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
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KHMER ROUGE ARTS

We Are New Revolutionary Women.....Back Cover



Tan Hak, 17.

Date of Entry into the Revolution: 07 Sept. 1974

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Letter:

BLACK CROW


In September 1978, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea was headed by Ieng Sary, who was also at that time deputy prime minister. He published an official document, referred to as a “Black Paper”, which was something equivalent to a “black book of honor”, and was widely known as the “Ghost Book”. These black papers of Democratic Kampuchea were a kind of documentary propaganda used for international persuasion in favor of the principles of Democratic Kampuchea. They were part of a strategy to transform white to black, and vice versa, in an attempt to counter the evidence of starvation and massacre committed during the DK regime. Like the clothing of Democratic Kampuchea, their papers were also black, which fits well with the nature of the regime and the minds of its leaders.

Interviewed by a Swedish journalist in 1980, Ieng Sary said: “We (Democratic Kampuchea) are firmly convinced that the Chinese Government will always help us in the struggle for independence and preservation of the nation until final victory. We weren’t aware of life at the grassroots, that is the way the murders were able to happen. But the murderers were Vietnamese agents. That’s as plain as day.” Clashes between Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam took place several times. Military of both sides were arrested and executed. Some 488 Vietnamese soldiers were taken from the battlefields and shipped to S-21, a detention center for the enemies of Angkar. The many thousands of persons who passed through S-21 included foreign nationals and persons from all sections of Cambodian society, all of whom were tortured, interrogated, and executed.

The black paper noted above is 89 pages long and divided into seven chapters. Chapter One, which is about the expansionist nature of Vietnam

in the past, mainly focuses on 1) the acts of aggression, expansion and annexation of Vietnam in the past; 2) the methods used by the Vietnamese to annex and swallow Kampuchea’s territory in the past; and 3) the factors which induced the Vietnamese to carry out a policy of expansion and annexation (published in this issue). Chapter Two covers two main aspects: the Indochinese Communist Party and its political program, and the carrying out of the Vietnamese strategy of Indochina Federation in Kampuchea. Chapter Three concerns the struggle between Kampuchea and Vietnam on the proper political line between 1954 and 1970. Chapter Four concentrates on the Vietnamese attempts from 1970 to 1975 to smash the independent political line of the Communist party of Kampuchea. Chapter Five centers on the Paris negotiations and the Vietnamese attempts to destroy Kampuchea’s revolution. Chapter Six relates the activities carried out by Vietnam in its alleged attempts at annexing and swallowing Kampuchea from 1975 until 1978. Chapter Seven is the conclusion.

This black paper is like the black crow that is always a bad omen in Cambodian culture. One can draw a comparison between the millions of Cambodians who died in the regime of Democratic Kampuchea between 1975 to 1979, their corpses food for the black crows to eat under the guidelines of Democratic Kampuchea’s leadership.



CONFESSION OF CHIN EA AKA SOU

By Kalyan Sann

Chin Ea, alias Sou, was arrested by Khmer Rouge apparatus in March 1977 and incarcerated at Tuol Sleng. Based on his “confession” (which like all such documents produced at Tuol Sleng was extracted under torture) Chin Ea was born about 1940 in Ampil Village, Prek Dambauk Sub-district, Srey Santhor District, Kampong Cham Province, which was to become part of Region 22 in the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea. Prior to his arrest, Chin Ea was a chief in the commercial section of Region 22.

The confession document states that Chin Ea joined the “CIA movement” in 1963, and had been in charge of eavesdropping and reporting on students who were involved with the Khmer Rouge. In 1970, he became a “hidden element”, “burrowing inside” the

revolutionary rank in the Eastern Zone. He was subsequently appointed Chief of Region 22. Under the leadership of Ta Phim (Sao Phim), Party Secretary of the Eastern Zone, Chin Ea worked very hard to recruit more forces within the region. In 1971, Chin Ea was appointed as chief of Srey Santhor District. During that time, he cooperated with the Vietnamese in planning a coup to capture power from the Khmer Rouge by enticing the masses to despise the revolution. In 1977, Chin Ea was arrested by Angkar and sent to Tuol Sleng prison.

The confession document states that from 1950 to 1954, Chin Ea lived in Phnom Penh with his brother Koy Thuon (Koy Thuon), who later was to become a minister of commerce in Democratic Kampuchea.

Between 1955 and 1959, Chin Ea moved to Kampong Cham and Kratie provinces for his education. In 1960, he decided to continue his studies at Yuk Kunthor High School, Phnom Penh, where he was “convinced” by Koy Thuon on the issue of politics. The confession states: “In 1960, my brother educated me in the field of capitalistic society and socialist society. I really understand the concept of these two social facts.” From 1962 to 1964, Chin Ea studied in Preah Sihanouk High School, Kampong Cham provincial town. Koy Thun then took him to live with Tin Kim Hong and Toek Kim Un. “Successively, Tim Kim Hong and Toek Kim Un introduced me to communist and liberal administrations as my brother had done in 1960. And in 1963, these two persons sponsored my CIA membership...”

From late 1964 until 1968, Chin Ea performed as a teacher in a private high school “Chamraen Vichea”, Phnom Penh. He made contact with persons named So Sa Phan and Taing Khet, who were working in Chamraen Vichea High School. Chin Ea also came to know eleven other former CIA agents in this

A bed and a desk at Tuol Sleng used for interrogation



school, including the school principle named Uk Yoeun. Ea managed to recruit three more forces. In mid-1968, Chin Ea was transferred to teach in Kampuch Botr High School.

Chin Ea remarked at one point, “Early in 1969 and in 1970, I was imprisoned at Prey Sar Prison...” While there, Chin Ea managed to recruit seven more people. In 1970, after his release, Chin Ea was assigned by So Saphan to link up with CIA agent Seat Chhe in the Eastern Zone. He brought along with him a letter. Chin Ea stated that in March 1971, he met Seat Chhe (original name Khoem) and then confirmed their relationship. “...a week later, a person named Heng asked me to meet Brother Seat Chhe (alias Khoem) at his office in Mohaleap Village, Mohaleap Sub-district, Koh Soten District, Region 22. When I met Seat Chhe, I gave him a letter signed by So Saphan. San Chhe read the letter and smiled...”

Seat Chhe gave a letter to Chin Ea and asked him to deliver it to another person named Ngin, chief of Srey Santhor District, so that Ngin would work in the revolutionary rank. As planned, Chin Ea met Ngin: “Half a month later, I handed the letter of Brother Khoem to Brother Ngin. ...After that, I stayed with Brother Ngin and acted as his secretary. Sometime later, Brother Ngin told me that they were going to change the name of Brother Khoem, secretary of Region 22, to Tum.” After three months (April-June 1971) working with Ngin, Chin Ea was assigned to serve as chief of Srey Santhor District. “...Up until late November, 1971, Brother Ngin had told me that Brother Tum wanted me to prepare everything and be ready for a Zone-level Congress scheduled to take place on November 27, 1971... Then I asked Brother Ngin for confirmation as to who would attend the conference, him or myself. Brother Ngin replied that all District Secretaries in the Region would attend the conference. The congress commenced on November 27, 1971 in Kroch Chhmar District, Region 21, under the chairmanship of Brother Phim, Party Secretary of the Eastern Zone, and ended a week later...” It was on that occasion that Chin Ea first met “Ta” Phim, through an introduction by Brother Tum. Chin Ea continued, “only then did I realize that the leader of the secret forces against the Khmer Rouge in the Eastern Zone was Ta Phim, not Brother Tum.”

