thunder. Previously, the Khmer Rouge

said they would not take Sihanouk, but now they accept him as President of the [National United] Front. Let all of you uncles and aunts have some thought about it. It is the impasse thing of the Khmer Rouge. In 1970, the plan laid down by Tum included grasping biographies of the people in each village so that they can be rounded up in a single place [Kier Ko, avoid



breaching secrecy], building up combat forces so that we can achieve our desired goals; we should not be indifferent because the situation of the revolution is approaching. Therefore, we have to fervently combat by taking our revolutionary tasks as a bulwark. We have to report to our superiors (Tum) every time we admit someone into membership of our group so that he can precisely review their biography.”

In 1971, Tuy Pheng, at the suggestion of Tum, hid a hundred guns to be used in any future counter-revolutionary activities. The situation inside Cambodia included not only famine, but incursions by the Vietnamese. Tuy Pheng educated people about this issue, noting that “this is not because of Lon Nol, nor the Americans, rather is it because of the Khmer



Rouge that the Vietnamese came and invaded our territory. It was the Khmer Rouge who brought the war to Cambodia. So, the matter of lack of rice and foodstuffs is also due to the Khmer Rouge. We must struggle to rid ourselves of these people”.

In 1972, Tuy Pheng was relocated to Srei Santhor District at Tum’s orders to set up a peace alliance with the aim of fomenting discord in the rear

and disrupt the frontline battles. Given the situation, the sound of firearms was heard day and night in every village, and at the same time, robbery was common. As part of his propaganda, Tuy Pheng would say, “Never think that it was a complete victory for the revolution that has done that much. It is not in fact, as the authorities will later fall into the hand of others. The victory was all attributable to Lon Nol’s partisans.”

In 1973, Tum called Tuy Pheng and their partisans to a meeting at Prek Changkran Office, Lvea Sub-district, Srei Sithor Kandal District, Kampong Cham Province. At the meeting, Tum stated, “In Viet Nam and Lao, they have negotiations, even though Viet Nam was at war with America for years. As for us, we do not have the experience in making war with America, and we do not even have sufficient armaments. However, Angkar always stands resolute and absolute (no negotiation). It will not work if we are not adequately equipped with weapons. This resoluteness and absoluteness has only resulted in the deaths of people, combatants and cadres. So as far as I can see, we will not win due to the magnitude of the war, the lack of weapons, and the fact that we are just a small country. We should not be too absolute, otherwise all the people, not only ourselves, will die. Therefore, to thwart Angkar’s absolute and risky fighting plan, we must organize a program in such a way that Angkar cannot continue with its absolute plan.”

On March 15, 1973, the CIA group staged a plan to oppose the revolution, in which they demanded that Angkar hold a negotiation with Viet Nam in Paris. They also brought up a slogan reading, “Angkar, please hold a cease-fire talk with Viet Nam to stop fighting any longer; all the people will die if fighting goes on.” Then, Tuy Pheng wrote letters inviting fourteen sub-district chiefs to a meeting in order to disseminate Tum’s plan to push Angkar to negotiate. But, the plan failed, because it was driven back by masses of people loyal to the revolution.

In 1974, people started to get more agitated about the peace alliance plan and revolutionary activities were on its impulse. In the meantime, Tuy

Pheng took the opportunity to educate people to oppose the Khmer Rouge revolution by telling them not to care much about the front-line battle, but to instead think only about making a living and having children to do farming. In 1975, Tuy Pheng instigated a split in the solidarity between the army and the authorities, and incited people to hate the army, in an attempt to obstruct the plan of revolution. Tuy Pheng told the people, “not to let our children fight in battles because it is only our children, not Angkar’s, who will get killed.”

History of anti-CPK activities after the 1970 Liberation

After he was asked by Angkar to evacuate the people, Tuy Pheng propagandized to the people: “Evacuation causes pitiless separations, deaths along the streets like animals. It deprives people of shelter and food, husbands and wives and children, parents become separated, and finally the people end up living in the forests. Angkar always boasts of caring for the people, but it sends them into the wilderness to die alone. They evacuate people from everywhere, they do not tell them where to go, and they accept no responsibility.” In their plan to topple the Khmer Rouge revolution in Ponhea Krek District, Region 22, they announced which forces would contact each other before actually engaging in battle. The plan was to be carried out in July, but if it failed, it would have to be carried out in September 1975. But both attempts failed because the forces had not been well organized.

In 1976, the CIA group gathered at another meeting in Tbaung Khmom District, with twenty-three persons present. The plan discussed was as follows:

“We will fight from Svay Rieng to Neak Loeung, using Division 3 under the command of Hak, Sar, Chamreun and So, with help from reinforcements from Region 22 under Chhouk, clearing their way along National Route 1 towards their objective, Phnom Penh. Another source of fighters will be the commands of Chhean and Sun, which will jointly break through from National Route 7 to Route 15, and finally head to Region 22 where they will take control of Arei Khsatt. Perhaps one artillery division will also help in the fight

from the south. At Chroy Changva, there will be a battalion commanded by Sim and Nuon, assisting in breaking through to Phnom Penh. In the Northern Zone, Sreng will be responsible to lead two divisions and ascend up Prek Kdam to join hands with other forces in Phnom Penh.

The plan was scheduled to be carried out on April 17, 1976, during Khmer New Year, but it was a complete failure because Angkar had wind of it and arrested a number of the partisans. However, about eight divisions that remained intact under the general command of Chhean in Region 22 still tried to find ways to overturn the revolutionary authorities.

In early February 1977, Chhean called Tuy Pheng to advise him, “Despite the failure, do not be hopeless, we will attempt it again in 1977, in that we will make a swift, yet intensive attack and achieve a quick victory. In that attack, we will use the navy at Chroy Changva led by Tum and Sim, as our major force. Strategically, we will employ mainly hand grenades, since that will not require many soldiers. We will not fail, and we will win a complete victory on September 30, 1977.” The meeting was attended by representatives only, not all the members. When the appointed day came, the plan failed again, and Tuy Pheng was arrested red-handed.

Tuy Pheng’s “confession” document (J852) is 54 typewritten pages long, and is dated September 21, 1977. It was written under interrogation by group “Ka” which included Comrades “Chhin” and “Von”. Eighty-six names in the document are marked with notes identifying them as Tuy Pheng’s associates. At the end of the document, there is a thumbprint apparently made by Tuy Pheng, and the signatures of the two interrogators. The final confession document was sent to superiors at higher levels after being approved. On the cover of the document, there is a note dated 11-11-77, which reads, “1) This is for you Brother to review; 2) Names mentioned include Comrade Chhean, currently in charge of Region 22; 3) Other names already arrested withdrawn.” Another note dated 12-11-77 reads, “Two copies for Comrade Chan, Eastern Zone.”



During 1997, DC-Cam's "Mapping the Killing Fields" team went to three districts; Mong Russey, Ek Phnom and Banan, in the Province of Battambang. The field research lasted from April 30 to May 3, 1997

Mong Russey District

1. Wat Ta Loas Chass

Wat Ta Loas Chass was used by the Khmer rouge as a prison and execution site. Now it is a place where people collect and store the remains of victims from the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Located in Wat Chass Village, Ta Loas Sub-district, Mong Russey District, Battambang Province, the Wat (or "pagoda") is about eleven kilometers east of the District Office of Mong

Russey District. According to our GPS readings, Wat Ta Loas Chass lies at latitude 12°48'44.98" North, longitude 103°23'13.04" East. Our team arrived on May 2, 1997 at 11:00am (GPS code number 20601/2/3, document R050203A).

We interviewed Huy Kroem, who lived in Ream Keaknakk Village, Ream Keaknakk Sub-district, Mong Russey District, Battambang Province. He told us that most of the victims were city evacuees, and included affluent families, "capitalists", civil servants, "moral offenders", and those caught foraging for food. There were also the children of these offenders, executed along with their guilty parents.





At this place, the Khmer Rouge brought and killed only high-ranking officials, teachers, professors, intellectuals, and doctors, not soldiers. The Khmer Rouge used the pagoda monasteries as their residences, and the Buddha hall as their security and prison facility. Victims were taken to be executed around the wall of the pagoda, just fifty meters from the Buddha hall. The pits and graves are still visible near the wall and the hall. Huy Kroem came to this village after 1979, and saw people unearth pits and search for hidden gold. They excavated hundreds of pits, the largest of which were four meters by four meters. The executions took place between 1976 and 1978. Based on the skulls we saw and the testimony of the interviewee, we conclude that at least 500 to 600 victims were killed at this place, but the total number of victims may be much higher, given that the killing lasted for three years. All the remains were collected by laypersons, monks and officials of the sub-district, and stored in a small raised memorial where a ritual ceremony is performed annually on the “Day of Anger”.

2. Wat Chrey

Wat Chrey is a place where remains of victims from the Democratic Kampuchea regime are stored. Located in Chrey Village, Chrey Sub-district, Mong Russey District, Battambang Province, it is about three kilometers from the Office of Mong Russey District.

According to our GPS readings, Wat Chrey lies at latitude 12°46’50.51” North, and 103°28’20.45” East. Our team arrived on May 2, 1997 at 11:25am (GPS code number 20604, document R050204A).

Hut Kroem informed our team that there was a hospital in Wat Chrey, which the Khmer Rouge used as their killing place. There were no medicines in the hospital. Coconut juice was used as serum for patients. Surgical operations were performed without the use of anesthetics. Those patients the Khmer Rouge cadres determined were faking illness were starved to death, in line with their maxim that “Keeping you is no gain and losing

you is no loss.” The skulls and bones collected are estimated to belong to 100 or 200 victims. Many of the skulls and bones were taken to be stored in a very old hut, where some may have been lost.

3. Wat Dhamaryuth

Wat Dhamaryuth, now called Wat Bophawatei, was also used by the Khmer Rouge as a prison and execution site. Located in Ream Keaknakk Village, Kea Sub-district, Mong Russey District, Battambang Province, it is just one kilometer from the Office of Mong Russey District. According to our GPS readings, Wat Dhamaryuth lies at latitude 12°46’21.06” North, and longitude 103°27’14.59”. Our team arrived on May 2, 1997 at 11:00am (GPS code number 20605/6, document R050204B).

Huy Kroem stated that in the Pol Pot regime, he lived near the Wat, and that he once entered the Wat and saw some Khmer Rouge persons frying human livers for their food. He said they even offered some for him to eat, but he declined. According to his testimony, there was a prison that measured approximately 15 meters wide and 60 meters long, which looked like a long barn. The victims at the prison were taken from all the collectives throughout the district. They had both of their legs shackled to an iron bar and lay in rows on the prison floor. The inmates were taken to the Buddha hall of the pagoda for interrogation, and then taken to be

killed at the front of the hall. Among the victims were those accused of being wealthy, “capitalists”, high-ranking officials and their wives, students from the secondary level or higher, “intellectuals”, and “moral offenders”. Children were also killed, as well as those accused of foraging for food. Executions at Wat Dhamaryuth took place daily from 1976 to 1978. The killing escalated noticeably between November and December 1978 after the Khmer Rouge had built the prison. The killing pits at Wat Dhamaryuth were along the wall of the pagoda and on the right-hand side of the Buddha hall, where many pits are located, each of which measures four meters by four meters, and about one and one-half to two meters deep.

Hak Sophal, former Khmer Rouge mobile work brigade member, lived in a camp near the pagoda in 1975. According to Hak Sophal, the pagoda was open in 1975; but after 1976 access to the pagoda was prohibited. Hak Sophal recalled that Khmer Rouge security persons came one day to borrow a hoe from his mobile work brigade and when he went to get the hoe back, he saw a group of Khmer Rouge persons frying human livers for their food. He also saw some 50 to 60 human livers were left to dry in the sun. He witnessed the Khmer Rouge group walking prisoners out of the Buddha hall and handing them over to the executioners. At the killing site there were pits, each twenty meters wide and long. Each pit was covered with dirt when it was full of human corpses. Blood was to be seen all over the surrounding ground. After killing a person, the executioners cut the chest of the person’s body open with an axe and removed the liver, placing it in a bucket. Then, they fried it in a pan for food. As for female prisoners, they were undressed while the Khmer Rouge enjoyed the spectacle, laughing at her nakedness. Eventually, the Khmer Rouge no longer permitted Hak Sophal to live in the mobile work brigade near the pagoda.

Hak Sophal estimated that there were approximately 60 or 100 bodies in each of the big pits, while each of the small pits contained two or three victims. After 1979, he saw about 300 skulls and a lot of bones scattered all over the place because of excavation by people looking for gold. Most of the remains were then taken to a place beneath Mong bridge. However, the remains were later removed and



apparently destroyed.

Hak Sophal stressed that in the prison at Wat Dhamayuth, the old and young prisoners were detained separately. Young prisoners had both hands tied up, and were clubbed or bayoneted to death. Old prisoners were killed with a strike of the hoe on the head. Hak Sophal estimated that there were about 50-150 victims killed out of the prison.

4. Por 1 Village

Located in Por 1 Village, Kea Sub-district, Mong Russey District, Battambang Province, the site is about 300 meters from the Office of Mong Russey District. According to our GPS readings, the site lies at latitude 12°46'34.04" North, longitude 103°26'53.54" East. Our team arrived on May 2, 1997 at 1:00pm (Code number 20607, Document R050205A). Hak Sophal stated that in this village there was a brick house used to detain victims who had attempted to flee to the liberating Vietnamese forces in 1979. All were killed before the Liberation.

TEN-FOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTY FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CADRES

(Revolutionary Flage, Number 8, July 1978)



(Continued)

In a practical matter, party members of all levels must have the standpoint, attitude, spirit, and natural gifts, and act with regard to safeguarding, building, strengthening, and expanding the party's internal unity and solidarity according to the party's political standpoint, spirit and assignments. Every party member must be unified in a 94-100% solidarity with the party to obtain the people's trust. Each party member must be vigilant to the maximum when dealing with standpoints, attitudes, spirits, natural gifts and acts that are opposed to the party and attack fellow comrades based on private ownership and partisanism.

Our party is small. In spite of the fact that the party is young, our party's internal unity and solidarity is so solid, brilliant and strong that we could combat with American imperialists, Vietnamese expansionists, racists, revisionists, and feudalistic landowners. We beat all these enemies, and were able to proceed ourselves into a stage of socialist revolution fervently and with vigor. We have confidence in our bright victory.

Every party member must increasingly uphold the party's internal solidarity and unity so that we can carry on our tasks to eliminate the Vietnamese invaders and expansionists who want to exterminate our race

from generation to generation. Thus we can eternally safeguard the Cambodian people and the soul of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

4) A Staunch Revolutionary Standpoint in terms of the Party's Assigning, Leadership and Implementing Guidelines

Assigning guidelines is the basis for implementing and realizing the party's policies. Despite the right political guideline, we absolutely cannot successfully implement the party's policies if the implementing guideline is wrong. The assigning guideline serves for the political guideline. The party's fundamental assigning guideline provides that the people of Cambodia must serve the revolution themselves under the sole leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The Communist Party of Kampuchea was appointed by the farmer classes, and Cambodia has prospered within the resistance movement of the Cambodian people's revolution. The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea was also appointed by the Cambodian farmer-peasant classes under the absolute leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The Revolutionary Authorities of Kampuchea were appointed by the Cambodian people under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, etc.