Late in June 1972, Chin Ea attended a special

meeting, held at the office of Ta Phim and Brother Tum, located in Kroch Chhmar District, Region 21. “When he met me, Brother Tum told me that I was asked in a letter from Brother Phim to attend a special meeting at his office in Kroch Chhmar, Region 21 on June 22, 1972”. The meeting was held on June 22, 1972 under the presidency of Ta Phim. The participants were from all institutions and departments of the Eastern Zone. The essence of the meeting centered around the building and strengthening of forces in order to be ready for recapturing power from the Khmer Rouge. The meeting ended on the evening of June 24, 1972.

The confession document of Chin Ea also mentions the relationship between Ta Phim and Vietnamese forces: “The messenger came out with a group of Vietnamese wishing to see Ta Phim. Then I heard Ta Phim talking with those Vietnamese. They laughed occasionally....Brother Tum told me that the Vietnamese (who had just left) had come to talk about the plan to overthrow the Khmer Rouge, because Ta Phim had asked them for assistance. During the discussion, I heard the Vietnamese affirm that they would, at any time, assist in every field Ta Phim would need....The Vietnamese stressed that they were also unhappy with the Khmer Rouge who had been intensively provoking conflicts against them.” On June 29, 1972, Tum organized a lower-level meeting with the aim of transmitting instructions from Ta Phim to all forces. Chin Ea added that at the meeting, Mut, Ngin, Phon, and Chhan all agreed that “as for our people at the moment, most of them are not satisfied with the new authority of the Khmer Rouge. They request a liberation as soon as possible so that they themselves as well as their families may have no more unhappiness.”

During his two years as Chief of Economic Support for Srey Santhor District (from April 1972 to 1974), he managed to recruit nine more people. In mid-1974, Chin Ea was appointed as chief of Commercial Section of Region 22. He stated that he devoted great efforts to clandestinely recruiting more forces. As a result, twenty-six more people were convinced. From 1973 until 1975, neither Ta Phim nor Tum convened any more secret meetings. However, there were private instructions given on a monthly basis. Only on May 25, 1975 was another such meeting held in Kroch Chhmar District under the chairmanship of Ta Phim, with the

participation of leaders from all regions in the Eastern Zone. The meeting agenda concentrated on three issues: 1) reason for the meeting; 2) plan to capture power from the communists; and 3) measures to be taken from that point until the time of the overthrow. At the meeting Ta Phim explained that,

“Because the Khmer Rouge have just captured power throughout the country, they must surely be facing great impediments, as grassroots authorities consisted of peasants who had never held power. Still with only meager supplies, people who have been fighting for five years must face obstacles, including insufficient food and clothing. Since the war ended, people have had no rice to eat. This is a heavy burden that the Khmer Rouge have to endure and tackle. Another problem for the Khmer Rouge is the millions of people forced to move from cities. Evacuees have

nothing to eat. This is also a problem. Not only the problem of rice, but also of salt which the Khmer Rouge cannot solve. Some people eat ashes instead of salt, which results in various diseases, including swelling. Numerous sick people go to hospital every day. Because of this, we have decided to continue with our struggle to take power from the Khmer Rouge by the coming May, 1976. Before carrying out the plan, more activities must be carried out so as to harass and worry the Khmer Rouge every day. The activities to be implemented include encouraging people both ‘old’ and ‘new’ to conclude that the Khmer Rouge are not qualified to govern the country and settle the problem of people’s living conditions. Also, there must be propaganda revealing the fact that people have no freedom of speech, travel, eating, or the use of equipment belonging to them, and that the people are subjected to forced labor without rest. In the meantime, we have to convince people to accept our goal of capturing power from the Khmer Rouge in order for them to live harmony as they used to in earlier days, to master their own land, farm sites and other things, reunite their families, have rights to eat, travel, and use their commodities themselves.”

Each member of the meeting stood up and committed themselves to abiding by the instructions of Ta Phim without fail. In the end, Ta Phim suggested that Chhaom Savat, Chhouk and Norng Saroeun, who were living in the area along the Vietnam border, contact and cooperate as well as possible with the Vietnamese, on whom we could fall back on in the future. The meeting ended on the evening of May 26, 1975.

On June 10, 1975, Ta Phim and Tum called another special meeting in Region 22 to officially transfer Tum from Region 22 to Phnom Penh. Fifteen officials from Region 22 were invited. On that occasion, Ta Phim raised the three-point principle once cited at the previous Zone meeting, and explained that Tum was going to be transferred to Phnom Penh in June, 1975.

S-21 Prisoner



Tum was then replaced by comrade Mut, who was responsible for leading the secret work in Region 22. At the same time that Tum was stationed in Phnom Penh, he was still in charge of undercover operations in Region 22, but he did not work on daily basis. At this point in the document there appears a notation by Duch, the Director of S-21 (page 70) reading: “Comrade interrogator so far has not yet grasped firmly the situation of Tum, who secretly went down to Region 22. Duch June 7, 1977.”

In July 1975, Tum left for Phnom Penh. The management tasks in Region 22 were taken over by Mut. Chin Ea claimed that “...after my departure, I only made contact with Brother Mut.” On the afternoon of December, 1975, Chin Ea met with Tum, who was going down to Region 22 to meet with certain important forces and would then return quickly to his office. Chin Ea said he met Tum on the road from Sithor Kandal District to O Reang Ov. Tum informed Chin Ea of the date for the organized coup so that he could relay it to all forces. The coup was supposed to take place on May 28, 1976. “Then Brother Tum replied to me... Brother has told me that the date for the coup to capture power from the Khmer Rouge is decided by the higher level, and will be May 28, 1976...” The news about the date of the coup was publicized to all network elements. However, the plan was postponed:

“On April 20, 1976, Brother Mut hurriedly visited my place. Brother Mut told me he had just received a letter of instructions from Brother Tum informing that the plans for the May 28, 1976 coup had been leaked to the Khmer Rouge as the result of traitors in our ranks. Some of our forces had already been taken away, and at that moment, the Khmer Rouge were on the trail of some other suspected elements, searching for those who initiated the attempted coup as well as their partisans. Brother Tum claimed that he was also a target of those tracing in the military ranks. Brother Tum ordered all comrades to cease all activities until they received further orders.”

On November 15-16, 1976, a special meeting was held at Zone headquarters in Kroch Chhmar District, under the presidency of Ta Phim. Chin Ea continued, “On the morning of November 15, 1976 all members were sitting at the meeting place next to the office. A moment later, Ta Phim arrived and opened the

meeting.” The meeting focused on three points: 1) the reason for the aborted coup; 2) a second plan for a coup against the Khmer Rouge; and 3) measures to be taken from that point on. Ta Phim explained in detail each of these points. Concerning the date of the planned second coup, Ta Phim stressed, “Our high levels have also decided that the coup to capture power from the Khmer Rouge revolution is now to take place on the 17th of April 1977...”

Another meeting with a similar agenda was organized by Mut, deputy secretary of Region 22, and was held at the former Staff Department on November 20, 1976 in Toury Kandal Village, Srey Santhor Kandal District. Chin Ea stated; “On November 20, 1976 I arrived at the Staff Department to attend a special meeting confirmed by Brother Mut earlier.” After the promulgation of the plan, CIA agents of the Eastern Zone resumed their activities. Chin Ea was subsequently arrested in early March, 1977, and sent to Tuol Sleng prison. At the end of the confession, Chin Ea wrote: “From that point until early March 1977, all comrades continued with their activities. I myself was arrested by Angkar and have been incarcerated until now.”

Based on the date on the confession document, Chin Ea was interrogated at Tuol Sleng prison for 12 days, from May 14 to May 26 of 1977. The confession document written by Chin Ea is 116 pages long. On the front page there is a note stating “Third Confession of Chin Ea alias Sou; history of Chin Ea alias Sou”. Next to it, there is a handwritten letter “S” (Secret) in a box that contains a notation: “Already sent to Angkar. July 27, 1977.” The next page contains notes taken by an interrogator named “Nan”, dated June 4, 1977. These include a message to higher levels describing the interrogation of Chin Ea: “...After that, I tortured him continually, but he refused to respond. Then, after another session of torture, he implicated Ta Phim.” The names of the 92 persons implicated by Chin Ea’s answer appear on nine addended pages, and are grouped into categories: sixteen from the Eastern Zone; fifteen from Region 22; eleven from Chamraen Vichea High School; three from Kampuch Botr High School; seven who were imprisoned along with Chin Ea; two from Kampong Cham, and thirty-eight persons he had recruited.

KILLING PITS IN BANTEAY MEANCHEY PROVINCE


By Kalyan Sann

1) Chamkar Khnao

Our mapping team from the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) continued our research in Banteay Meanchey Province on August 19, 1978. We arrived at the execution site of Chamkar Khnao and managed to find several potential witnesses. Chamkar Khnao execution site is located in O Ambil Village, O Ambil Sub-district, Sisophon District, Banteay Meanchey Province. It is behind Wat Kiri Chum and covers an area of one square hectare. It is located in the middle of Phnom Kaun Kla, Phom Svay and Phnom Chunh Chaing. Now Chamkar Khnao consists of plantations belonging to the villagers. According to a map published by the DK government in 1976, it was located in Region 5, Northwest Zone.

Patriarch Sien Nhean of Wat Sopheak Mongkul, 69, said victims were killed in rows. The victims were of different nationalities, most having been descendents of Vietnamese who had settled in Cambodia a long time ago. Chinese, Muslim Chams, and Laotians had also been executed there. Sien Nhean concluded that approximately 4000 to 5000 executions took place at Chamcar Knao. Victims' remains were dug up after 1979 but were not properly re-buried. As a result, bones were left scattered around the pits. Patriarch Sien Nhean led villagers to bring the remains to be preserved

at the Wat Sopheak Mongkol memorial. Sien Nhean added that the executions at Chamkar Khnao took place between 1976 and late in 1978.




Saom Lang, 63, chief of Wat Sopheak Mongkul, witnessed the excavation of the killing pits by villagers in search for gold in 1979. He stated that the largest pits were five meters wide, 200 meters long and one meter deep, and that the remainder were four meters square. Saom Lang estimated that thousands of people were killed, as one pit could contain an average of more than 500 people. The exhumed remains were taken to a memorial at Wat Sopheak Mongkol for

preservation and for purposes of a national rally, the "Day of Vengeance" celebration.

2) Phnom Srok District

There is a large prison at Phnom Srok District Office, which in the DK time had been part of Region Five, according to the map published by Democratic Kampuchea in 1976. It is located at latitude 13°44'32.03" North, longitude 103°20'07.67" east. The data recorded with our Global Positioning System is classified as file No.R 082003A. Our mapping team arrived at the Phnom Srok District prison at 3: 45 p.m. on August 20, 1998.

Kong Loeu, governor of Phom Srok District, reported on the location of this district and the former prison in Khmer Rouge era. People imprisoned here were of different backgrounds and from all sub-districts of Phnom Srok District. Kong Loeu went on to comment that the Khmer Rouge had called upon all victims to gather together at Wat Chey Udam in an attempt to search for educated people such as intellectuals and government workers, promising to allow them to work in their respective former positions. Unfortunately, the victims were taken by truck to be killed at the Tbeng Bridge near Prey Moan Village, Rohall Sub-district, Preah Net Preah District. The executions took place during 1975 and 1976. An elderly woman named Chhay Rin, currently living in Phnom Penh, stated that during her return to Phnom Penh in 1979, she had walked across execution sites at Daem Po



Bei, located in Prey Moan Village, where she saw many corpses scattered about. She added that Phnom Srok District had been a place for holding Phnom Penh evacuees targeted for execution.

Mr. Chhum Ruom, 50, deputy chief of Phnom Srok District, was also one of those who had been asked to attend the previously noted meeting. He recalled that the people had been deluded by the Khmer Rouge into believing that they were being brought to meet the King. The

Khmer Rouge also tricked the people by saying they would be allowed to hold their former positions. All these people were soon slaughtered in Prey Moan Village. As for himself, he survived the killing through the help of a local villager. Chhum Ruom added that a former People's representative named Chou Phot had also been imprisoned there, and was later killed at Daem Tra Meng, located in Srah Chik Village, Srah Chik Sub-district, Phnom Srok District.

3) Prey Kok Trach

Prey Kok Trach was a main execution site located in Kok Trach Sub-district, Phnom Srok District. It is about 1,500 meters from Phnom Srok District Office. According to the DK map published in 1976, Kok Trach site was located in Region 5. A bodhi tree is planted there to mark the execution site, which is located at latitude 13°44'45.97" North, longitude 103°19'43.07" east. The data recorded with our Global Positioning System is classified as file No. R0082005A. The mapping team arrived at the site on August 20, 1998.

An elderly woman, living in Poy Snuol Village, Poy Cha Sub-district, Phnom Srok District, remembers that she saw the Khmer Rouge bring about ten people to be killed at Prey Kok Trach every two days. She stated that sometimes entire families were executed together. She said she could not estimate the number of people killed at Prey Kok Trach, but that many people were slaughtered.

Chhum Ruom noted there were no grave pits left, as the victims' bodies had not been buried. Instead, they had been left scattered around the area. Concerning the executions at Prey Kok Trach, Mr. Tatt Chhoeum, living in Poy Snuol Village, Poy Cha Sub-district, claimed that sometime after 1979, when he was walking across Prey Kok Trach to pull rice seedlings, he witnessed bodies lying about, along with belts, ropes, and strips of clothes that had been used to blindfold the victims' eyes. He said local villagers who were working in their fields would also come upon remains. Chhoeum pointed out that the execution site was only half a kilometer from the main road, and that all people, whether base people or new people, were killed if they committed purported offenses.


4) Ang Toek Trapeang Thma

This was another main execution site, located 5,900 meters from the District Headquarters in


Trapeang Thma Kandal Village, Poy Cha Sub-district, Phnom Srok District. The reservoir there was constructed between 1975 and late 1976. It is ten kilometers long, seven kilometers wide and can hold seven million cubic meters of water for dry season irrigation of paddies in two districts, Preah Net Preah and Phnom Srok. The district governor said the Khmer Rouge gathered people from all districts of Region 5: Thmar Puok, Serey Sophon, and Preah Net Preah, as well as people from Phnom Penh, to build this reservoir.