The Vietnamese invaders and expansionist who want to exterminate our race are furious with our party's right and proper assigning standpoint. They tried to grasp opportunities to infiltrate their lackeys into the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They insisted that they wanted to educate and assign our revolutionary army so that they would grasp our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. To serve their interest, they secretly assigned their henchmen in our authorities. They have as a pretext that they would assist the Cambodian revolution assigning this and that according to their standpoint, but in fact they wanted to swallow the Cambodian territory. However, the people and the Communist Party of Kampuchea, have fully realized the Party's assigning guideline, and thus have succeeded in sweeping out the Vietnamese secret scheme to assign and maintain the purity of the party's assignments. This drove the Vietnamese enemy into a most disgraceful defeat.

Meanwhile, all party members must try to build up on the standpoint of democracy and the concentration of the masses' views and guidelines, and the party's firm and proper class guideline. They must try to build up on the leadership standpoint by taking the lead to work in the collective, firm and proper sense. They must build up on the standpoint of high responsibility for completing particular tasks. They must try to build up the leadership standpoint and attitude by constantly working with the masses in the collectives and the revolutionary army. They must have initiatives, creativeness, self-mastery, vigorousness, and steadiness in combating. They must obliterate any of the leadership standpoint and attitude by completing the tasks by means of bureaucracy, bourgeoisie, authoritarianism, militarism, liberalism, individualism, and subjectivism, and by not being responsible for anything.

5) A Staunch Revolutionary Standpoint in terms of the Party's Revolutionary Vigilance, Secrecy and Defense

The party's revolutionary vigilance, secrecy and defense are one of the fundamental elements that can determine the success of the party. This element is the secrecy in all the revolutionary party leaderships. It is the tool for gauging the levels of political self-awareness of the party members. It is the gauge to meter

out the spirit of responsibility the party members have for the party, revolution and people. It is the gauge to meter out the spirit of love they have for the party, revolution and people. The Vietnamese invaders and expansionist who want to exterminate our race assigned their lackeys to burrow themselves into our party and revolution to grasp the secrecy of our party and revolution so that they would be able to destroy the political, spiritual and assigning standpoints and strengths of our revolution. They continued their acts of thievery and espionage to realize our party's secrecy in their continued attempt to destroy our revolutionary forces. However, their shameful acts will always be defeated as they experienced before in their successive failures.

All party members must pay more attention to the building up of the spirit of high revolutionary vigilance, secrecy and defense to the more proper and stronger intensity, in all circumstances, regardless of all kind of acts, tasks, speeches, attitudes and living conditions, both for the short-term and the long-term future inside and outside the party.

Based on their respective standpoints in terms of the party's revolutionary vigilance, secrecy and defense, we can partly judge party members or cadres as good or bad, as having or not having the staunch revolutionary standpoint, and as having or not having the strong combating spirit. Measures must be taken against any of the party members and cadres seen as having no standpoint of the party's systematic revolutionary vigilance, as leaking party's secrecy in a systematic way, and as spoiling the revolutionary forces in a systematic way, if he/she does not change when the party has reeducated them many times.

6) A Staunch Revolutionary Standpoint in terms of the Party's Independence, Mastery and Self-reliance

If we look at the disastrous acts of the liberalism adherents and expansionists in the world, who are opposed to our party, and the way they led their revolution-and especially the Vietnamese invaders and expansionists who wanted to swallow our territory and exterminate our race-we can clearly see that they aimed mainly to overthrow the staunch revolutionary standpoint in terms of our party's independence, mastery, and self-reliance. If the Vietnamese enemies disqualify or overthrow the revolutionary standpoint in

terms of the party's independence, mastery and self-reliance, we will be subservient to them, becoming their dependents, and they will become our masters, supervising the destiny of our party, revolution, nation and people, to their best interests. In a word, they will have a chance to swallow our Cambodian territory and exterminate our race.

Given this real situation, it makes us see even more clearly the appropriateness, the brightness, the cleverness and the promptness of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Obviously, the party set forth the staunch revolutionary standpoint in terms of "the party's self-reliance and self-mastery". This standpoint aims to educate and convince the whole party, people and army to have the spirit of self-mastery and self-reliance, and to energize them so as to magnify the revolutionary movement more fervently and to storm to combat enemies. Making the revolution in the name of our party, our nation and our people, which are independent, and as great warrior descendants and world-class celebrated stone-caving architects, never will any of us easily submit ourselves as subservient to the Vietnamese, allow them to swallow our territory, and exterminate our race. Even though we are empty-handed, we have our great and powerful weapon, the very standpoint of independence, self-mastery and self-reliance. With that weapon, a total of eight million people of Cambodia will stand up, take possession of the enemy weapons, smash their forces, and build up our own, promote our people's democratic revolutionary movement throughout the country in 1968, and finally achieve a victory on April 17, 1975. Our party not only has been through transitions from a society encompassing people and democracy to one embracing socialist revolution, building socialism, maintaining the staunch revolutionary standpoint in terms of the party's independence, self-mastery and self-reliance, and strengthening and expanding it to the national level. But it has also won the world's admiration. Our Communist Party of Kampuchea has been admired for the courage it have to enhance its independence, destroying the Vietnamese invaders and expansionists, and their expansionist liberalism-adherent partisans who wanted to swallow our territory. Kampuchea has been admired for the courage it has to enhance its standpoint of self-reliance and self-mastery,

destroying the Vietnamese enemies who went everywhere begging for alms for their mere survival.

The standpoint of independence, self-reliance and self-mastery is an invincible standpoint, one that will never dry up, considering both human and material forces. It is an undying standpoint, one that will always survive with prosperity, dignity and greatness in a prideful way for both the nation and the world.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea is getting bigger in number, size and strength because it has the staunch revolutionary standpoint of independence, self-mastery and self-reliance, whereas the Vietnamese Party is getting smaller in number, size and strength. The Vietnamese invaded Cambodia because they were the lackeys of the liberalism-adherents and the expansionists, and because they lost their independence. They went everywhere begging for alms for their mere survival because they were not self-reliant. They lost their self-mastery under the order of their liberalism-adherent and expansionist superiors. All members of the Communist Party of Kampuchea must maintain our independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national reputation, by making every effort to build up, strengthen and expand the staunch revolutionary standpoint in terms of the party's independence, self-mastery and self-reliance, so that we will be able to make it more effective from one generation to another. With this standpoint, we will be able to more strongly combat by using weapons to destroy the Vietnamese invaders who wanted to swallow our territory and exterminated our race. Despite all kinds of hardships, we shall remain independent and shall not be subservient to others. Despite all kinds of intricacies, we shall maintain our status quo of self-mastery, and shall not allow others to be our masters. Despite all kinds of shortages, we shall remain self-reliant, and shall not rely on others. Despite all kinds of famines, we shall remain our masters, and shall not allow others to be our masters. In a word, we make our revolution on our own under the sole leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea. Therefore, all party members must have the high standpoint of "independence, self-reliance and self-mastery" in completing any of our party's tasks in all areas and all circumstances.

(Continued)

BIOGRAPHY OF COMRADE KONG



(Continued)

**May-1975 to 1977 Period:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

On May 12, 1975, the Party approved for members of the Overseas Representative Office of the CPK Central Committee, and members of the CPK

National United Front Radio to return to work in the country. I was a member of the travel delegation, responsible for logistics. The Vietnamese created all kinds of difficulties concerning the setting up and the arrangements of travel departure. We had to be out of Region 1 on May 9, 1975. Contemptible traitor Keo Meas, editor-in-chief of “AKI” News, was also supposed to travel with us, but the Vietnamese said there was no plane. In fact, as the Party reported, contemptible traitor Keo Meas was going to South Vietnam for May 9-12, 1975 to contact their treacherous links in the country in an attempt to arrange treacherous schemes to destroy the party’s leaderships machine, revolution and Cambodian people and Cambodian country.

On May 12, we set off on a passenger flight, which could not carry cargo. The delegation headed by Comrade Sou decided for me and two other comrades (Toang and Khoem) to wait and fly with the cargo later. The cargo weighed three tons, comprising documents of the radio and documents of the CPK Representative Museum, other materials, and luggage of the “AKI” News. The next day, May 13, Toang and Chhieng transported the first load while I waited with Khoem at the airport to transport the rest of the cargo, weighing one ton. Over the previous two days, we were waiting in the AKI Headquarters. Hinh, Deputy Chief of CP48, came and told us not to worry,

affirming that there would be flights in a day or two going to Phli Kou. On May 15, 1975, we boarded a helicopter and arrived at Phli Kou where Comrade Khmao, Member of Stung Treng Region, was waiting to receive me. We took off and arrived in Stung Treng on May 17. We reached Office B-20 on May 19. Then, we boarded a small boat to Phnom Penh, arriving on May 27, 1975.

On May 28, 1975, Comrade Hong, Chief of Office B-1, took Comrade Mi, Comrade Nup and myself to serve the Chinese experts at Office K-2. At Office K-2, we completed our task with precision, seeing it as a practical one for developing ourselves. We lived and worked at this office with the traitor Sok Tuonphalla, but I did not notice any of his treacherous activities. We only observed and saw that they seemed to be of extreme attitude in respecting us too much. One day, Sok Tuonphalla told me that he met an American woman named Laura Summer who thought of herself as one opposed to the Cambodian war. She had arrived in Phnom Penh in 1971. But in fact, she was a CIA treacherous link of this contemptible traitor Sok Tuonphalla. The contemptible American woman also told the contemptible traitor Sok Tuonphalla that she knew Comrade Ok Sakun and Contemptible Touch Kham Doeun in Paris. I stayed with Keat Chhon and Contemptible Sao at a house along the riverbank near the Royal Palace from June 16 to July 15, 1975. I was tasked to follow foreign radio news, and report on views of situation every month. Contemptible Tauch Phoeun often visited the house with Keat Chhon, though they would stay for only a short time. Sieng Pose also visited it quite often. Issues raised in the chats mostly concerned such matters as food and tools like fishing nets and boats for catching fish.

On July 15, 1975, we moved out to live at the

current Office B-1. We had the same tasks, though living in a new place. Then, we received instructions to arrange for a delegation to pay a state visit to China and to attend a conference for foreign ministers from non-aligned countries in Lima, Peru. I was also one of the delegation leaving in August 1975 in the capacity of assistant. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed gradually under the direct leadership of our party, and adhered firmly to the class guidelines and the standpoint of increasing in number and rank by taking the spiritual and political factors as the main focus and the technical factor as a subsidiary one.

During the period of working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon after the liberation until present days, the Party has continued to be sympathetic and merciful with me. The Party has made great effort to educate and build me up every day in terms of the party's strategic guideline in its pursuit of making the socialist revolution and building socialism. The Party has made great efforts to educate and build me up every day in terms of the party's class guidelines, the standpoint of having pride for and trust in the party's leadership, the standpoint of being the masters of our nation and revolution. The Party educated me to constantly adhere to the standpoint of independence and self-mastery. It educated me about the essence of the spiritual and political standpoints in all matters, about the party's class guideline, about the party's foreign policy guideline, and about the need to build up myself in terms of the party's proletarian class standpoint, the party's revolutionary world views, and the party's communist world views. After being accepted into the party, especially after the liberation, politically I have totally adhered to the party's concepts for not using currency, not having market and not having salary, for city evacuation, for people collectivization. I have totally adhered to the party's concepts for continuing to make socialist revolution and build up socialism out of the socialist authorities and revolution, for building up socialism out of the farmer and peasant authorities and revolution. I have totally adhered to the party's collectivization

principle, the party's political guidelines and the party's guidelines for defending and building the country.

I was very much excited to have returned to my home country since I would be able to weld myself once again to my beloved motherland and serve for the party and the people. I felt delighted and utterly clear with my task, particularly when I was in Phnom Penh shortly, serving guests at Office K-2. Gradually afterwards, in performing my tasks, I kept on trying to complete them to the furthest extent of my self-consciousness, knowledge and ability.

The Party has brought me back, welding and fastening me to the Cambodian country and the revolution once again. The party has brought to me a new life with reputation and happiness in the name of one of the party members and revolutionists. I cannot forget in my whole life all the great merits of the party and brothers with the party's leadership role. These are all my most sincere dedication and best wishes. However, through my actual work performance, especially though the continued tasks of eliminating enemies such as CIA, KGB and Vietnamese agents from our ranks, our ministries and our country, I have seen a number of weaknesses according to the far extent of my self-consciousness, knowledge and ability as follows:

1. Not having had the party's firm proletarian standpoint. Still having the proletarian element as an intellectual. Having had the suppressing element as being concerned with my social status and power and as being overjoyed with my position. Not having had the firm standpoint of struggle and perseverance when faced with difficulties, most easily becoming pessimistic and losing the fervent activities. In contrast, having been more vigorous and combative when there was a victory or easy time.

2. Not having had the firm revolutionary world views yet. But having had the oppressive, capitalist, feudalistic and revisionist views in times of hardships with the twists and turns of situation. Particularly, not having been constantly strong and profoundly

interested in such a matter that living is to serve for one ideology, that is to say, to make the revolution, and for what and whom. I have not been mindful in both difficult and easy times of the ideology that led me to join the revolution. I have not been mindful of the ideology as constantly instilled by the party that making the revolution is to liberate the country from slavery, to develop it and to free the poor farmers and peasants and let them be the masters of the country and their own destiny.

3. I still have not washed myself clear of the matter of intellectual property and of technical skills. As a consequence, I sometimes paid less attention to the spiritual and political elements. Obviously, I have not fully perceived the mass views and guidelines, especially the party's class guideline yet. Now as I started to understand, I agree with the party on this matter, but will have to go over the matter again according to real practices.

4. These standpoints were loyal to the party. In general, I have not had any trick to play with the party, the revolution and the people. In the practical sense, however, without having the full perception of our party's guidelines but some individualistic ideas, I have not reflected upon the sincere standpoints I have for the party. I have not acted fervently and decisively enough to protect the party's guideline and implement it to a better and more steady level. I was more like an observer.

5. I have not given myself a try in a heated matter of life and death. I have not tempered myself repeatedly, thoroughly and to most details yet. Therefore, I have not had the full confidence in myself. I have not had enough experience building up myself as well as building up the forces of the party and of the revolution.

My approaches to solving major weaknesses

1. Make greatest effort to strengthen and expand the loyal standpoint with the party by trying to study and consider the party's guidelines and to best implement them in my daily tasks.

2. Make greatest effort to build up, strengthen

and expand the party's proletarian class standpoint by trying to build up myself to become a worker of the party.