The execution site is located at latitude 13°47'02.22" north, longitude 103°18'18.52" east. The data was recorded with our Global Positioning System and is classified as file No. R082004A.

Mr. Tann Minh, 39, one of those who worked on the site for more than a month, claimed that thousands of people died at this reservoir from execution, starvation, and overwork. Not all of them had been outsiders, for everyone was forced to dig the reservoir. People were killed for the slightest offences, including failing to fulfil the tasks assigned and breaking the handles of tools. A person was required to move two cubic meters of soil a day. People who failed to meet this target were killed, while others died from overwork. Tann Minh stated that grave pits were located immediately next to the reservoir and at its bottom. Chhay Rin, who'd been sent to work the reservoir along with her children, corroborated this, stating that many people had been killed there. Exhumed remains from various execution sites in the district were taken to a memorial at Wat Kandal for preservation, 500 meters from the Phnom Srok District Headquarters.



Ang Toek (Bassin) Trapeang Thma



September 30, 1976, marks the 25th anniversary of the delightful Communist Party of Kampuchea. Today the people of Kampuchea, revolutionary army of Kampuchea, male and female combatants, cadre of all levels celebrate the 25th anniversary in a solemn atmosphere of great solidarity and happiness on receipt of newly accomplished victories of new revolutionary tasks, defending and building the country under the direction of socialist revolution and building socialism. The 25th anniversary of Communist Party of Kampuchea is held this year as a dedication to the eminent efforts of our party, who succeeded in driving American imperialists and their lackeys from the country and liberated our people. Moreover, it is celebrated with an aim to copy the absolute sacrifice and heroism of the party, that is the stance of independence, self-reliance, self-mastery over the fate of the nation, which have been the radiant traditional nature of our party.

Since its birth (on September 30, 1951), the Communist Party of Kampuchea has led people and male and female youths to stand up with arms-struggle

against the French colonialists, who were completely expelled in 1954, by which time our party was just five years of age. The party had to lead the nation and people as well as male and female youths of Kampuchea in the political struggle against interference, aggression, and subversion by Americans and their lackeys in order to protect both the national independence of our country and its freedom and democracy from being crushed under the fascist oppression and violent robbery of power-holding elements such as feudalists, capitalists, and reactionaries. Our party worked on this field for 13 years (1955-1967) overcoming numerous obstacles. Our party started its work with bare hands. We had no strategic guidelines, party statutes, economic support, or army-only our stance of serving the people, and our absolute stance against enemies of the nation and class enemies. We took no position of compromising. For the first step, the party made all out efforts, facing impediments and hardship, and sacrificing everything in order to both indoctrinate and educate people, male and female youths of Kampuchea, to stand up for

revolutionary struggle, actively lead the struggle movement, and extend ourselves in the revolutionary movement among the masses.

In 1960, our party became independent in form of strategic guidelines and methods used as a compass or lantern to show the way of further revolutionary struggle and to establish the party's statutes without fail. Based on the fundamental principles of the party's statutes and strategic guidelines as well as on the methods created by the fresh blood of many people, male and female youths and cadre, the party went on with the political struggle movement until 1967 and gained victories successively. Several planned coups organized by American imperialists and their lackeys to capture power by peaceful, legitimate means were aborted. We had rejected the poisonous economic aid of American imperialists, driven the embassy of the U.S. and other countries off Kampuchea, and maintained the independence, peace, and neutrality of Kampuchea.

In 1968-69, the party led people and youths to struggle by both military and political means to prevent and put an end to the internal war with fascist characteristics, inflicted by American imperialists and their lackeys. Both the national and international situations at this time became very tense and intricate. We were in a difficult situation where what needed to be done required the highest devotion and self-reliance so that the situation could be improved. Yet, our party absolutely devoted everything for leading people and youths to smash enemies and get rid of fascist internal war. During this time, we not only managed to deal with enemies, protect revolutionary forces and the revolutionary back, but also actively led the struggle movement to smash a number of enemy forces and attack enemies by both military and political means successively. As for our party, it not only managed to protect itself but also rapidly improved its quality and size. In the meantime, the party assigned and recruited armed forces, which are considered as instrumental to dictatorship, and to be used when it needed.

Due to their failure in the internal war, on March 18, 1970, American imperialists and their lackeys staged a military coup against the independence, peace, and neutrality of Kampuchea. They attempted to use our country as a military base and their new protectorate. At that time, the country was in a

tumultuous situation. Internal war became coarse war of aggression by American imperialists and their lackeys. The perils took the lives of our nation, people and youths. Facing this situation however, the Communist Party of Kampuchea was not shocked, as the party was ready in both standpoint adherence and other criteria. Therefore, soon thereafter, the party led the whole nation and people to stand up for revolutionary war, by actively wiping out the war of aggression by the American imperialists and their lackeys, based on the standpoint of independence, self-reliance, and self-mastery in the control of the country. As a result, the party gained successive victories. In the new phase of the revolutionary war, the party not only mastered the struggle against the aggression of American imperialists and their lackeys, but also strengthened and extended itself over 70 percent of the whole country's territory, known as liberated areas and among the revolutionary army, which consisted of three categories. Also, the party strengthened and extended the economy for self-support and self-reliance, and assigned new revolutionary authorities to govern the vast liberated areas with self-mastery.

1973 marked an immense historical turning point of our revolutionary movement. At that time, Vietnam and Laos started negotiations on a cease-fire. An emergent issue for us was whether we take the position of cease-fire or continue to fight against the American imperialists alone. At that moment, the general world situation became tense and complicated. Facing such a situation, our Communist Party of Kampuchea, both in the country and in the world, committed to devoting everything to continuing to lead the people and male and female youths to fight against American imperialists for the sake of existence and prestige of our nation, people, revolutionary movement and of our Communist Party of Kampuchea. The Party has devoted everything, such as leading the people of Cambodian and the nation to defeat the largest scale air-war in the history of world war carried out by Americans, who utilized thousands of bombers and a wide variety of fighter planes based in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region to conduct raids on the Cambodian people with their tiny territory at full strength day and night over a period of 195 days. On August 15, 1973, the Party led a revolutionary struggle

Comrade Saom Hok Sreng



movement and succeeded in pouncing upon the abusive air-war initiated by the American imperialists. Furthermore, our Party managed to direct the nation and people as well as male and female youths to continue to fight the war of aggression by American imperialists and their lackeys and the theoretical Khmerization of the Nixon Doctrine, which tried to drive a wedge between Khmer and Khmer until the day of triumph on April 17, 1975.

This is a brief history of the struggle with highly dedicated spirit and revolutionary heroism by our Communist Party of Kampuchea which had a sharp stance of attacking enemies and absolute no-reconciliation standpoint with enemies. The struggle history of the Party is the history of self-reliant standpoint and self-mastery over the fate of the nation at all times. The Party headed the struggle movement from the time when it had only bare hands until the day of independent establishment of the Party's statute and strategic political guidelines and methodologies. Furthermore, the Party succeeded in founding the three types of armed forces that were so brave and strong that

they could institute a solid authority and the fastest-growing economy that we could rely on during the time of war until the complete victory was gained. This is the struggle history of the Party during the past few years.