3. Build up, strengthen and expand myself in terms of the party's revolutionary worldviews and especially the standpoint of "making the revolution for what and for whom".

4. Learn from the active and worthwhile activities of the people, workers, peasants, collectives, and our revolutionary army. Learn particularly from the real lives of our wonderful, bright and prosperous revolutionists, from the limitless sacrifices of our brothers with leadership role, whom I have known, loved and respected ever since the first day.

I wrote this biography based on the level of my self-consciousness, ability and loyalty spirit I have for the party since the party has appealed for continued sweeping of underground CIA, KGB enemies and the Vietnamese who wanted to swallow our territory. I understand that with my current class standpoint and my current self-consciousness level, I have not been aware to the fullest of my weaknesses yet, if compared to the party's requests and the current great radiant mass movement.

In conclusion, as far as my revolutionary life is concerned, I see that it is very complicated with many twists and turns, and I still have enemy influences in my thinking and attitude. In times of hardship, like for instance when I was on the brink of a cliff or was about to fall into the destruction with liberalism and family matters, the party was there rescuing me from the fatal danger. It helps me out of the despicable path I was taking that led me to be a betrayer to the country and revolution. So, that I have lived my revolutionary life with happiness as a revolutionist and a communist, due to the party's always sparing me in so many ways. In returning my gratitude to the party, I have nothing but must pledge to the following: "Sacrifice everything for the sake of the party, the revolution and the class".

(End)

Phnom Penh, Friday, June 17, 1977

SECRET TWO-WAY RADIO CONTACT

By Youk Chhang

◆◆◆ **Dear respected Brother 89:** 1) On 4 February, [our] comrades at Pring Island fired at a Thais fishing boat under sail about five kilometers west of the island. Then, the boat escaped west and disappeared. 2) At 6pm of 5 February, the State Fishery brought Thai boat(s) in Rong Island, but brought the boat(s) out without yet knowing the reason. 3) At 4:25 on 5 February, brothers [our comrades] at Seh Island saw two TA and one BE [helicopters] coming out of Southern Tral Island, going west and returning to the island from the north. Then, at 6:15 they heard sparkling blast of three rounds of 105[mm] falling on the island. Afterwards, at 15 minutes to 7, another two BEs came to join the previous [three] and launched two rounds of 12.7[mm] guns on the island. 6 February, Mot [report's name]. Copies sent to Brother 87, Brother 89, Brother, for documentation. **(Excerpt**

from File D02BBK)

◆◆◆ **Division 164, Political Section, Report on 12-8-77 “via secret two-way radio line”:** 1) Yesterday on 11-7-77, we went out one a patrol and captured two boats, one with a 50 horsepower engine and the other with a 175 horsepower engine. The 175 horsepower boat, carrying five people, all unarmed, was caught about two kilometers from Koh Kong. When we interrogated the captives, they said they knew a lot about the White Khmer in Thailand. They also knew about the assigning partisans who entered our country; they even knew their names. Now the five have been brought to Kampong Som. We are further interrogating them. There is one Khmer national among them. 15 rafts were found on the 175 horsepower boat. But, according to the phone correspondence, there was only one raft. 2) Yesterday,



there was a 175 horsepower boat arriving at Poy Av Yeay Sen and simultaneously an aircraft of unknown make was flying over the boat at an altitude of 2-3 kilometers.

3) Today at 2pm, there was a plane flying over Kampong Som from West to East at an altitude of 12-13 kilometers. Received at 7:27pm on 12-8-77, Mot. To Angkar: 1) we have [our people] ask them to tell us of their internal links. 2) [ask them to tell us] how they accessed [Cambodia]. 3) situation of the treacherous links at the border. Khieu [Reporter's name], 3-8 [date]

(Excerpt from File 13bbk)

◆◆◆ Division 164, Political Section, Secret Two-way Radio Correspondence, Report: 1) The death and injury toll of the Vietnamese partisans during our rounds of fire from March 27-30, 1978 is 120 persons; and we also captured five 10 to 37 horsepower boats, a number of weapons and other materials. 2) There was a delay in the freeing of the Thais supposed to be freed because some names of the persons supposed to come and take them back are different from the names we have, though only the last names, not the entirety, are different. As for correspondence for further suggestions, we could not make it because according to the telegram at Comrade Launh's end the two-way radios did not work well. Another thing was that the message was transmitted very slowly and some parts of it were lost. This problem caused the handing over to be deferred until 20:00 pm on March 31, 1978. Among the people who came to receive the Thais were Chief of Khlang Yai and a rescue medical worker. They donated three boxes of cigarettes and a balm to our comrades. 3) The result of the rehearsal trial shooting of propellant mines on March 1, 1978: We started shooting at 8[am] at designated targets. A mine was shot out of the cannon into the water as deep as 25 meters, then went up toward our targeted direction and level. We had to fire two shots. The two shots fired were caught back in a designated container with success and without major problem. We are now



trying to test technically and politically. On April 4, 1978 we made another test, taking a ship as a target for the trial attack. The number of weapons requested include 20 cannons 12.8mm, 40 Chinese [Mitrailleurs] guns, and 20 DK57 cannons. Twenty 22- to 100-horse-powered boats are also needed on the island; the small boats are used for patrolling, while the big ones for intervention when the small boats happen to be engaging in a fight in the front. [We have] to cut back some oil and diesel and spare it for use to operate more patrol boats; in doing so we will not ask for more petrol. April 1, 1978, Mot. Copies sent to Uncle, Uncle Nuon, Brother Van, and for documentation. (Excerpt from File 15bbk)

◆◆◆ Division 164, Political Section, Secret two-way radio correspondence dated March 20, 1978, to respected Brother 89: Sea situation: 1) At Kep, at 8pm on March 19, 1978 we fired at a Vietnamese 22 horsepower boat under way about one kilometer south of Kyang island. There was no damage on our side. 2) On Wai Island, between the night of March 19, 1978 until 4am of the next day, a Thai canoe was seen on sail about 3 kilometers Northwest of the old Wai Island. We chased it and finally captured it by 5am. The 250 horsepower canoe was carrying 21 persons. 3) On Tang Island, at 2:30[am] on March 20, 1978, our 800 horsepower canoes were out on patrol and arrested two canoes containing 75 Vietnamese, young, old, male and female people. But, after we tied them

up, the smaller canoe did not maintain balance, causing two of the Vietnamese to fall and disappear in the water. The rest were already on shore. March 20, 1978 [report date], Mot [reporter's name]. **(Excerpt from File 15bbk).**

◆◆◆ **Division 164, Political Section, Secret two-way radio correspondence dated April 4, 1978, to respected Brother 89:** 1) Situation on April 3, 1978: There were sounds of 105mm rounds over the Trol Island. Besides this, there was nothing strange concerning situations on the Vietnamese and Thai sides. 2) [The result of] the rehearsal trial shooting of propellant mines on April 4, 1978: Situation regarding the preparations of mines and ships, practically we have gained some experience from the test. We started to fire at 8am. The mine shot landed well on a target ship. We made two shots. But there was some problem when the mines were pulled back from the water. Before the shooting, we had not tied up the head of one of the mines properly. Instead, we roped the body part of the mine, which made it submerge into the water. As a consequence, the mine made its way to hit a TA ship, whose front part of the ship was attached to a crane, which was used as tool in shooting test. The mine shot left an indent of the size of a human palm on the part of the ship holding the propeller. However, the whole part of the ship holding the machinery remained undamaged. As we saw it, the part affected could not be used any longer. Meanwhile, two of our comrades got injured; one was serious and the other was mild. The mine also wounded one of our Chinese comrades as while it was hooked out of the water, the mine touched the ship with force. We sent the wounded Chinese comrade to Hospital P17 last night. Examining the cause, we found out that there were big waves while the mines were hooked out of the water. Before shooting, there were not big waves. Copies sent to Uncle, Uncle Nuon, Brother Van, Brother Vorn, Office; April 4, 1977, Mot [reporter's name] **(Excerpt from File 15bbk)**

◆◆◆ **Division 164, Political Section, Telegram via secret two-way radio correspondence dated July 13, 1977, to respected and beloved Brother Mot:** 1) Nothing remarkable has been observed concerning the situation at O'Chheu Teal

and Rong Sanloem Island. But, at Ream where I went and worked with our brothers, there have been a number of problems, such as the following. A comrade named Chan, of transport section T918 scared his colleagues by telling them to pack up all the kits dry or wet immediately in order to go and meet Comrade Roeun at O'Chheu Teal. And then, he told them not to take any thing with them as that was a very urgent thing that needed to be done. That situation worried the few of people of the transport section who lived there together. Concerning this matter, when asked, Comrade Chan replied that he did not mean what he said, and that he was just kidding. However, I discussed this matter with Comrades Khatt, Chhen and Mao, and we have already grasped the matter. 2) Technical study of a guard ship: I went to meet Comrade Brother Han in person, and he told me that everything was set for the ship since July 17, 1977. It definitely could be used to serve the party's interest. The technical study of the guard ship is under way as usual without any problem. Please brother(s) be informed of the above report. Received at 4:45[pm], on July 14, 1977. Best wishes for good health to leaders, July 13, 1977, Moeun [reporter's name]. Copies sent to Brother 89, Office and for documentation. **(Excerpt from File 9bbk)**

◆◆◆ **Division 164, Political Section, Telegram via secret two-way radio correspondence dated July 13, 1977, to respected Brother Mot:** Concerning the matter of Chinese [experts] that joined us in examining and fixing problems with the machinery and radar of Ship 02, it has not been finished yet. The Chinese requested to take all the devices to Ream so that 1) it will be easy for the people of the machinery section to contact a lath section. 2) It will be easy for the radar section to contact the Chinese of the fishing section for help. Therefore, we are seeking your advice as how to deal with this. Received at 4:45[pm], on July 13, 1977. Best wishes for good health; July 14, 1977, Moeun [reporter's name]. Copies sent to Brother 89, Brother Mot, Office, and for documentation. **(Excerpt from File 9bbk)**

All these documents are excerpted telegrams, over one hundred pages of which have been translated into English.



Photo: Hong Hun, female combatant arrested October 1976.

Voices from S-21

Chapter Three: Choosing the Enemies

By David Chandler

(Continued)

Choosing the Enemies

S-21 was a total institution whose mission was to locate, question, and destroy the enemies of the Party Center. Given its prisoner intake and the number of inmates who were executed by the facility, S-21 was probably the most efficient institution in the country. Considering the emphasis the Party Center placed on protecting itself from “enemies,” it was also one of the most important.

The theory of the regime posited the existence of enemies, and the search for them was a crucial ingredient of its practice. Because Cambodia’s leaders subscribed to the Maoist doctrine of permanent

revolution, counterrevolutionary “enemies” were continuously created, and purges (the Cambodian compound verb, *boh somat*, translates as “sweep and clean”) were continuously needed to assure the safety of the Party Center and to maintain the revolution’s purity and momentum. Enemies were thought to be everywhere. “Sweeping and cleaning” them could never stop. Building and defending the country went hand in hand. As a CPK motto put it, “One hand is for production, the other for beating the enemy.”

To Pol Pot and his associates, friends and enemies posed a “life-and-death contradiction” (*tumnoas slap ruos*). In making this distinction, Pol Pot drew on Mao Zedong’s 1957 speech “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” in which Mao had classified “the problem of eliminating counterrevolutionaries” as an example of “the first type of contradiction” (i.e., between the enemy and ourselves).

Twenty years later, in a five-hour speech announcing the existence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), Pol Pot said:

Within the new Kampuchean society there exist such life-and-death contradictions as enemies who belong to various spy networks working for the imperialists, and international reactionaries are still planted among us to carry out subversive activities against our revolution...These elements are small in number, only 1 or 2 percent of the population.

From Pol Pot’s perspective, in other words, 140,000 Cambodians at most (2 percent of an estimated seven million people) were real or potential enemies of the regime. “Contradictions with these elements,” he continued, “must be dealt with the same way we deal with any enemy.” These measures included “winning over” and “educating” some of the enemies and “neutralizing” others.

Finally, Pol Pot proposed to “isolate and eradicate only the smallest number of elements, those who determinedly oppose their own nation, people, and revolution.” As he spoke, several thousand people had already been questioned, tortured, and put to death at S-21.

DK divided its enemies, as Stalin and Mao had done, into those outside and those within the country. External enemies included powers opposed to

socialism, led by the United States, and “revisionists” or “hegemonists” like the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and their allies. Pol Pot and his colleagues frequently suggested that the destruction of Cambodia was so important to these enemies that they had set aside their antagonisms to achieve it. In the same vein, a document prepared at S-21 in March 1976 fantasized that recently deposed South Vietnamese and Communist Vietnamese forces were happily cooperating with each other in Vietnam with a view to overthrowing DK, coordinating their effort with those of Thailand and the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Six months later another S-21 document, drawing on information from former Lon Nol soldiers who had undergone training in the United States, described SEATO (the South East Asia Treaty Organization)-whose principle policy objective was to destroy DK-as having Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and “the Viet Cong” as its members. In 1978 Nuon Chea, the second-ranking official in the Party Center, told a sympathetic Danish visitor that “It is widely known that the USA planned to seize power from us six months after liberation. The plan involved joint action on the part of the USA, the KGB and Vietnam. There was to be a combined struggle from inside and outside. But we smashed the plan.”

External enemies were relatively easy to identify. They could be held in check by vigilant defense and by Cambodia’s powerful friends. “China can help us scare our enemies,” Pol Pot told CPK cadres in 1977.



Pol Pot

“Having friends like the Chinese is a good thing.

Internal opponents of the regime, on the other hand, were hard to locate and considered more dangerous. Those operating in the open posed no special problems. They included the “new” or “April 17” people evacuated from the towns in 1975 and men and women from the “old society” whose class origins or biographies were inimical to the revolution. After April 1975, tens of thousands of these people were kept under informal surveillance in the countryside or were held in “education halls” (sala oprum), indistinguishable from prisons, where conditions were harsh and thousands died.

Internal Enemies

What concerned the Party Center more than these remnants of the past were those designated as “hidden enemies burrowing from within” (khmang bonkop si rong phtai knong). Although these men and women had joined the revolution, they were now working to betray it. In May 1975 Nuon Chea attacked such enemies at length when he spoke to Party cadres. A few months later, an editorial in *Tung Padevat* claimed that internal enemies had “tried to make the revolution change its colors.” In 1978, an editorial in the journal railed against people who were able to carry the signboard (plaque) “Revolution” temporarily, masquerade as revolutionaries, burrow away, build up their treasonous forces inside our revolutionary ranks and damage our revolution at a time when our revolution wasn’t strong, hot or battlehardened, when it still took the form of a secret network or when it was cut off from the masses. But at the moment when the revolutionary mass movement sprang out seethingly, resplendent with power, when the secret networks awoke, at that point the buried enemies boring from within no longer had a place to hide, no matter how important they were. Every single one of their silent, shielded, masked activities aimed at destroying the revolution could be seen clearly by the revolutionary masses and could be smashed at once.

Toward the end of the regime, talking to the Danes, Nuon Chea remarked in passing that “we are not worried about...external, military aggression. We worry most of all about the enemy inside.”

The hunt for internal enemies was deeper, more complex, and more relentless than merely finding and “smashing” treacherous individuals.

Insidious “bourgeois” ideas, preferences, and attitude were thought to be buried in everybody’s consciousness—an idea that Pol Pot inherited from Stalin and Mao. In 1977 Pol Pot declared, “We all carry vestiges of our old class character, deep-rooted for generations.” These had to be destroyed before socialism could be achieved. A year earlier, a writer in Tung Padevat had said:

We must rid each Party member, each cadres of everything that is of the oppressor class, of private property, stance, view, sentiment, custom, culture which exists in ourselves, no matter how much or how little.

In “sweeping clean” Cambodia of its traitors and all citizens of their potentially “bourgeois” thinking, santabal’s work had to be wide-ranking, open-ended, and merciless. As a DK adage put it, “It is better to arrest ten people by mistake than to let one guilty person go free.”

Once they were identified, arrested, and brought to S-21, suspects of the Party Center became “guilty people”—guilty because they had been arrested rather than arrested because they were guilty. Dehumanization of the prisoners was immediate and total. Just as Lon Nol had seen his opponents as nonbelievers or thmil (i.e., “Tamils”), and just as the U.S. Congress until recently regarded indigenous Communists as “un-American,” Pol Pot and his colleagues thought of Cambodia’s internal enemies as intrinsically foreign and impure. Internal enemies could wreak enormous damage. In his “Last Plan,” Duch compared their strategy to “the way that weevils bore into wood” or “the way oil permeates” and likened them to “worms” (dongkeau) or “germs” (merok) that had come from the CIA, Vietnam, and so on to attack healthy, revolutionary people.

Once infected, anyone could infect others. Counterrevolution, unless it was nipped in the bud, could become an epidemic. In December 1976 Pol Pot drew on this quasi-medical imagery in a passionate address to CPK cadres. “There is sickness in the Party,” he said:

We can not locate it precisely. The sickness must emerge to be examined. Because the heat of the People’s revolution and the democratic revolution were insufficient at the level of people’s struggle and class

struggle.....we search for germs within the Party without success. In the Party, the army, and among the people we can locate the ugly germs. They will be pushed out by the true nature of the socialist revolution.

Like many of Pol Pot’s statements, this one was a volatile mixture of hubris, paranoia, and wishful thinking. It failed to define the “true nature” of the revolution, explain how the sickness might “emerge,” or, most important, demonstrate any proof that the Party had “treacherous, secret elements” buried inside it. Instead, the speech referred vaguely to “observations over the last ten years.”

The 1975 Purges

The purges conducted by the Party Center and enacted at S-21 can be broken into two broad phases. The first lasted from September 1975 until September 1976. The second extended until the collapse of DK. Most of those targeted in the first wave of purges were civilian and military officials affiliated with the defunct Lon Nol regime. In the back-wash of victory, thousands of these people were rounded up and killed. In Vietnam, by contrast, such people were normally sent off to “reeducation” camps; many died, but tens of thousands eventually emerged. The 1975 killings in DK, like reeducation in Vietnam, were ordered from the top. According to Cho Chhan’s 1977 confession, after the “liberation of the entire country,” the Organization put forth a policy of successively exterminating officers, starting from the generals and working down through to the lieutenants, as well as government security agents, policemen, military police personnel and reactionary civil servants.

These killings extended the civil war and reflected its brutality. Historical precedents can be found in the Soviet Union after 1917, in China in 1949-1950, and in Vietnam after 1954. Another parallel, pointed out in 1979 by Noam Chomsky and Edward Hermann, might be the “purification” (epuration) of suspected collaborators and “enemy agents” that followed the Allied victory in France in 1944-1954. In both France and Cambodia, popular anger, the sudden empowerment of former victim, and the absence of judicial safeguards combined to encourage a range of extrajudicial behavior that included widespread killings.

(Continued)

DESTRUCTION OF FAMILY FOUNDATION IN KAMPUCHEA

By Siv Leng Chhor

When Democratic Kampuchea took power and led the country in 1975, the objectives of the leaders of the regime were to achieve a “pure” utopian communist revolution through their plans of increased agricultural production, with which they led the country to changes in social order to such a state of complete disparity from human conditions.

To achieve their plans, the Khmer Rouge desperately needed an “absolute sacrifice” by the people. Before the regime started to implement the “pure” kind of utopian communist revolution, Cambodian people had maintained very close family ties, from which they received their sense of identity. Nonetheless, the Khmer Rouge did not need such relationships by “family” line and identity; instead they determined to replace them with a new loyalty to “Angkar”, a non-person, soul form of the Khmer Rouge organization.

The Khmer Rouge used three methods in order to separate family members from each other and to split and destroy the family structure: 1) evacuation; 2) execution; and 3) collectivization of everything in daily life.

Evacuation

Almost of all of the families living in cities were separated in an inhumane evacuation from all urban centers, the major example of which was the evacuation of Phnom Penh that commenced on April 17, 1975. Of the people interviewed, 93% replied that their families had been evacuated from one place to another. 33% said their family members were separated because of the evacuation. Worse still, many families died from starvation and diseases resulting from the evacuation. In the case of Narom, for instance, he lost his father. He recalled that, “When my family was evacuated from the city of Phnom Penh, my parents and I were separated. My parents took me to stay in the care of my aunt because they feared for my safety, due to the fact that my family was close to the Lon Nol regime. When the

Khmer Rouge entered the city, my siblings were separated from my parents. My siblings and I were evacuated to my father’s home village. I told my parents to go there, and that we would wait for them. Then, they went after us to the village. Unfortunately, on the way, the Khmer Rouge took my father to be killed because they knew his real profession in the previous regime. They knew my father was a capitalist. It was from that time that I lost my father. I have never seen him again”. The evacuation had brought about a state of complete turmoil, destroying the basic family foundation structure indispensable for people in our society.

Execution

Most of the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime died from mass executions and starvation. Out of the people interviewed, 48% of the respondents said at least one or more of their relatives were killed during the Khmer Rouge regime. 24% of the respondents said their relatives died due to starvation and lack of food. Rattan, who lost a father and a younger brother, recalled that, “When we were in Svay Rieng, the Khmer Rouge took my father to be killed, and two months later they took my younger brother to be killed. I have another brother who was imprisoned by the Khmer Rouge. One night at 12 o’clock, he escaped from the prison to see my mother at home. My mother cooked some rice for him to eat. He told my mother how harshly he was treated in the prison. He had to work very hard. Next day, at three o’clock in the morning, when he returned to the prison, the Khmer Rouge arrested and tortured him. They accused him of escaping to his mother’s home. As my brother was taken away for a long time, my mother secretly cooked potatoes and had my younger sister and me carry them to him to eat. My sister and I went with the cooked potatoes my mother put in an empty milk can to meet him. However, the Khmer Rouge did not allow my sister to give the potatoes to my brother because he had been clubbed and severely injured by the prison guards. They took the

can from my sister and ate all the potatoes. Two days later, they took my brother to be executed. They killed my brother before my father died. My father died from lack of food and diseases. The Khmer Rouge never gave him any food to eat. They knew that my brother used to hold a high-ranking position in the previous regime”.

Collectivization of everything

Other than the separation of people by means of evacuation and execution, the Khmer Rouge split family members through collectivization of living and working. This is the third measure they took to cut off the familial and marital relationships between parents and children, husband and wife, and among siblings, etc.

All families were split into three categories according to sex, age and work status. The first category consisted of people 50 years old or more, and was subdivided into two groups according sex. The second category was mobile brigades of people ranging in age from 14 to 50. Women worked in female brigades, while men worked in male brigades. The third category was children of 13 or below. Boys worked in boy units, and girls worked in girl units. A woman named Chey who was widowed and lost all her children under the Khmer Regime recalled that, “All my children died. They went to different units, and we lived separately.

We could hardly meet each other. After some times, my daughter came to visit me. I got together with my daughter, and I asked her if she was allowed to come to meet me here. She said, “No, Mum, I did not tell them at all”. Then, I told her to go back. While I was saying this to my daughter, coincidentally a Khmer Rouge cadre arrived and started to yell at my daughter saying, “See! You walk freely!”. In fact, my daughter came to see me, telling me that she wanted to have a traditional coin treatment as she did not feel well, and that she would return after the treatment”. It was very sad when she returned, the Khmer Rouge had her do much hard labor. If she failed to complete it in a timely manner, they would starve her. Not only did the Khmer Rouge destroy family line and structure through the above methods, they also continued to destroy it by other means such as daily attacking family livelihood and belongings, enforcing collective eating, arranging forced marriages, and forbidding religious beliefs and practices. All of this was in their attempt to cut off the familial bonds and tradition, and force people to love “Angkar” only. Instead, with the Khmer Rouge enforcement and practice of their policy toward family, the familial bonds and the emotional sensations toward family have grown even closer and more profound. The policy they established that required people’s “absolute

sacrifices” for the sake of Angkar by means of threat, force and execution could not allow the Democratic Kampuchea regime to attain their ends. In all circumstances, family members struggled to encounter and deal with the Khmer Rouge policy toward family by quiet, secret, yet dauntless approaches. Even though they had realized the fatal danger would lie ahead and whatever the matter would be, they always rested determined and sincere, and always maintained the love toward their families.



The Survivor

CASE LAW

By Elizabeth van Schaack

The International Court of Justice has not ruled on any cases of torture or CIDT.


The Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) has heard many individual charges of violations of Article 7, which prohibits torture and CIDT; but its holdings do not always distinguish the two crimes, in accordance with its view that it not useful “to draw sharp distinctions between the various prohibited forms of treatment of punishment.” In addition, the Committee has consistently considered charges of torture and CIDT in conjunction with Article 10 (1), which requires that prisoners be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. The Committee clearly sees some overlap

between Articles 7 and 10(1) with respect to inhuman treatment; when it finds that a State party failed to treat a prisoner “with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,” it sometimes calls this a violation of Articles 7 and 10(1), and at other times a violation of 10(1) only. It is important to note, also, that the Committee does not usually single out individual acts as CIDT, but bases its judgment on the complete collection of circumstances before it.

1. Alberto Grille Motta v. Uruguay (1980)

Petitioner, a Uruguayan national, claimed that on 7 February 1976 he was arrested in Montevideo at the home of a friend and brought to Department 5 of the National Directorate of Information and Intelligence. Here, he was interrogated and induced to admit that he held an important position in the Communist party and to identify fellow detainees as members of the Communist Youth. For approximately 50 days after his arrest, the petitioner claimed that he and his fellow detainees were tortured severely. The acts he described included but were not confined to:

Instruments used for torture



- The Committee held the State's refutation to be inadequate, and further noted that Uruguay did not show the allegations had been duly investigated. It

◆ During the day and night, she could hear the cries of other detainees being tortured.

September 27, 1976
Pon

◆ During interrogation she was threatened with “more effective ways than conventional torture to make her talk.”

◆ She was kept sitting on a mattress, blindfolded, and not allowed to move for many days.

◆ She was allowed to take a bath every 10 or 15 days.

The State party refuted these allegations in general terms, but provided no evidence that they had been investigated. The Human Rights Committee accordingly found that Uruguay had violated Articles 7 and 10(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because of its inhuman and degrading treatment of the petitioner. The Committee accordingly expressed its view that Uruguay was under an obligation to furnish the petitioner with effective remedies, including compensation, for the violations she suffered after 23 March 1976, when Uruguay became bound by the Covenant.

3. Dave Marais, Jr. V. Madagascar (1983)

Petitioner, a South African national, was a passenger on an airplane forced to make an emergency landing in Madagascar on 18 January 1977. The pilot, petitioner, and another passenger were tried and convicted of overflying Malagasy territory and sentenced to a fine and five years in prison. While serving his sentence, petitioner escaped; he was apprehended, tried for prison-breaking, and sentenced to an additional two years' imprisonment. From December 1979, he was subjected to over two years of unrelieved solitary confinement in a basement cell measuring 2m x 1m.

The Human Rights Committee found Madagascar to be in violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political rights because of the inhuman conditions in which the petitioner was held. The Committee expressed its view that Madagascar was under an obligation to provide effective remedies to the victim for the violations and to take measures against similar violations in the future.

4. Elena Beatriz Vasilskis v. Uruguay

Petitioner was arrested on 4 June 1972 on the charge of membership in a clandestine political group engaged in armed struggle. Her case was submitted to the military courts in September of that year. Judgment was pronounced on 14 December 1977, and petitioner was sentenced to 28 years of rigorous imprisonment

and 9 to 12 years of precautionary detention. On appeal in May 1980, her sentence was raised to 30 years imprisonment and 5 to 10 additional years of precautionary detention. The following conditions of imprisonment were alleged by the petitioner:

◆ Petitioner occupied a cell with 14 other prisoners.

◆ Failure of a prisoner to perform her tasks was punished by up to three months solitary confinement and by prohibition of visits, denial of cigarettes, etc.

◆ Visits were permitted every 15 days and lasted half an hour. Only close relatives were allowed to visit.

◆ Prisoners were severely punished for discussing prison conditions with relatives and for speaking with each inmates at certain times.

◆ Prison diet was unbalanced and deficient in protein and vitamins.

◆ Medicines sent to her were never delivered.

◆ Prisoners were allowed almost no exercise.

◆ Prisoners were forced to take cold baths in the dead of winter.

◆ There was a total absence of natural light in the cells.

The State denied these allegations in general, but provided no detailed description of what was in its view the true state of affairs; nor did it provide evidence that these allegations had been investigated. The Committee therefore found Uruguay to have violated Articles 7 and 10(1) on the grounds that the petitioner “had not been treated in prison with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.” The Committee expressed its view that the State party was under an obligation to provide effective remedies to Elena Beatriz Vasilskis and, in particular, to provide her with proper treatment as laid down in Article 10 of the covenant; to provide proper medical care; to transmit a copy of the Committee's views to her; and to ensure that similar violations did not occur in the future.

Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The following decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have helped to delimit the two categories of violations.

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND THE PROBLEM OF IMPUNITY IN CAMBODIA: THE KHMER ROUGE'S CASE

By Youk Chhang

Between 1975 and 1979, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), more commonly known as Cambodia's "Khmer Rouge", carried out one of the worst episodes of mass slaughter in the twentieth century. Some two million people, approximately one quarter of the entire population, lost their lives in less than four years. Virtually every legal scholar who has examined the case of the Khmer Rouge has concluded that the leaders of that organization are vulnerable to legal prosecution on charges of war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity.

Detailed research on the issue of Khmer Rouge culpability has been carried out for more than four years at the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) in cooperation with Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP), Australia's University of New South Wales (UNSW), School of Information, Library, and Archive Studies (SILAS), Cambodia's Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and other institutions around the globe.