To sum up, adhering to the stance of independence, self-mastery over its nation, the Party could extend itself rapidly, build everything which had not been created earlier and achieve revolutionary democratic nationalism during a period of only 24 years-the shortest time in the history of achievement of any of the world's revolutionary movements.

Since the glorious day of April 16, 1975, the Party has been guiding the people, workers, peasants, and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea and male and female youths to go on with the socialist revolution and the building of socialism under a stance of independence and self-reliance so as to defend and build the country with the speed of several great leaps forward. Only one year after the war and devastation, albeit enemies from all directions are still attempting to destroy, overthrow our revolution and swallow our territory, the Party has been in control of the situation and led the nation, people of Kampuchea and male and female youths to defend the revolutionary achievement. Meanwhile, the Party has been leading the nation, people of Kampuchea and male and female youths to put efforts into restoring the national economy and working intensively on agricultural production with a view to settling the problems of the people's living standard.

Now we are in a phase of building socialism and systematically defending the country. We want to restore our country as quickly as possible and maintain the stance of independence and sovereignty in order to upgrade the people's living standards and build the country with a speed of several great leaps forward. In the meantime, the country must also absolutely be defended. Therefore, the guidelines for building socialism and the country's systematic defense from this year on must be based on the stance of independence and self-reliance. Obviously, from our experience during the struggle for revolutionary democratic nationalism, we learned that the victory could not be gained unless the above-mentioned factors were absolutely relied upon.

(Continued)

Vorn Vet



VORN VET aka SOK THUOK

- ◆ 1952 (May) Demonstrations.
- ◆ 1954 Fled from Phnom Penh when his uncle was arrested. Arrested and imprisoned for four months.
- ◆ 1956 Teacher at the Chamroeun Vichea High School.
- ◆ 1958 City Party Committee of KPRP responsible for workers.
- ◆ 1962 Secretary of Phnom Penh branch of KPRP.
- ◆ 1963 Member of the Party Center against armed struggle.
- ◆ 1968 Based in the Cardamon mountains, but forced to return to Phnom Penh after contracting malaria.
- ◆ 1969 Returned to the Southwest, but was ill until 1970.
- ◆ 1973 Control of Region 25.
- ◆ 1974 Control of Region 11 (Koh Kong province.) Headquarters at Am-Leang.
- ◆ 1975 Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Defense.
- ◆ 1976 Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Economy.
- ◆ 1977 Executed after torture at S-21 prison.

BIOGRAPHY OF COMRADE KONG



(Continued)

1) Phase 1: 1958-1960. I joined a movement with students and intellectuals with a view to unifying Cambodian emigrants living abroad and then form a ‘front’ to fight against imperialists and feudalistic and reactionary classes in order to reach the goal of revolutionary democratic nationalism. I became responsible for the activities within the framework of “Khmer Home” Committee mostly consisting of members of the “Khmer Student Union”. During this time, I managed to maintain the spirit of attack with which I’d been imbued when I was in Kampuchea.

2) Phase 2: 1961-1966. It was a time when influence of revisionism dominated us, which drove us into becoming confused with standpoints and stance against enemies-imperialists and class enemies. However, I noted that American imperialists were still life-and-death enemies of our people and nation, while their lackeys were none other than Chau Sang, Lon Nol, and Nhiek Tioulong. Yet, the guidelines for life-and-death contradiction resolution were ambiguous. I

argued that “democratic nationalism” could be practiced in Kampuchea. In the field of leadership, I didn’t think Sihanoukists were qualified. Only with the Leninist Party could leadership be on a good track. For internal conflicts between [us] and the imperialists and their lackeys, I thought they could be solved by motivating the Sihanouk administration to curb and fight against interference, invasion, and sabotage by American imperialists and their lackeys. It is important to note that in 1962, we did not read or learn about the point of views and stance of the party. The party tried to send documents on the correct points of view on situations to us in order to update us. Unfortunately, the supervisor of “Leninist Group” named Chuon Mom failed to spread the news among us. This was the reason for our unawareness. Sometimes, I learned that the party had sent such documents through overheard conversations, but when I asked about it, I was given evasive answers. Most sections replied negatively, asserting that the documents were nothing but personal letters.

In April, 1963, leading brothers went on to further the struggle movement in local bases. This was a historical event bearing strategic, deep importance for the future of our nation and the Kampuchean revolution. What was my thought and stance? First, I was very surprised by the event as at that time the movements of masses against American imperialism were gaining in momentum. Sihanouk then announced that he would accept no more assistance from the U.S. We didn’t agree with that stance either overtly or covertly. When enemy attacks took place, mostly there were responses, in a manner of blow receiving, that brothers were escaping from the contemptible Lon Nol’s execution. I presumed that it was true. I thought

very much about this thing. However, it was very confusing between revolution and anti-revolution. And there was the same idea as the enemy's—that it was not appropriate for brothers to flee into the jungle. As King Sihanouk was attacking American imperialists, why did they chose to leave him alone?

This is my view and stance of revisionism in connection with the life of the nation, Kampuchean revolution, and of communism being embedded in me since my childhood. I have been committed to achieving these objectives for my whole life.

3) Phase 3: From 1967 to the day of the coup, the situation in Kampuchea became more and more serious. Contemptible Lon Nol took power for the first time. I thought that it was impossible to come to power by means of parliamentary election. The dike opening for a reactionary coup by American imperialists could not be avoided. That was my impression. There was no clear stance and measures to be taken yet.

When the event of Samlot broke out, it appeared to be the act of American lackeys with the conspiracy of Sihanoukists who spread massacre against innocent people and our male and female revolutionary cadre. I strongly condemned such fascist commission by power holding class in the quarterly bulletin, “Khmer Student Union”. Through the bulletin, we expressed our belief in Brother Khieu Samphan, as former deputy of the Khmer Student Union. In the meantime, we also listed down the names of the contemptible Hou Yun and Hou Nim.

We never knew that the Soviet revisionists said “the Khmer Rouge were extreme leftists”. We didn't learn these words until 1970, after the coup against King Sihanouk, who then told us that after the event at Samlot, the Soviet ambassador based in Phnom Penh had met with Sihanouk and hinted that the Soviet Union would support him against those who caused the massacre at Samlot.

After realizing that the situation was evolving from worse to worst, I was not surprised at all, and the

Khmer Student Union condemned the coup immediately at a meeting held on April 22, 1970 by Kampuchean immigrants residing in France.

Kampuchean immigrants in France were also influenced by the tension. It was because the stance of Leninist Group revisionists was so extreme in favor of Sihanouk that no patriotic students and intellectuals living abroad were mobilized. Patriotic youths did not trust the Leninist Group as it held the stance of the Soviets and was in favor of Vietnam. Internal conflicts became worse. It was a chaotic situation where no one knew who to believe. For myself, I lost sight of the future of the revolution. I thought of nothing besides my personal affairs—how to earn my living and my family's. It was because of this situation that I, at the age of 30, chose to marry a French primary school teacher on November 9, 1967.