With assistance from lawyers, leading Khmer Rouge experts and scholars, we have made great strides in improving our understanding of what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime.

One of our most important findings has been to unravel the mystery of the mechanism through which the Khmer Rouge took so many lives. In brief, the leadership of the Khmer Rouge established a nationwide network of extermination centers through which they liquidated real and imagined enemies of the communist party at an average rate of 5,200 per week, for each and every week of the three years, eight months and twenty days of the regime. Another million people died of aggravated neglect through starvation, disease and overwork. From their own bureaucratic records, it is clear that the entire leadership of the Khmer Rouge was complicit in this historic crime.

Yet more than twenty years after their ouster

from power, the entire surviving senior leadership of the Khmer Rouge continues to enjoy impunity for their role in the Cambodian genocide. There are many reasons for the persistence of impunity in Cambodia, but lack of efforts to bring the accused to justice is not one of these reasons.

1. There have been efforts by the Cambodian government to prosecute Khmer Rouge regime.

Contrary to common perception abroad, there have been numerous efforts by the Cambodian government to bring the perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide to book.

In 1979, the new Cambodian regime which ousted the Khmer Rouge held a "People's Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT)" in Phnom Penh. Khmer Rouge leaders Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were convicted of genocide in absentia, and sentenced to death. The sentences, of course, were never imposed, and in the case of Ieng Sary, the conviction and sentence were overturned in 1996.

Between 1979 and 1983, and between 1994 and 1997, various individuals were charged and some were convicted and jailed in Cambodian domestic prosecutions connected to alleged involvement with the Khmer Rouge and their crimes. In no case to date, however, has a senior officer of the Khmer Rouge ever been subject to such a proceeding.

In March of this year, senior Khmer Rouge military leader Chhit Choeun, also known as Ta Mok was captured, and he is now awaiting trial before a domestic military tribunal in Cambodia. Cambodian government sources have hinted that other senior Khmer Rouge leaders currently living freely in Cambodia—such as Khieu Samphan, who was President of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), and Nuon Chea, who was Deputy Prime Minister of the Khmer Rouge regime—may also face charges in a Phnom Penh court later this year.

Due to the weak nature of the Cambodian domestic legal infrastructure, the lack of properly trained legal staff, and the vulnerability of the Cambodian legal system to political influence, international legal experts are nearly unanimous in their view that domestic prosecution of senior Khmer Rouge leaders is a sub-optimal solution to the problem of impunity in Cambodia. This brings us to the question of prosecutions of Khmer Rouge leader abroad, employing one or another variation of the emerging Doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction.

2. I should discuss efforts inspired by the Pinochet case, and other extra national approaches.

Over the last decade, legal activists in the United States have attempted to use the US Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victims Protection Act—to bring charges against Khmer Rouge leaders. An effort in 1993 sought to bring civil charges of wrongful death against Khmer Rouge President Khieu Samphan, but that effort failed due to the inability of the plaintiffs to exercise personal jurisdiction over the prospective defendant.

And though I am not at liberty to go into any detail, I can tell you that a new effort is currently being explored to use these two US laws to bring charges against Khmer Rouge leaders presently sheltering in the United States. I believe several other nations have statutes similar to the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victims Protection Act, and it would be a helpful step in combating impunity in Cambodia if countries with the appropriate legal means could demonstrate the will to act against Khmer Rouge leaders present on their territory.

Another set of “extra national” legal initiatives against Khmer Rouge leaders has been inspired in significant measure by the action against Chile’s Augusto Pinochet playing out in the United Kingdom and Spain. In recent months, charges have been filed by victims of the Khmer Rouge in both France’s and Belgium’s courts. Though there is little precedent for these actions, just a few weeks ago the Belgian courts agreed to hear the class action suit against Khmer Rouge leaders. Such cases of “extra national” prosecution may hold out hope for the victims of the Khmer Rouge to find some justice after so many years of suffering and such a sorry lack of legal results.

3. Let me now consider some Pro’s and Con’s of

Khmer Rouge Prosecutions Abroad

In June 1997, the Co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia, Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, submitted a formal request to the United Nations, asking for help in setting up an international tribunal to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders accused of genocide. Due in part to political turmoil in Cambodia and in part to the very deliberate nature of United Nations processes, it was not until February of this year that a United Nations Group of Experts submitted to the Secretary General a proposal for international prosecution of the Khmer Rouge. The Group of Experts recommended expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia to include crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. In a surprise turnabout, however, Prime Minister Hun Sen promptly rejected this recommendation and declared that prosecution of the recently captured Khmer Rouge military leader Ta Mok would take place in Cambodia’s domestic courts.

This Cambodian decision has attracted widespread criticism from interested parties in the international community. Notwithstanding this torrent of criticism, it is clear that there are both advantages and disadvantages to any given venue, which might be selected for prosecuting Khmer Rouge leaders.

There are several advantages to prosecuting Khmer Rouge leaders in Cambodia.

Under the Genocide Convention, states parties have the primary obligation to prosecute genocide which has taken place on their territory; all other things being equal, this would be a welcome precedent in the Cambodian case.

The crimes in question took place in Cambodia, and consequently, the victims, the perpetrators and the evidence all reside in Cambodia.

Perhaps of greatest importance, the primary audience for the morality play, which is a genocide tribunal, in this case, is the Cambodian people. As the United Nations Secretary General’s Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia, Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg, has noted, not only having justice done, but having the Cambodian people see justice being done, would be a most valuable outcome.

There are also some serious disadvantages to

prosecuting KR leaders in Cambodia.

A significant problem with genocide prosecutions in Cambodia is the competence of domestic judicial system. There is general agreement, at least beyond the Cambodian government, which such competence does not presently exist in Cambodia.

Among other things, there was no domestic implementing legislation in Cambodia following ratification of the Genocide Convention and other relevant international treaties; thus any genocide prosecution would have to rely on a legally suspect 1979 decree by the revolutionary front which overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime.

There are numerous advantages to an international prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders.

The crimes alleged to have been committed during the Khmer Rouge regime were not merely crimes against the Cambodian people. These crimes are of such a serious nature and such an awesome magnitude as to warrant being labeled crimes against humanity. An international court is an appropriate jurisdiction in which to hear such serious charges.

The procedural and case law precedent which have been established by the activities of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY/R) provide a framework which would provide for transparent and fair justice in the case of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge. It makes sense to rely on these established laws and institutions to judge accused Khmer Rouge, rather than risking the possibility of a disorderly process in Cambodia's present legal environment.

Perhaps more importantly for individuals involved as defendants and as witnesses, an international proceeding would be able to provide greater assurances of due process for the accused and protection for witnesses than could any trial taking place in Cambodia.

But there are also some disadvantages to an international prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders.

The Hague is far away from Cambodia. There is a risk that the distant, formal and rather antiseptic procedures developed by the ICTY/R would seem somehow unreal to the Cambodian people, and that they might not see the results as justice.

Because all the witnesses, suspects and evidence


are in Cambodia, the logistical and financial obstacles to an international proceeding are substantial. Who would pay? Already the ICTY/R have a hard time attracting enough funding to support their existing caseload.

There are many other important advantages and disadvantages to be considered in evaluating the relative merit of domestic versus international justice in the case of the Khmer Rouge, but my time is limited today, so I will leave it at that.

In conclusion, I can make two basic observations about the matter of universal jurisdiction in the case of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge. After balancing the pro's and con's of domestic versus international prosecution of individuals charged with the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, I must conclude that international prosecution would be the best approach, presenting the fewest potential problems and the greatest potential for impartial justice not only being done, but being seen to be done.

The most important outcome of a genocide tribunal for Cambodia would be its impact on Cambodia's "culture of impunity". Many Cambodian civil servants—politicians, police and soldiers—and even some ordinary Cambodian civilians—have lived for the last three decades in an environment characterized by impunity: the strong take what they can, and the weak suffer what they must, and no one expects that the rule of law will intervene to modify this relationship. Convincingly punishing the most serious criminals who have ever existed in Cambodia—the leadership of the Khmer Rouge—is the most effective way we can begin to erode this culture of impunity and nurture the fragile foundations of a culture built on the rule of law. And this can best be done by applying universal jurisdiction in an international legal proceeding against the leadership of the Khmer Rouge.

*Please send letters or articles to
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P.O. Box 1110, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: (855) 23-211-875
Fax: (855) 23-210-358
Email: dccam@bigpond.com.kh
Homepage: <http://welcome.to/dccam>*



Ieng Sary

Khieu Samphan

Nuon Chea

A SAMPLING OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE LINKING THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS

By Steve Heder

(Continued)

Met attended another General Staff meeting on 30 August, which had as its first agenda item an “examination of enemy situations and measures”. Opening the meeting, Son Sen reported that four days earlier, there had been “enemy unrest at Ang Prouch, on the border between Kandal Steung district” of Sector 25 and the neighbouring Sector 33, both in the Southwest Zone. Those involved in the unrest had “raised a white banner with the slogans ‘Long Live Buddhism’ [and] ‘Long Live the White Khmer Front of Liberation from Rice by the Can’”. This pro-Buddhist, anti-Communist, anti-communal eating movement had been “getting ready for major unrest”, but it had “already been sorted out by the grassroots” political administration, through the arrest of more than 160 people. Moreover, Son Sen explained, their “responses” during interrogation had supposedly revealed their there was “a nexus between this situation and our army”, because they had implicated Chan

Charkei alias Nôv Mean, the former Secretary of Central Committee Division 170, which was based on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, as “their leader”. Chakrei had been removed as Division 170 Secretary and made a Vice Chairman of the General Staff on 15 March, and then arrested on 19 May.


Son Sen presented as purported evidence that an “enemy ... leadership apparatus” was behind rural unrest and problems in the army the fact some Division 170 combatants had recently “deserted” and fled to East Zone Sector 20, where they had “conducted agit-prop to the effect that there was unrest in Phnom Penh”, and that there had also been “agitation to steal” in certain military units. Son Sen advised Met and other senior military cadre present that they should “examine and keep track of no-good elements” in their divisions, and “organize for them to be administered separately”, that is, cull them out of existing units and concentrate them some place apart.

At the meeting, Met himself reported that one of

his men had deserted, while another had recently “hung himself to death”. Other leading cadre recounted their units’ recent arrests. Division 450 Secretary Chea Non alias Suong (later purged), reported the arrest of a former courier who had fled into the forest “with the White Khmer”. The Deputy Secretary of Division 310, Yim Chheuan alias Veuang (later purged), reported the arrest of two persons who had been “stealing food supplies in the Olympic Stadium and Calmette Hospital areas” of Phnom Penh. Under interrogation, these two detainees had “said they were looking to steal rice in order to make the trip” to their homes in the countryside. Veuang also reported that in Division 310 there was “theft and agitation to the effect that making

socialist revolution means eating rice gruel with bindweed, and when we reach communism, we’ll be eating plain bindweed.” Central Committee Division 801, reported that one combatant of this unit deployed in the Northeast Zone who had tried to flee to Laos had been “caught and brought back”, and under interrogation had said that “our revolution is strict and difficult, not like the Lao and Vietnamese Revolutions”. A cadre from General Staff Logistics revealed that an “old society fisherman” working under the General Staff “was active opposing the collective eating system, saying that, ‘What bullshit this socialist revolution is, eating rice gruel this way’.”


Son Sen concluded from these accounts that it




Pol Pot



Khieu Samphan



Ieng Sary



Nuon Chea



Son Sen




Vorn Vet




Mok




Duch



Ke Pauk



Ieng Thirith



Khieu Ponnary



Yun Yat

was “apparent that the enemy has commenced activities, and these are activities endowed with a leadership network because the news is the same and the slogans are the same.” He warned that:

“The enemy would like to take the opportunity to gather up no-good elements, the status—and rank-conscious, those whose families we have swept out, those whom we have removed from their positions, and those who have not internalized the revolutionary movement and can’t keep up with the rest, and, at the same time, the new people who don’t yet understand things, whom we are putting in difficulty and temporarily lack food: the CIA enemy is finding opportunities to gather them all up to attack us.”

He insisted that although “95 per cent of the people ... are good”, perhaps 2 per cent of the population comprised “no-goods”, and that these existed within the army. He declared that it was “imperative to conduct further purges of no-good elements” and “to be absolute” with them, “but not leftist”. He explained this meant differentiating between those who were “supporters” of the enemy and those who were not, and among the supporters whether this was “because of not understanding or are they supporters because they are opponents in league with the enemy?” In any case, the no-good elements must be removed from their units and be “concentrate[d] ... in one location” where they would be educated separately. He added that in no case should they be allowed “to go

to the grassroots”.

In a report over his signature on 1 September 1976, Met informed the General Staff that Battalion 513 of Division 502 had arrested “two persons, one named Sut and another named Eng, on 19 August 1976” near the south wall of Pochentong airport. This followed an incident on 15 August, when “some strangers stole some equipment” in Battalion 513’s area of operation. According to Met’s report, during interrogation, Sut and Eng identified themselves as combatants of the Central Committee’s marine Regiment 152, and the report treats them as acting on behalf of an enemy network. It declares that according to their “responses”, they “were going around stealing things to eat, such as rice, chickens and various items.” These “theft actions” had supposedly been “whipped up” as part of an enemy “organizational plan” by two persons named Sovan and San, “whose agitation was that making revolution is difficult, there’s not enough rice to eat, and that those who want to be bigshots should have formal officer ranks.”

Met attended another meeting of division leading cadre on 16 September, where he listened to more reports of arrests and more explanation and advice from Son Sen. Division 310 Deputy Secretary Veuang revealed that it had detained a boy at Prek Kdam, north of Phnom Penh, “who said that a woman named Meuang ... assigned him to come at reconnoitre our arms dump in Phnom Penh.” Division 703 Secretary Pin reported the arrest of “eight persons travelling by boat” off the coast of Kampung Saom, who had been trying to escape to Viet Nam, and whom he said had been “sent back to the grassroots”.

Son Sen then expounded on “the enemy activities in the American imperialism and their lackeys department”. In an apparent reference to the results of the interrogation at S-21 of Cambodians who had been allowed to come back to Cambodia from the United States and other places since April 1975, he declared that “according to the responses of those returning from abroad who we sent to do production and who fled, they say they fled in order to report to the CIA in South Viet Nam.” Their “responses” had supposedly also revealed a French and United States imperialist plan to attack Cambodian islands in the Gulf of Siam. Referring to “the infiltration links” of the previously arrested former



Ieng Thirith

Secretary of Division 170, Chan Chakrei alias Nôv Mean, Son Sen declared that “the Chakrei links are a major infiltration network that is in contact both with American imperialism and the revisionists” of the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, and that his links had been “making contacts” within the Revolutionary Army “to win over those having contradictions over status and rank and those dissatisfied with our revolutionary regime”. This was because “Soviet, Vietnamese and CIA links were all connected to Chakrei.” The “current agitation actions” within the armed forces demonstrated the existence of “links to CIA” among “those with an incorrect revolutionary stance”. All this proved that the army had been lax in allowing no-goods, deserters and others enemy infiltrators who had been purged from the army during the 1970-1975 war to re-enter it after 1975, along with “newcomers who had never fought at all” and “even evacuees from Phnom Penh”. He called on leading cadre “to follow up troop biographies clearly and conscientiously, especially of those we have enrolled recently”, apparently in order to weed out such elements by means that were not specified.

Also on 16 September, Son Sen addressed a meeting of “Comrades” of Mut’s Division 164 at which they discussed the discovery of alleged plans by a platoon cadre and some 40 other persons in the division to desert, and expressed concern about “strange activities” among “base people” near Kampung Saom that they blamed on former Khmer Republic soldiers engaged in “no-good movements”. They also discussed the recent arrest of two ex-Khmer Republic first lieutenants. Son Sen instructed the Division to “arrest and interrogate” the accused platoon cadre, Vung Sruol. He instructed it to make sure to “round up” deserters and make them “do production in one place”, and also to “round up” all ex-Khmer Republic “soldier elements”. He did not specify what should be done with the latter.

It is not clear whether Mut was present at this 16 September meeting, but it is certain that both he and Met attended the General Staff meeting convened on 19 September, at which S-21 was represented by its number three cadre, Huy.


They and the other cadre present heard another exposition on the situation from Son Sen, who called for continuing concern “about the activities of the

enemies inside the country and inside our ranks”, all of which were “CIA activities”. In another apparent reference to those already identified as “traitors” by S-21 among Cambodians who had been allowed to return to the country from the US and elsewhere, Son Sen said the first network included those who had “pretend[ed] to request to enter the country legally”, as well as those infiltrators who had come “surreptitiously by way of the Thai border”. According to Son Sen, their first “attack actions” had begun in June 1976. In an apparent allusion to their “confessions”, Son Sen revealed that this network’s plan was “to attack so as to liberate everything by 1980. They assassinate cadre and do surreptitious wrecking of fuel depots, airports and factories.” A network of Soviet-Vietnamese agents had meanwhile also been “going all out to expand” their “infiltrators in the army and in the grassroots”, also as part of a plan “to attack us and take us in 1980, like the CIA”. As proof of their interconnectedness, Son Sen again offered


The case with the network of the contemptible Chakrei, who was a CIA who nevertheless had intimate connections with the revisionist networks in the grassroots of Sector 24 and Sector 25 that were connected to Viet Nam. He gathered in some cadre who had contradictions about rank and status. They got together with the idea of smashing our apparatus in April 1976. Simultaneously, they conducted little activities as political and military guerrillas.

Despite the unmasking of Chakrei, continuing vigilance was imperative against the ongoing threat of an “enemy attack from the inside” by “those who are burrowing from within among us”. Son Sen explained that those present must “grasp firmly the class perspective and that of class struggle”, according to which the resulting contradictions “between revolution and imperialism-revisionism” were “of a more acute character than before”. Thus, although attacks by enemy networks “burrowing from within the grassroots and our army” had “been basically defeated” because the most important of these networks had now been “attacked and smashed”, it remained:

“Imperative to have the perspective that the enemies are not all gone; they are continuing further with their activities of attacking us. Therefore, do not be optimistic in a non-revolutionary way.” (Continued)



Pol Pot



Ieng Sary




Son Sen


Black Paper

KHMER ROUGE VIEW ON KAMPUCHEA KROM


Department of Press and Information of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic
Kampuchea
September 1978



Khieu Samphan



Nuon Chea



Vorn Vet

(Continued)

3. The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam on The Issue of The Political Line From 1954 to 1970

During the period from 1945 to 1954, the revolutionaries of Kampuchea who were then struggling against the French colonialists were not independent.

From 1954 to 1970, the struggle opposed the political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, a line of independence, sovereignty, self-reliance and of determining by itself its own destiny, to the political line of expansion and annexation of the Vietnamese party. That was a dogged and stubborn struggle. It can be divided into two periods.

1. Period from 1954 to 1960

During this period the revolutionaries of Kampuchea didn't yet have a party with a clearly

defined political line. But they let by themselves their revolutionary movement, the open and underground struggles in the cities as well as in the countryside. During this period, the revolutionary movement of Kampuchea tempered itself in the struggle, which allowed the revolutionaries of Kampuchea to progressively forge their position of being independent, sovereign, of relying on their own forces and determining their own destiny as well as their confidence in their own forces and capability of making by themselves their own revolution. It is on the basis of these actual experiences between 1954 and 1960 that the revolutionaries of Kampuchea organized a Congress in order to found the Communist Party of Kampuchea on September 30, 1960, to determine the strategical and tactical line, to adopt the Statute of the Party and to elect the Central Committee of the Party. The revolutionaries of Kampuchea have then clearly laid

down their political line and their way.

When they knew that the Communist Party of Kampuchea had been definitively set up, the Vietnamese started to launch systematic attacks against Kampuchea's revolution. To this end they used several procedures and especially the two following:

a. They secretly organized another organ of leadership, another party, without the knowledge of the revolutionaries of Kampuchea. It was at the moment when the revolutionary movement of Kampuchea made great strides, but it was also at the moment when the enemy's repression was in full swing. The men they placed in position were the old cadres they had trained before the 1954 Geneva Agreements and that afterwards belonged to the Pracheachon group.

Some elements of this group openly attacked the Communist Party of Kampuchea, when the others carried out manoeuvres of seduction. And they launched continuous attacks at the time when our Party had not yet achieved its unity in the whole country. Such were the activities organized by the Vietnamese against the Communist Party of Kampuchea inside the Party itself.

b. The Vietnamese attacked by themselves the policy of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They entirely opposed the Communist Party of Kampuchea since 1960.

◆ They were against the analysis of the Communist Party of Kampuchea concerning the division of Kampuchea's society into classes. They pretended that Kampuchea did not yet gather together the conditions of a society divided into classes. They asserted that Kampuchea's society had the same characteristics as those in Laos. By rejecting the analysis of the classes of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, it was clear that the Vietnamese were opposed to the whole line of the Party.

◆ They were against the line of independence and sovereignty of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

◆ They also opposed the line consisting of waging at the same time the armed struggle and the political struggle.

To support their arguments, the Vietnamese referred to the resolution of the 81 parties adopted in Moscow in 1960, which considered the defence of the

world peace as a priority task.

2. Period From 1961 to 1970

In 1961, the Vietnamese continued to attack the political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They worked out a political line for the Communist Party of Kampuchea and handed over this document in Vietnamese language to the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. This document mentioned neither the struggle against US imperialism nor class struggle. It was a political line which was conspicuous for its confusion.

From 1962 to 1964, the Vietnamese intensified their attacks. They wanted to nip in the bud the movement for carrying out the Communist Party of Kampuchea's line, for this movement did not yet make great strides. But in 1964, as the people's movement started to develop vigorously, the Vietnamese broke out against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They accused it of being adventurist and leftist. In fact, they were frightened by the soaring of Kampuchea's revolutionary movement, by the continuous development and strengthening of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the revolutionary forces of Kampuchea. Faced with this situation, they concentrated their attacks against the line of the Party by coordinating their own attacks with those of the group they had organized before. These attacks were waged inside the organ of leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea itself by leading cadres who were agents infiltrated into the Party by the Vietnamese.

In 1965, the Communist Party of Kampuchea sent a delegation abroad. It was the first delegation to pay a visit abroad. It was led by Comrade Secretary Pol Pot. Their journey was made on foot from the revolutionary base in Kampuchea up to Hanoi.

The delegation of the Communist Party of Vietnam was led by Le Duan.

The talks lasted for a very long time, for the Vietnamese dragged on the discussions aiming at deviating the political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. As a matter of fact, the Communist Party of Kampuchea has had a political line of its own and thanks to this line, Kampuchea's revolutionary movement has made great strides. This made the Vietnamese worried for if Kampuchea's revolution went on, that would affect their revolution with the

ruling classes in Phnom Penh. What was worse, if Kampuchea's revolution developed and strengthened in full independence, the Vietnamese would not be able to control it. That was why they had to absolutely deviate this line.

With this objective in view, the Vietnamese had gather together their points of view in a document for Kampuchea's side. Le Duan had sent a lot of his time drafting this document. He had looked over and corrected it several times. The Political Bureau of the Vietnamese Party had also examined and corrected it. This document, written in Vietnamese language mentioned neither class struggle nor struggle against the US imperialists. In this document, it was written that when Vietnam achieves victory, it would come to liberate Kampuchea.

In this document, the Vietnamese carried out a stand-up attack against the revolutionary concept and position of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, so that it would abandon the revolutionary struggle and wait until the Vietnamese achieve their victory which would

automatically bring about the victory to Kampuchea.

During the talks, the Vietnamese knew perfectly that the Communist Party of Kampuchea firmly abided by the position of independence and sovereignty. That is why they concentrated their attacks against this position. Le Duan affirmed that in the world it is impossible to abide by the position of independence and sovereignty. One has to rely on others. It is also true for Vietnam. As for the three countries, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, they have to support each other.

This struggle on the issue of the political line was very keen. But Kampuchea's side was always patient and serene, and did nothing that could give offense to the Vietnamese side. After the departure of Comrade Secretary Pol Pot to Kampuchea, the Vietnamese knew that the Communist Party of Kampuchea would continue to carry out its line which was to wage armed struggle in combination with political struggle.

They then intensified their activities against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. In the East and Southwest revolutionary bases, the Vietnamese carried



out activities aiming at creating confusion and division in the ranks of Kampuchea's revolution. They acted by themselves and also made to act the Khmer elements they had organized for a long time and infiltrated into ranks of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Abroad, they carried out many activities of division. They distributed: "Leftism, the infantile disease of Communism" by Lenin, so that the Khmers in Hanoi intensified their attacks against the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

In February 1967 an armed uprising broke out in Samlaut, Battambang provinces. The Vietnamese were panic stricken and intensified their attacks against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. When shortly after, there was a certain lull, they were delighted and felt a bit relieved.

But in 1968, when the armed struggle movement was launched in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese once again opposed it.

In the armed struggle from 1968 to the beginning of 1970, the Vietnamese did not help Kampuchea's

revolution at all, even though their organs of leadership were settled everywhere in Kampuchea. Their reasons was that the two lines, that of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and that of the Vietnamese Party were entirely different. So, the Vietnamese had to fight against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Besides, the Vietnamese had to deal tactfully with the ruling classes in Kampuchea in order to enjoy their help.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea asked nothing from the Vietnamese, but that they kept quiet and abstained from carrying out activities against Kampuchea's revolution and people. But the Vietnamese secretly incited the cadres of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to oppose their Party and continued to set up secret networks.

The political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was correct. If the Party had not led the armed struggle, Kampuchea's revolution would have been condemned to disappear sooner or later. It had led only the political struggle, the enemy would certainly have destroyed all its revolutionary bases.



CAMBODIA: JUSTICE DELAYED

By Ben Kiernan

Twenty-five years ago this month, the Khmer Rouge army entered Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia. Thus began a genocidal regime which killed, starved or worked to death 1.7 million of 8 million Cambodians, before it was overthrown by Hanoi's troops in 1979. For the next twenty years, Pol Pot, one of the worst mass murderers of the twentieth century, evaded justice. Two years ago he died in his sleep.

China, the United States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Thailand, all supported Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in various ways. The Great Powers opposed attempts to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice. No country in the world could be found to file a case against them in the World Court. The Khmer Rouge held on to the Cambodian seat in the United Nations, representing their victims for another fifteen years even though they were openly accountable for their crimes. Rather, international aid poured into their coffers, abetting their war to retake power.

Governments were not alone at fault. In the 1980s, respectable non-government international legal bodies

rejected numerous invitations to send delegations of jurists to Cambodia to investigate the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and possibly initiate official legal action. The American Bar Association, LawAsia, and the International Commission of Jurists all refused.

Only the Australian branch of the International Commission of Jurists showed interest, in the late 1980s. Powerful U.S. media outlets also campaigned to derail the attempt to document Khmer Rouge crimes.

But, at Cambodia's request in 1997, the U.N. set up a Group of Experts to investigate, headed by former Australian Governor-General Sir Ninian Stephen. Its

Pol Pot



1999 report recommends an international tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders for genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Negotiations are now underway with the Cambodian government, which has captured or accepted the surrender of the surviving Khmer Rouge leadership.

Why did it take so long? From 1979 to 1994, there was tremendous international opposition to any legal action against the Khmer Rouge. Only since 1994 has there been an important shift.

1979-1994

When the Vietnamese army ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979, most of the world lined up in confrontationalist Cold War positions. By intervening, Hanoi was seen as having created ‘the Cambodian problem’ rather than having ended the genocide. With the support of Australia as well as the United States and China, the Khmer Rouge held on to Cambodia’s U.N. seat. The only major Western country that abstained, but did not vote against the Khmer Rouge on the issue, was France.

From 1979 to 1982 the Khmer Rouge continued to hold Cambodia’s seat alone, using the name ‘Democratic Kampuchea.’ Then two smaller non-communist parties joined them in a ‘Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea’—in fact neither

a real coalition, nor a government, nor democratic, nor in Cambodia! Thus the Khmer Rouge flag flew over New York until 1992.

Several actors contributed to the impunity the Khmer Rouge enjoyed after 1979:

Thailand


Thailand provided key support to the Khmer Rouge—beyond physical sanctuary along the border, or secret diplomatic aid. (See Dr. Puangthong Rungswasdisab, Thailand’s Response to the Cambodian Genocide, Yale University Genocide Studies Program, 1999.) In 1985, Thailand’s Foreign Minister described Pol Pot’s deputy, Son Sen, as a “very good man.” In 1991, General Suchinda Krapayoon, who had seized power in Thailand through a coup, told a U.S. senator that he even considered Pol Pot a “nice guy.”

Thai premier Anand Panyarachun told Pol Pot’s front man, Khieu Samphan: “Sixteen years ago I was also accused of being a communist. Now they have picked me as prime minister. In any society there are always hard liners and soft liners, and society changes its attitudes toward them as time passes by.”

After meeting Pol Pot in 1991, Suchinda pleaded to the media that Pol Pot had no intention of regaining power any more and it was time to treat him ‘fairly.’

The media

In the early 1990s some of the Thai-based media were encouraged by official Western agencies to speculate that the Khmer Rouge leopards had changed their spots. First, they had become ecologists. One reporter recorded in 1991: “Western intelligence sources along the Thai-Cambodian border say that Pol Pot recently issued a directive calling on Cambodians not to poach birds or animals and to refrain from killing them for any reason.” Pol Pot’s military commander, ‘Ta’ Mok, was reportedly described by the same Western intelligence sources as being “hot on ecology issues and



protection of endangered species.”