In 1969 contemptible Touch Kham Doeun resigned from his position as Chief of the Khmer Student Union without the consent of the group members. The Group decided to choose another member named Tun Chot Sirin for the position, but he refused. Then I was appointed. I became a Chief of the Khmer Student Union until the day of my visit to Beijing (on May 15, 1970). In May 1970, the Conference of the Khmer Student Union reselected me for this position. But, another (female) member named In Sopheap dissented and walked out of the meeting. The reasons for her dissatisfaction were because she didn't trust me as I was a revisionist and class enemies, including Sarin, Chhakk, Vann and Piny, were also in action.

During that period of time, the contemptible traitors Hakk Seang and Lay Ny went to France two times, once in 1965 and once in 1966. During the two trips I did not make contact with them at any meetings, as the contemptible Touch Kham Doeun was the former Chief of the Khmer Student Union and, covertly, Thioun Mumm was responsible for the Leninist Group. Kham Doeun made contact several times with Chuon

Mom, especially in July, 1966. Overtly, this contemptible person constantly raised the issue of the Khmer Student Union in Europe. Our side was also vigilant because we didn't want to have any problems, in relation to the contact with East Europe and with the French administration.

In 1968, Roeung Mach went to France with a book of criticism against the Buddhist Socialism of Sihanouk, as well as leaflets bearing a series of signatures of revisionist students in the Soviet Union reading: "Communist Party of Kampuchea". These documents were posted to the Khmer Student Union. Beside these documents, I had no idea of their reasons for travelling to France.

During this time, the Leninist Group had closer relationship with Yuon [Vietnamese] Progressive Students, particularly Thiounn Mumm and Nguyen Khach Vien, chief of the "Vietnamese Student Union" based in France. The Leninist Group completely fell in with the notion of Indochina, believing that the Yuon had no ambition of swallowing our territory as it had been following communism like ours on the basis of equal rights, mutual interest and brotherly relationship in the way a human family performs. After the "Indochina" summit in 1970, the student unions of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam held a meeting in favor of the summit in Paris. I was the chairman of the meeting held on May 21, 1970.

On May 15, 1970, I traveled to Beijing with the aim of conveying the support of the Khmer Student Union to the National United Front of Kampuchea and to observe what was happening there. Along the way to Beijing as chief of the Khmer Student Union, I was in transit in Moscow when I met with the Soviet Union's Student Organization for the purpose of introducing the Kampuchean situation after the coup and during the time when the Americans and their lackeys were preparing their troops to invade Kampuchea. I took this opportunity to call for the organization's support of the struggle movement of Kampuchean people. And then

the government of the Soviet Union recognized Kampuchea's National Union government. The attitude of the Soviet students was not very supportive. They just said: "Soviet Student Organization supports the position of Soviet government on Kampuchean issues." I left the meeting with great disappointment as there was no doubt that the Soviet Union did not recognize the National Union Government of Kampuchea.

On May 19, 1970, I arrived in Beijing. I held no position. I just helped individuals with this and that.

In May 25, 1970, I became a member of a delegation of the National Union Front as the government of Kampuchea, headed by Sihanouk, was visiting Hanoi. I was very excited by the way my vision became revisionist, in that I saw nothing different between Vietnam and our country.

However, I was so impressed by the way Vietnam welcomed Sihanouk as he had been in the past. Sihanouk's favorite music and artistic performances were displayed. Nothing contained revolutionary characteristics. Furthermore, Vietnamese officials serving the Kampuchean delegation had correct standpoint. They liked to talk about women and songs from western countries, such as Italy and France.

On June 4, 1970, we returned to Beijing and stayed there for a period of time. We decided not to return to France and I asked for permission from the front to bring my wife here. She arrived in China on July 7, 1970.

Reasons for my decision

1) I wanted to contribute to the fight against the war of aggression by American imperialists.

2) I wanted to have some influence in the National Union Front of Kampuchea.

At that time we lived in an environment of feudalism and capitalism and enjoyed influence and rank.

With my own initiative and support from young members, I began to write and published the weekly "Bulletin of National United Front of Kampuchea".

Then there was the establishment of an office for propaganda accredited to the bureau of the National United Front of Kampuchea. From that time I started promulgating texts via broadcast on radio to mobilize Khmer immigrants. We carried out this work until a CIA headquarters was established on August 10, 1970.

In the weekly publication, we were inclined toward the stance of great revisionism. For example, we broadcast activities or statements by the Soviet Union and its partisans who were in favor of our Kampuchean struggle movement. Among our brotherly nations, I focused mainly on Vietnam, because Vietnam and Laos had the same battlefield characteristics. On the other hand, we considered China as a rear regardless the fact that China was our strategic backer.

As far as the dispute between the Soviet Union and China was concerned, I adhered to revisionism. For example, we refused China's film showing on conflicts between the Soviet Union and China under a pretext that this was an affair of Soviet and Chinese relations, and that Kampuchean people should not have to choose sides. This had been our standpoint and attitude toward revisionism long before we met the Party in July 1971.

Rationale for standpoint and stance of revisionism

1) I was on the side of the standpoint and stance of private ownership of the oppressive class, devotion and struggle organized for personal interests of influence and rankism. In the situation where revolutionary forces and people in the world realized and became more active along with the influence of socialism, I decided to take 'honorable way' by choosing to follow revolution with the poor people. However, struggle with enemy required hardship and high devotion-life sacrifice. Therefore, choosing 'revisionism' there would have both name revolution and honor, and the condition of hardship would be less severe to the point that we can endure based on our position as quasi-technicians.


(Continued)



Khieu Ponnary

KHIEU PONNARY aka YIM

- ◆ Born in Battambang province. Father was a judge. Attended Sisowath High School. Received a baccalaureate from France.
- ◆ 1951 Returned to Phnom Penh from France and began publishing a women's magazine called "Neary", in association with Madame Son Sann.
- ◆ 1956 Married to Saloth Sar, also known as Pol Pot, on Bastille Day in France.
- ◆ 1961 July, founded secret communist women's organization.
- ◆ 1965 Fled to jungle.
- ◆ 1973 Party Secretary of Kampong Thom (considered a severe area).
- ◆ 1976 Chairwoman of the Association of Democratic Women of Kampuchea.



PLACE OF ASYLUM TRANSFORMED INTO INCARCERATION CENTER

By Pong Rasy Pheng

Victory Hospital is the former Prek Tnaot Asylum, an institution for the care of the mentally ill and the aged before the Khmer Rouge era. Between 1955 and 1964, the asylum was under the authority of Dr Son Mam. The name of the institution was Son Mam Hospital from 1964 to 1975. Dr Chamraen Oeun was Son Mam's successor after Mon's death in 1964. The hospital functioned until April 15, 1975, when the Khmer Rouge came to power. From then until January 7, 1979, the hospital functioned as a detention center.

A victim named Daok Sokhai, who had been a staff member of the institution since 1955, stated that after 1979 he saw holes on the wall designed to secure devices for holding prisoners being tortured. He also stated that most of the inmates had been disabled people brought from Phnom Penh and various other places. The victims were executed near the institution after being tortured. Corpses were buried in pits on which coconut trees were then planted, with a view to making them grow faster. At that time, 130 coconut trees flourished there. In 1980, there were cuffs scattered

inside and outside building. There were also lashes and tables, presumably used for interrogation.