Describing his battlefield commanders in 1987, Pol Pot noted that, “Mok is the best among them. Despite his brutality, the good outweighs the bad.” Junior commanders described Mok as “cruel but reasonable”; Mok is quoted as saying, “I know that people inside Cambodia fear me.” Such statements were apparently not reported in the press.

An analyst at a Western embassy in Bangkok even described the Khmer Rouge as “much more respectful of civilians than the other three factions.” Reporting on the Paris Agreement of 1991, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that “diplomats say that the Khmer Rouge would not have signed an agreement that it did not intend to follow.” Khmer Rouge troops quickly attacked 25 villages in Kompong Thom province, driving 10,000 people from their homes. While some diplomats called this the “worst violation of the cease-fire so far,” others argued that “the Khmer Rouge apparently mounted the attacks to hasten deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to the area.”

More recently, some journalists have been slow to report the findings of legal specialists that the Khmer Rouge have a case of genocide to answer. Writing in the New Yorker in August 1998, Philip Gourevitch asserted: “But the regime of death that the Khmer Rouge visited on Cambodia does not properly fit the legal definition of genocide: ‘acts committed with an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’ Although some minority groups were singled out for special persecution in Pol Pot time, the crime as a whole was the systematic mass murder of Cambodian people by the Cambodian state... to say that it was not genocide does not diminish the offence.” In fact, the leading legal study of the case had already concluded differently: “The existing literature presents a strong *prima facie* case that the Khmer Rouge committed acts of genocide against the Cham minority group, the ethnic Vietnamese, Chinese and Thai minority groups, and the Buddhist monkhood.” Inventing a new legal concept—“the crime as a whole”—does diminish the offence. Genocide is the most serious crime, often called an ‘aggravated’ crime against humanity because of the proof of intent, and its victims have a specific legal remedy. The Khmer Rouge regime committed five

counts of genocide, as the UN’s Group of Experts reported in 1999.

Chinese and U.S. policies


“I do not understand why some people want to remove Pol Pot,” said China’s Deng Xiaoping in 1984. “It is true that he made some mistakes in the past but now he is leading the fight against the Vietnamese aggressors.” China provided the Khmer Rouge forces with \$100 million in weapons per annum all through the 1980s, according to U.S. intelligence. A large Chinese arms shipment in mid-1990 violated a previous promise to cut weapons deliveries to the Khmer Rouge in return for Vietnam’s September 1989 withdrawal from Cambodia.

For more than a decade, official Western support for Deng Xiaoping’s China spilled over into support for his protégé Pol Pot. Former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski recalls that in 1979, “I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him, but China could.” According to Brzezinski, the United States “winked, semi-publicly” at Chinese and Thai aid to the Khmer Rouge. At the same time, international aid to the Khmer Rouge on the Thai border was pushed through by United States officials.

In the 1980s, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz opposed efforts to investigate or indict the Khmer Rouge for genocide or other crimes against humanity. Shultz described as “stupid,” Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden’s 1983 efforts to encourage dialogue over Cambodia, and in 1986 he declined to support Hayden’s proposal for an international tribunal. In 1985, Shultz visited Thailand and warned against peace talks with Vietnam, allegedly telling ASEAN “to be extremely cautious in formulating peace proposals for Kampuchea because Vietnam might one day accept them.”

The Bush administration also took a hard line against Thailand, especially after the advent of a democratically elected Prime Minister there in 1988. Thailand’s new policies—turning Indochina into a marketplace rather than a battlefield, and engagement with Vietnam and Cambodia—were seen as a defection from China’s and the U.S.’ posture.

(Continued)



CAMBODIA: RULING WITH IMPUNITY = THE IENG SARY CASE

By Julio A. Jeldres

A few days ago, Cambodian prime minister, Samdech Hun Sen, told Kyodo news agency that former Khmer Rouge Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs, Ieng Sary, should not be brought to trial on charges of genocide committed during the Khmer Rouge's 1975-1979 reign of terror in Cambodia.

The Cambodian premier said that Ieng Sary made a significant contribution to national reconciliation by leading 70% of former Khmer Rouge forces to the government side, leading to the elimination of the Khmer Rouge military organization.

He added that "Ieng Sary showed goodwill by bringing down the Khmer Rouge" and that "the King signed the amnesty for Ieng Sary that led many of the rebels to defect", in reference to a September 1996 amnesty granted to Ieng Sary by King Norodom Sihanouk at the request of the then two co-Premiers of the Royal government of Cambodia.

Ieng Sary and other Khmer Rouge leaders were sentenced to death in absentia in 1979 by a tribunal organized by the Vietnamese army occupying Cambodia at the time and staffed with "judges" from Cuba and other countries where the judicial systems are not independent but rather form part of the ruling

party's state apparatus.

Samdech Hun Sen's continuous statements to the effect that Ieng Sary should be brought to trial and then his retractions that Ieng Sary "should not be tried twice for the same crime" leads me to believe that there will never be an independent process to try those Khmer Rouge leaders responsible for the mass murders that took place in Cambodia between 1975-1979.

According to Youk Chhang, director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, which has spent several years gathering evidence for an eventual Khmer Rouge tribunal, "we have enough information for the prosecutors to begin a case against Ieng Sary".

In Europe, the widows of former Cambodian diplomats, recalled back in December 1975 by a telegram signed personally by Ieng Sary, blame him also for the disappearance of their husbands and sons. In most cases, the Ambassadors and other diplomats were sent "for re-education" upon their arrival in Phnom Penh from their respective posts. Re-education being, of course, a Khmer Rouge euphemism for the death sentence.

Strangely, the Cambodian premier constantly uses the amnesty given by King Sihanouk to Ieng Sary

to justify his defense of Ieng Sary in front of the people of Cambodia and the international community.

I am often asked why His Majesty the King agreed to the request made by HRH Samdech Norodom Ranariddh, First Prime Minister and, Samdech Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister of the Royal government of Cambodia to grant an amnesty to such a notorious mass murderer as Ieng Sary.

Firstly, it should be said that under the 1993 Cambodian Constitution, His Majesty the King is empowered to grant amnesty of his own volition or after a request from the head of the Royal Cambodian government has been received.

Let me recall the events surrounding this royal amnesty for Ieng Sary, back in September 1996.

1) On Saturday 14 September 1996, the two co-Prime Ministers of the Royal Government of Cambodia, HRH Samdech Norodom Ranariddh and Samdech Hun Sen requested an audience with His Majesty the King. His Majesty received them at the Throne Hall, where they submitted to the King an already drafted royal decree granting amnesty to Ieng Sary. His Majesty signed the royal decree but advised the two co-Prime Ministers that they should get the support of two thirds of the National Assembly, the representatives of the people of Cambodia, before making the royal decree public and promulgating it.

2) As the two co-Premiers were against a debate

in the National Assembly on this matter, His Majesty repeated, before his visitors left him, that the royal decree should be supported in writing by two thirds of the National Assembly, adding that individual letters addressed by the deputies to the King would suffice. The two co-Premiers gave a formal assurance to His Majesty that they could deliver at least 80 signatures of deputies agreeing to the amnesty, thus satisfying His Majesty's precondition.

3) To show his goodwill, Samdech Hun Sen pledged, in front of the King and the throne, that he would cooperate closely with Prince Ranariddh in governing the country and that their quarreling would end. His Majesty was very happy by this news saying that if the two co-Premiers quarreled, as had been the case since March 1996, it would only benefit the enemies of Cambodia.

4) The same evening, at his wedding anniversary reception, Prince Ranariddh told ASEAN Ambassadors of the signature of the royal decree by His Majesty the King, thus breaking the promise made to the monarch and making the amnesty public;

5) The royal amnesty signed by King Sihanouk granted Ieng Sary a pardon for the sentence passed on him by the "international tribunal" in 1979 and granted immunity from prosecution under the 1994 legislation outlawing the Khmer Rouges. It did not, however, give Ieng Sary immunity from possible future war crimes or genocide trials for his role in the regime, which claimed the lives of thousands of Cambodians.

Ieng Sary has claimed over the years since the amnesty that he is completely innocent of the crimes he is alleged to have committed. He insists that most decisions were made by a so-called "gang of four" composed of Pol Pot (already dead), Nuon Chea (living in Pailin) who was the real "brother number two", Son Sen and his wife Yun Yat (both murdered in June 1997).

He has also claimed that after the "Democratic Kampuchea" government was formed in April 1975 not a single cabinet meeting



was held. This again is plainly not true, as the minutes of cabinet meetings are available and he attended some cabinet meetings.

In his memoirs for the period, which I have just completed translating and which will be published in Bangkok before the year's end, His Majesty King Sihanouk tells how on 5th January 1979 he was summoned to a meeting with Pol Pot at Government House, where he was informed of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and asked to plead the cause of his nation and people at the United Nations Security Council in New York, which His Majesty accepted.

Pol Pot told His Majesty that all his family could leave Cambodia the same afternoon in a special Chinese plane but Ieng Sary intervened to say that only the King and Queen could leave and that the rest of the family would remain in Phnom Penh. Ieng Sary wanted to keep His Majesty's family (what was left of His Majesty's own family) in Cambodia to ensure that His Majesty did not say or do anything detrimental to the regime. But Pol Pot prevailed and everyone left that afternoon.

At a press conference on 9th September 1996, Ieng Sary said, in answer to a question from a foreign journalist that he did "not feel remorse because as

Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs he had nothing to do with the genocide". Next, he may say, as the Nazis at Nuremberg did, that he was following orders!

I would suggest that the Samdech Hun Sen and the Cambodian government need not to fence themselves behind the notion of "national reconciliation" to defend this gang of murderers who currently enjoy a rather comfortable life in Pailin and Phnom Penh, while their victims have to live side by side with their abusers. Any politician that does so, cannot be trusted to guide their nation towards a peaceful or democratic future. Just as those who equate enforcing criminal law with revenge show no respect for the law or human rights.

When such government abdicates its responsibilities to punish violations of human rights, as the Cambodian government appears to be doing, the international community should step in.

I realize that this issue is a thorny one but I would suggest that the Cambodian Prime Minister will earn the respect of his own people and the international community only if he gives the right answer to his people's cry for justice and ceases trying to defend the indefensible.



THE VIETNAMESE SEARCH FOR THEIR RELATIVES LOST DURING DK

By Sorya Sim

A total of 148 Vietnamese family members were claimed to have lost in Cambodia according the 1976 petitions from 30 relatives. The petitions, dated between June-October 1976, were in hand-written and typewritten Vietnamese language. The petitions mentions the addresses of the petitioners in Vietnam and their lost relatives in Cambodia. Of the 30 petitioners, 11 lived in Ho Chi Minh city, 10 in Dong Tap province, 2 in An Giang, 1 in Hau Giang, 1 in Quang Minh and the rest gave unclear addresses. Of the 148 lost relatives, 51 lived in Phnom Penh city, 33 in Kampong Chhnang Province, 11 in Kandal, 10 Siem Reap, 7 in Takeo, 6 in Kampong Cham, 4 in Battambang, 3 in Battambang, 1 in Kampong Speu, and

the rest gave unclear addresses.

Of the 30 petitions, two petitioners have attached photos of the lost relatives. On August 8, 1976, Ngo Thi Tien wrote a letter requesting information regarding her husband and daughters who disappeared in Cambodia. The then 43 years old Ngo Thi Tien along with three sons had returned to Vietnam and lived at no.539, street 20, Tran Hung Dao Road, Ho Chi Minh city. Her husband Chok Pak and her two daughters Ngo Thi Srey and Ngo Thi pau lived in Daun Tuot village, Nhien Nhan commune, Tram Kak district, Takeo province. In the letter, she wanted them to also return to live with her in Vietnam.

Ngo Thi Srey



Ngo Thi Peou



GRANDMOTHER OF “FERTILIZER”

By Sopearith Choung

During the Khmer Rouge regime, Chhay Rin was an old woman the Khmer Rouge soldiers evacuated to live in a jungle area known as Po Penh, situated in Phnom Srok District, Banteay Mean Chey Province. That remote area was far from the national road, and barely accessible by vehicle. If we walk down the country road leading to the area it will take us at least half a day to get there. She told us about her life in the area during the Khmer Rouge regime. She and her female unit of 40 women were required to make fertilizer out of human bodies and excrements. The Khmer Rouge simply referred to her as “Yeay Chi”, meaning “Grandmother of fertilizer”, because she was appointed Chief of the female unit responsible to produce fertilizers. In spite of the fact that she did not like the kind of nauseous work she was doing and the hard conditions she was in, she managed to endure it, trying to live her life as if she were not able to see and smell. That was because she wanted her family to be safe from persecution or execution by the Khmer Rouge.

The first day she was brought there, she was so lonely and pitiful about herself that she dropped her tears while she was begging for God to safeguard her family. Young Khmer Rouge soldiers, some as young as 10, each of them equipped with a gun, came and said to her, “Do not cry, mother! You are brought here not to die but to live. You are not left in Phnom Penh eating stones”. Yeay Chi replied, “My children, there are only bushes. There is nothing but tree leaves to eat, so why did you bring me here?” Suddenly, one of the young, armed soldiers pointed his gun at her and threatened, “Mother, you are vicious and dare to oppose Angkar”. She immediately begged to them in her quick response, “Mother dare not oppose Angkar, my children!”. Fortunately, she was spared her life at that moment due to her sincere and kind pleading.

Chhay Rin continued, recalling that, “After one year living in Po Penh, the whole area was inundated. As the flooding reached the area, the Khmer Rouge evacuated the people to Snuol Village, Poay Char Sub-district, Phnom Srok District, Banteay Mean


Chey Province. “Life here is very difficult. We were provided a thin rice gruel, made from five cans of rice and some water flowers for the entire unit. As the days passed, people kept dying, either from disease, starvation, or food poisoning from eating various leaves. The Khmer Rouge took people to Po Penh to be killed”.

She confirmed to us that there was a site in Phnom Srok District, where people were forced to make fertilizer from human bodies and wastes. She told us that she was required to excavate graves and get the bodies to make fertilizer. As far as the making of fertilizer is concerned, she said that her unit was supposed to go out looking for graves and pits, unearth them and get the bodies out. Then, they peeled the flesh and things from the bodies, and took the cleaned bones to burn and make fertilizer out of the ashes. She stated that every day she was required to collect human remains and bones in order to make fertilizer.

Yeay Chi went on explaining about the hard times and all difficulties she encountered, “In the beginning, I could not stand the smell of corpses, but as time passed it would not really matter to me. However, I did not try to remove the flesh from the corpses immediately after I excavated them, because it smelled too bad. No matter how bad the smell was I never had any objections since the Khmer Rouge constantly kept their watching eyes on me. If I did not do it, it would be a problem. Making fertilizer was my routine task, and I did it for over one year. Every time we were out to work, we were always accompanied by a group of four armed Khmer Rouge soldiers.

She further stressed, “During my first time at the task, I saw people die miserably. At one site, among the dead bodies were two to three monks the Khmer Rouge tied up with a rope before they killed them and put them in a pit. I found a lot of people killed and the bodies were piled up in big stacks. Mass executions were carried out in 1977. Evacuees from Southwest [Zone] were all executed. People in the village were also butchered. Bodies were buried in bigger pits than those at Choeung Ek. Anyone found to have some reservations about anything was taken by the Khmer Rouge to be killed”.

She recalled, “If anyone was as active as me and was quick to come when called, he or she would survive. I did anything; sometimes some of the Khmer Rouge cadres called me to perform a traditional coin treatment on them, and I always did it without any objections as long as they would spare my life”. In 1978, large-scale executions were carried out, in which both base and new people alike were killed. There were only a few surviving families. Among members of my female unit responsible for producing fertilizer, only half survived. The survivors had



Chhay Rin

swelling diseases because of malnutrition. My family was the first the Khmer Rouge wanted to take to be killed because they were told by those who were not happy with my family that we were educated and used to work for Americans". But in fact, Chhay Rin was just an ordinary Christian disciple.

She felt very miserable to witness many of the people close to her taken to be killed by the Khmer Rouge, usually after being told that, "Angkar needed them to be educated". A total of 26 people including her children, nephews and nieces, were killed under the Khmer Rouge regime. Her brothers and sisters were taken to be killed near a big tree in Po Penh before her family moved to Poay Snuol Village, Poay Char Sub-district, Phnom Srok District. She expressed sadly, "Every time I think of it, my tears drop. I am so full of sadness."

Thouny is one of Chhay Rin's daughters. She was also a victim under the regime. She was taken to be killed by the Khmer Rouge soldiers under the order of the collective chief, named Chhin, who was very brutal. He beat her until she lost consciousness in front of the edge of a pit. Luckily, seeing her laying there unconsciousness, they thought she was dead and left her out of the pit. They did not have the time to check to see if she was dead or alive because there were many more to be killed at that time. But she was still alive, and has survived until today. She was left with two scars, one on her the lower, right part of her chin, and the other on her right foot. She showed them to us, while saying, ".....These scars always remind me of an unforgettable history, an extremely hurtful one. I can retell the whole story of "One Thousand and One Night", but there could not be time enough for me to relate the history of the period of three years eight months and twenty days under the Pol Pot regime. The more we think and talk about it, the fresher our memory and the more our tears. It is so much pain that words cannot describe".

The Khmer Rouge took Thouny to be killed on the grounds that she was a KGB agent because she had spoken back to some Khmer Rouge cadre while laboring at a work site. She said indirect words meaning something critical of her superiors by expressing them in general terms. But, she did not do it in a meeting. She said, "If everybody is to work that much, they all will die. Does it work that someone with a very thin rice ration can handle the earth hoeing work for 125 cubic meters?" Immediately after she finished her words, the Khmer Rouge exchanged a threatening question, "How dare you! You want to oppose Angkar? You know Angkar?" She then responded honestly, "I do not know Angkar because I do not know what form it takes; all I see that you are wearing black

clothing with a beret on your head and a scarf around your neck. I do not who Angkar is". Then, the Khmer Rouge reacted by saying, "This is some kind of underground intellectual." "I do not know the term 'intellectual,'" she replied. They further asked her, "Is it true that you lived in Phnom Penh previously?" She lied to them saying that, "No, I was not a city resident; I am an simple street vendor and lived at Kien Svay". Later, they threatened to "smash her". With such a threat, she replied inquisitively, "How come you want to smash me because Angkar said it would train people to labor to give them employment". The Khmer Rouge, said "You oppose Angkar". They just said that, but did not do anything to her at that time. However, at 12pm of the same day, they took her out from the concentration camp to be killed. She was walked away, her face blindfolded, both of her hands tied up behind her back. As she was blindfolded, she could see nothing, thus did not know where she was taken. But, after a while, she felt a blow and lost consciousness.

After regaining consciousness, she attempted to remove the blindfold, and untie the rope on her hands. Then, she decided to run away from the camp for fear that they would take her to be killed once again. She had nothing with her, except a black dress and a scarf. It was from that time that she was away from her parents with a new mobile brigade in another region. She was going to Spean Sreng, in Kralanh District, Siem Reap Province.

She estimated that a majority of the evacuees from cities were executed because hundreds of thousands of people were evacuated there, but there were about ten thousands left and returning to the province. At Kork Romchek, Srah Chik Sub-district, Phnom Srok District, Banteay Mean Chey Province, the Khmer Rouge took people to be killed in the rice fields. At Poay Trach, especially in 1979, near the fall of the regime, the Khmer Rouge killed people indiscriminately and scattered bodies everywhere. During that time, people evacuated from Phnom Penh were taken to be killed immediately. She used to see piles of bodies; and she said she was very scared.

She concluded that, "When the country was liberated in 1979, there was only a small number of people in my collective who survived." She thought that, "It would have been ideal if the Khmer Rouge had not treated people badly, and instead had provided them with all necessary supplies for living. During that time, if Angkar had not attempted to make such 'Great Leaps Forwards' and had given people enough to survive, people would not have died no matter how hard they were worked, except for those taken to be killed."

THE 17TH OF APRIL IS THE BEGINNING OF THE SEPARATION

By Bun Sou Sour

Many people understand the 17th of April in different ways according to their personal tendencies. Some understand this day as the day of victory over the Lon Nol government that was supported by the U.S. Others understand this day as the end of the corruptive practices of the Lon Nol regime. On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge, who worked hard on activities to help the people build their strength after many years within the Republic government, understand this day as an historical day of celebration. In contrast, many of the Cambodian people have many reasons to doubt. They were uncertain in their feelings what the 17th of April meant as soon as the country of Cambodia was liberated. Some citizens, including my father, celebrated and shouted in victory along with the Cambodian liberators whom people recognized as the Khmer Rouge. However, I understand that the 17th of April was the first day of separation for the families of the people as well as my own family.

My family originally came from Reap Village, Reap Sub-district, Kandal Stung District, Kandal Province. But after the Lon Nol government began dropping bombs in 1970, my family forced ourselves to flee to Phnom Penh and start up a little business in the Daem Takuh Market in order to support our livelihood. For approximately five years, until 1975, we continued to live in fear from the bombing. In May 1975, I was exactly six months in my mother's womb. I have much remorse for not knowing and for not having seen the true activities that took place on 17th April 1975. But no matter what, when I reached an age in which I could understand, I often asked my mother about what happened, about the tragedy, the separation, and the countless pain and suffering of the Cambodian people and more specifically, the problems that occurred within my own family.

My mother made an effort to talk about all the problems that developed in my family. She told me that on the 17th of April, she was six months pregnant and I was the one in her womb.

The 17th of April is a day of attack and a day of surrender for the Khmer Rouge and the army of the government. My mother's father-in-law who is my grandfather, was willing to take the risk to make the journey and cross many dangers in order to bring my mother to his house. He understood that it was safer there because it was a stone house that might prevent accidents from gunfire. As soon as she crossed and reached the Russian Hospital, she saw many people crowding the streets. At that time, my mother did not yet know who these people were. On the same day, when she reached my grandfather's house in front of the water tank near the Olympic Stadium, a large gun battle ensued. She saw many helicopters flying and settling in the clearing of the Olympic Stadium. The sound of large and small guns answered each other. About two hours later, the people dressed in black, who were recognized as the Khmer Rouge, entered my grandfather's house. They commanded everyone in the house to leave the house. If they did not leave, they would be shot and killed. Fearing the Khmer Rouge would shoot and kill our entire family, we forced ourselves to leave our home and only took with us the clothes on our backs. The Khmer Rouge told us they would allow us to return to our homes after three days so that they could clean up the enemies in the city.

As we walked along the 18 March Road, my mother saw many people walking and crowding the streets. She did not yet know who these people were. The people dressed in black ordered those who had motorcycles to give them up. They said they were going to use it for their work.

The journey continued and countless painful scenes could be witnessed along the road. Some people had to give birth without a mid-wife to help them and after they gave birth, they continued their journey without any energy. Seven hours later, at 10:00 at night, my mother reached Koh Thom District. As soon as they got there all the evacuated citizens prepared to cook along the houses of the villagers. Afterwards, the Khmer Rouge worked until morning preparing a table of the biographies of each person in order to make it easier for them to divide and send people to different parts throughout the district. At that time, my mother's family, like the thousands of other people who were evacuated from the city of Phnom Penh, were separated from each other without knowing where their husband, their parents and children would be driven. The Khmer Rouge sent people like soldiers, civil servants, police, etc., to different places. After they finished dividing people, my father and my mother who was six months pregnant with me, were ordered by the Khmer Rouge to live in Chheu Khmao Village, Chheu Khmao Sub-District, Koh Thom District, Kandal Province. After living there for three months, my mother gave birth to me. One month after giving birth to me the Khmer Rouge sent my family to another place. They told us that there was not yet enough food for the people here. At that time, my father acquired a sickness and was not able to do anything. Therefore, the burden fell on my mother's shoulders and she forced herself to prepare everything. Most of the things she carried in one end of the pole and on the other end of the pole she carried me. In a wearied tone, my mother said, "Your face was scorched by the sun and your skin was peeling. I carried you many kilometers for three days and three nights until we reached the place the Khmer Rouge had assigned us to go. All of our relatives were separated from each other. As we traveled to Preah Vihear Province, when he saw how exhausted and tired we were, there was one Khmer Rouge cadre named Sou who tried to convince me to name you Sou. This is his name. He understood that a person with this name would not die easily."

Every time we talk about the 17th of April, I usually remember the day my family was separated

from each other. I still have never seen the faces of my grandparents and my aunts and uncles. If there was no 17 April 1975, my family would not have lost so many members.

If I count all of my grandparents and aunts and uncles on my mother's and father's side, the Khmer Rouge probably killed almost fifty people. They killed family after family accusing them of being capitalists. One question I always have with me is: "Why did the Khmer Rouge take my grandparents, my uncles and aunts and all of my relatives to be killed? What wrong did they commit? And who is the source of these unjust acts?"

This question usually pushes me to discover the truth that no one yet knows with certainty. In 1997, I was still studying at the university. I decided to join and work as a member of the staff at the Documentation Center of Cambodia, which is an independent institution, a non-governmental organization, and a training ground for the youth. The office staff and the leaders are all Cambodians. As soon as I entered and worked at the Documentation Center of Cambodia I encountered a message written on the computer: "Searching for the Truth." At that time, I had strong hopes that I would realize the truth of my life that has passed for twenty-five years.

But we still have not yet discovered this truth, unless there is a tribunal that has international support.

Therefore, 17 April 1975, which is the start of the separation of the people of Cambodia, including my family, remains a mystery. The 17th of April stole the lives of 50 of my family members and relatives. If there was no 17th of April, the day of separation and suffering for my family would also not exist. A trial with international support should be established immediately, so that we can answer the simple and general questions of Cambodian people as well as my own. Only an independent tribunal can ease the suffering of the Cambodian victims that are still alive. With a trial, the 17th of April will no longer be a question for the public, national, and international opinion.

LETTER FROM READER:

To Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia:

On behalf of all the government officials within the authority of the Office of Puok District, Siem Reap Province, and myself, I would like to most profoundly thank Mr. Youk Chhang for continuously providing copies of every issue of “Searching for the truth” magazine to our Office of Puok District. The contents of each of the magazines clearly reflect the tragedy of the Cambodian people and the heinous inhumane crimes committed by Pol Pot’s genocidal clique against the Cambodian people during the Democratic Kampuchea regime’s period of three years, eight months and twenty days in power. All of us who experienced and were fortunate enough to survive that regime’s destructive period until the present days, praise and highly value the struggling efforts by you and your staff in compiling such invaluable documentation so that the people and the country of Cambodia can understand and learn from them forever.

My view at the moment is that the magazine should reach as far as the Khmer Rouge-controlled bases. However, I would like to suggest that more in-depth research be conducted to see what the Khmer Rouge patterns for direct leadership and control are from the bases, and from low to top levels, including group, collective, village, sub-district, district, region and zone. This research should look into the organizational structure of the Khmer Rouge regime because it had two characteristics:

1) After the coup on March 18, 1970, except for some bases controlled by the Republic Regime, most regions were under the control of the Khmer Rouge, and were called “Liberated Zones”. The Khmer Rouge movement in 1970 was under the guise of a “National United Front”. Later, in 1973, a

number of regions introduced collective meals, and the Khmer Rouge movement turned into a communist style.

2) From 1975 to 1979, what became of the Khmer Rouge movement? This is a history that depicts direct involvement by the Khmer Rouge authorities, through which the world has come to clearly realize the crimes of genocide committed by the Khmer Rouge against their own people. The special suggestion to you is that more studies should be done at base levels where witnesses could give you their accounts and testimony which can be used in the publication of “Searching for the truth” magazine. This will help provide a better grounds for understanding the Khmer Rouge regime for the rest of the world, and particularly for school children born after 1975, of whom many only know stories about the Khmer Rouge, while others have only a vague knowledge. For suggesting this, I think you will not be angry with me. Although the points I have raised at the moment are not in details yet, some of the things have already been published in the magazine.

I wish to thank you for your letter to me dated 7 February 2000. Finally, I hope that you will continue sending future issues of “Searching for the truth” to our Office of Puok District.

I wish you and all your colleagues good luck and success in your respective tasks.

Please, Mr. Director, be assured of my warm regards.

Office of Puok District, 28 August 2000
Signed and sealed

Tes Chankiri
Chief of Puok District

KHMER ROUGE POEM:

“WE ARE GRATEFUL TO THE REVOLUTIONARY ANGKAR”

Compiled by Sayana Ser

We children lived in the darkness of a canopy of dense forests, where the sunlight could never reach, where we lived in a world without light.

We lived in the wealth of a society with corruption, where earth was no object of thought and concern to any man no matter how fertile it was.

But now we live happy lives since our Kampuchean Revolutionary Angkar made us understand that the old regime was the cause of all the worries.

With Angkar guiding me, I am trained to know clearly a new, good society and to clearly know the party's guidelines.

The new society brings a light and opens our eyes to see things more clearly. It is one we all wish for.

Oh! Our gratifying Angkar! You are our greatest merit worth more than our lives, for which we are always grateful.

Therefore, we children have to spare no effort in our struggle until the end of our lives.

**ដើម្បីទប់ទល់ការបោះពុម្ពនិងចែកចាយដោយឥតគិតថ្លៃដល់មន្ទីរស្រុកនិងឃុំនៅទូទាំងព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា
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ថវិកានៃការបោះពុម្ពផ្សាយទប់ទល់ដោយឥតគិតថ្លៃនិងជំនួយមនុស្សធម៌នៃក្រសួងការបរទេសនៃរាជរដ្ឋាភិបាលនៃស្រុក មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជាអំពីការរស់នៅរដ្ឋាភិបាល មូលនិធិធានា
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Documentation Center of Cambodia would like to appeal to governments, foundations and individuals for support of the publication of
Searching for the truth. For contribution, please contact (855) 23 211 875 or (855) 12 90 55 95. Thank you.