The original floor tiles are white, while newer ones are yellow. The iron window bars in the administration office were replaced in the Khmer Rouge time. These bars had prevented patients from wandering around. This building has two floors with more than thirty rooms. Although renovations have been made, it still looks like a place intended for incarceration. The iron bars used for shackling prisoners are still lying about, and the previously noted holes in the walls for securing victims are found in most rooms. Twenty-four of the thirty rooms on the ground floor were used for detention of prisoners. The remaining smaller rooms were used for storage and as toilets.

Following are assertions by victims who had known much about the former asylum before and after the fall of Ta Khmau, and after 1979.

Daok Sokhai, administrative staff member of Victory Hospital



I am 65 years old. I was born in Ta Khmau Sub-district, Kandal Stung District, Kandal Province. Currently I live in Prek Anchanh Village, Prek Russei Sub-district, Ta Khmau District, Kandal Province. Between 1955 and April 1975, I worked in the asylum. In 1980, after the liberation day, I resumed my position in the institution. Administration had been my job since my first employment until my retirement in 1992. During the Khmer Rouge control (1975-1979) I had not been working closely with the hospital. Neither was I living in Kandal Province. I was relocated to Pursat Province by two unknown Khmer Rouge cadre on the night of May 4, 1975.

For twenty days after the fall of Ta Khmau town—April 15, 1975—I lived and disguised myself among insane patients until May 5, 1975. The Khmer Rouge expelled all asylum staff warning there would be bombardments by the Americans. My family had thirteen members. During that time (April 15-May 5, 1975) I witnessed incidents such as the shooting to break open the doors of the asylum for the insane

people to leave, and the emptying of the medical supply warehouse. On April 16, the Khmer Rouge took materials they had gathered from the institution to unknown destinations. During my twenty days with the patients, a 12 or 13 year old Khmer Rouge cadre, using a Carbine, shot at me being in a room which is now part of the Tuberculosis Building. Fortunately, he did not hit me. After firing at me, the young cadre turned away indifferently. I also saw insane people working here and there and wearing the military uniforms left scattered in the asylum compound by the fleeing Lon Nol soldiers. In some cases, they held guns in the arrogant manner of real soldiers. Among them, some were killed immediately by the Khmer Rouge, while others were shipped away from the institution, as the Khmer Rouge apparently thought they were genuine Lon Nol soldiers. In mid-April, 1975, Khmer Rouge asked me to raise pigs and slaughter them for their food. It was because I had chances to go out that I learned these things. At 8 p.m. on May 4, 1975, two Khmer Rouge elements came to knock at my door and called my name, “Khai!Khai!

come out for a moment”. I then opened the door and saw two people. Immediately, they pointed guns at my head accusing me of being a chief of the hospital. I replied: “No I am not. I am an insane person like those patients. I used to be a hospital staff member in Kampong Luong District. But I was so sick and then sent in here to handle papers and things like that. However, I cannot write, as I am now suffering mental disease.” After listening to my explanation, the Khmer Rouge asked me to leave the hospital by the following day. Between April 15-May 5, 1975, our family lived in intense fear. I reached Pursat Province in 1976.

After 1980, I returned to my homestead along with a son and a daughter. Also, I returned to the asylum to prepare and renovate it in the interest of local survivors. I saw stains where bloodied hands had dragged from the upper to lower parts of the walls of a room of Building “Chor”, the department for treatment of general diseases. Foot-cuffs remained scattered inside and outside the rooms on the hospital premises. I and a number of staff members gathered and brought them for disposal at a banana plantation and under the Mai Sakk trees behind the asylum. Each cuff had a ‘U’ shape with two holes for the insertion of an iron bar. Both sides of entrance-wall in each room of Building “Chor” were riddled with holes designed for inserting iron bars into the foot-cuff holes and securing them to the main bar that lay outside the room. The holes were cemented over by myself and the hospital staff in the 1980’s. Floor-tiles used for repairing the holes were not the same as the original tiles. I just took them from various places where different kinds of tiles were available.

Mr. Penh Say, administrative chief of Victory Hospital

I am now an administrative chief of Victory Hospital. In the Sihanouk regime, I worked in Ang Duong Hospital. In June, 1979, I worked in the then-asylum by order of the provincial bureau of Kandal. When I first came, I noticed that the hospital was surrounded with forest that was so dense that we could hardly see all the buildings at one glance. I and Ngov Horn (unidentified) started arranging the rooms of the buildings

in preparation for patients’ hospitalization. During this process in Building “Chor” I saw lots of cuffs, bolts, tables, lashes, etc. I presumed this was a place used for interrogation and incarceration. Each room bore many holes in the floors designed for inmates to urinate. When I entered this hospital, I saw patients in extremely poor condition, due to starvation under the Khmer Rouge. They hinted that this hospital had been used for keeping handicapped persons herded off from cities and various places throughout the nation. Those disabled victims were made to dig three wells in the north part of the hospital. The wells were used to bury bodies slaughtered on May 20, 1977, after the Khmer Rouge’s first wave of killing. Now the hospital is surrounded with coconut trees in neat lines. In the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes, there had been no such view. Based on my reports, there are one hundred thirty coconut trees in the compound. The trees were planted in the Pol Pot time. Before planting, the Khmer Rouge placed victims’ corpses in the holes first, and then put coconut tree seedlings on top. All corpses were those of handicapped people. In the surrounding areas of the hospital, there had been cadre whose good points were praised by Khmer Rouge. They lived under high-level command, and had been married to the most beautiful village girls. Most handicapped persons detained here (inside the hospital) were those who were evacuated from Phnom Penh.

Daok Sokhai





Photo: Hong Hun, female combatant arrested October 1976.

Voices from S-21

Chapter two: A Total Institution

By David Chandler

(Continued)

Several medical study notebooks were recovered at S-21, but the teachers, students, and locations of the medical lessons are unknown. A pocket-sized notebook discovered near the prison suggests that bizarre experiments were sometimes carried out by prison personnel. These included bleeding prisoners to death and seeing how long dead bodies took to rise to the surface of a tank of waters. Elsewhere in the country, fatal surgery was sometimes carried out on anaesthetized prisoners to teach anatomy to medical cadres. It is possible that experiments of this kind were also conducted on prisoners at S-21 and hardly

surprising if the records have not survived.

Profile of Prison Personnel

What kinds of people worked in the units at the prison? Duch, Chan, and Pon were Sino-Cambodians in their thirties who had worked as schoolteachers; the senior interrogators Pu and Tuy probably came from similar backgrounds. Most of their subordinates at S-21 were young ethnic Khmer from rural areas. Before joining the revolution in the civil war they had been students in primary school, apprentice monks, or helpers on their parents' farms. Hardly any had lived in cities or worked for pay.

Of some 166 S-21 employees who completed biographical statements in 1976 when they came to work at the prison, 44 classified themselves as "poor peasants," 99 as "lower middle peasants," 16 as "middle peasants," 1 as a "worker," and 6 as "petty bourgeois." Five of the latter had been students when they joined the revolutionary ranks; the six had been a teacher. Allowing for a male gender bias in the sample, the profile of workers at S-21 replicated the class structure of prerevolutionary rural Khmer society, in which the vast majority of rural families owned land, and would have been categorized as "middle" peasants.

The Khmer Rouge, like its counterpart in Mao's China, made virtues of inexperience and ignorance, preferring young people who were, in Mao's phrase, "poor and blank" to those corrupted by capitalism or extensive schooling. In praising the "poor and blank" Mao asserted that "a sheet of blank paper carries no burden, and the most beautiful characters can be written on it, the most beautiful picture painted." In Cambodia, the "upper brothers" were in charge of commanding respect—a respect derived in several cases from their own extensive schooling—enjoyed inscribing their ideas on others. They chose their subordinates from the least-trained member of society and demanded their respect.⁵⁵

Duch, Chan, Ho, and Pon were indeed "older brothers" to most of their subordinates. Only twenty-five of those completing the S-21 personnel forms in 1976 were over twenty-five years old; twenty were under eighteen. One hundred eight were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. Kok Sros, who was twenty-five when he came to S-21, has said that guards

Kok Sros

recruited after mid-1977 were markedly younger than those assigned to the prison earlier.

Nearly all of the lower-ranking workers at the prison were young, unmarried men. Through -out world history, young men have been easily uprooted or have uprooted themselves to pursue new lives among

others of their own age. Stints of travel, military service, religious life, banditry, pilgrimage, wage labor, and university study have often served to mark the transition between childhood and maturity. In the Cambodian revolution thousand of young women were also “liberated” to take up duties as soldiers, cadres, and district leaders—position unthinkable for Khmer women in prerevolutionary times. Many young Cambodians fighting on both sides had found the war exciting, and while several soldiers confined to S-21 had deserted the ranks because they “missed their mothers and fathers,” One prisoner in his confession claimed to have joined the revolution because he was angry with his parents. Many survivors of the DK era, now in their mid-thirties, enjoyed the freedom of moving around the country as teenagers, much as the young Red Guards in Maoist China had done.

Many of the S-21 workers had “joined the revolution” (choul padevat) when they were very young. Nhem En was only ten. Six years later, when he came to S-21, others his age were working there. Photographs of these self-satisfied, smiling teenagers, many wearing oversized Mao style caps, adorn the walls of the Museum of Genocidal Crimes. For many of them, the “Organization” had replaced their mothers and fathers. Responding to its desires, filtered through the commands of their “older brothers,” they were often capable of extreme cruelty.

Adolescents have earned a reputation in many countries for their malleability, idealism, their hunger for approval, and their aptitude for violence. Talking to Philip Gourevitch in 1996, the psychiatrist Richard

Mollica discussed the Hutu warriors in Rwanda, whose age and background resembled those of the workforce at S-21. “In my opinion,” he said, “the psychology of young people is not that complicated, and most of the people who commit most of the atrocities in these situations are young males. Young males are really the most dangerous people on the planet, because they easily respond to authority and they want approval. They are given the rewards for getting into the hierarchical system, and they’re given to believe they’re building heaven on earth.... Young people are very idealistic and the powers prey on them.”

Problems arose at the prison with young people precisely because they were “poor and blank.” Their exposure to revolutionary discipline, to say nothing of Marxist-Leninist ideas, had been hortatory, brief, and haphazard. What they had learned in study sessions was no guarantee of good work habits. Their raw energy, so attractive in its revolutionary potential, was difficult for older people to harness. In the short time they were at DK’s disposal, many of these boys and girls were impossible to educate. As a Party spokesman noted ruefully at a cabinet meeting in May 1975:

Speaking of young, untrained people, they are honest, dedicated, and vigorous. These are their strong points. As for shortcomings, our young brothers and sisters play around too much; their culture is weak and they are illiterate and innumerate to the extent that the places where they work encounter difficulties.

After the regime collapsed, Ieng Sary explained the disastrous history of DK to the American journalist Henry Kamm. “We did not choose our public

servants well,” he said disingenuously. “We lost some control.” He neglected to say that DK “Chose” its “public servants” from among the least qualified people in the country after all the incumbents had been dismissed and thousands of them had been summarily put to death.

Maong Tha



Samrith Neang

Very few of the workers at S-21 had been “revolutionaries” for long. Only twenty-nine of those completing personnel forms in 1976 had “entered the revolution” before 1973, when Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia and a massive U.S. bombing campaign forestalled Khmer

Rouge attacks on Phnom Penh. Fifty-eight of the workers joined in that year, forty-three in 1974, and forty-two in the first few months of 1975. The remaining five had “joined the revolution” after the capture of Phnom Penh. The only training that any of them received for working at S-21 was a two-week session of studying “politics” (nayobay) at a “technical school” run at Ta Khmau in sector 25 by “Brother [Kim] Tuy,” who later became an interrogator and administrator at S-21.

For many, the school may have been their first encounter with a total institution. If study sessions from the DK era serve as any guide, those that Kim Tuy conducted would have involved listening to hortatory lectures, memorizing slogans, and preparing brief, self-critical autobiographies.

Students would have marched from place to place singing revolutionary songs. They would have been allowed very little sleep. Like newly enrolled members of a religious movement, they were expected to emerge from the school with an intensified focus and a shared sense of exaltation.

The cohort of workers at the prison appears geographically cohesive. Of those who completed biographical statements, one hundred one of the men and thirty-two of the women had been born and raised in the region designated as Sector 25, north of Phnom Penh, while twenty-nine came from Sector 31, three from Sector 32, thirteen from Sector 33—all northwest of the capital—and one from Sector 41, to the north. They were drawn from military units that were relocated to the capital in 1975.

Sector 25 was a thickly settled, relatively prosperous area housing thousands of Chinese and Sino-Khmer market gardeners and town dwellers as well a majority of ethnic Khmer rice farmers. In the 1960s the region had been represented in the National Assembly by Khieu Samphan, who was popular in the electorate and encouraged followers to join the clandestine Communist Party. “Everyone in the region loved Khieu Samphan,” Him Huy has recalled. Four years after his flight to the maquis in 1967, when many had thought him dead, Samphan became a key member of the Party Center. Until his defection to the Phnom Penh government in 1998, he was a formidable, malevolent survivor.

In summary, making an exception for the “older brothers,” most of whom sprang from Cambodia’s minuscule intelligentsia, S-21 workers were of similar age, class, experience, and geographic origins. They also resembled the majority of the people incarcerated in the prison.

Prisoners at S-21

The number of prisoners at S-21 varied, reflecting the waxing and waning of the purges that swept through DK from mid-1976 onward. These are discussed in detail in chapter 3. The prison’s maximum capacity, reached in 1977, was around 1,500 prisoners. On 20 April of that year, the prison held 1,242 prisoners, of whom 105 were female. It was probably in this period that Nhem En saw truckloads of prisoners arrive at S-21 and be taken off almost immediately to be killed, without being photographed or interrogated, presumably because they were considered unimportant and there was no space in the prison.

At other times, S-21 held only a few hundred people. In 1975, fewer than 200 people were held by Santebal. The number rose to 1,622 in 1976, with more than three-quarters of these arrested between May, when serious purges began and the Tuol Sleng facility was brought into operation, and the end of the year. In 1977, when many DK government offices and all geographic zones were purged, at least 6,300 people entered the prison. On some days, more than 300 prisoners were brought to the prison.

(Continued)

Tran Ngoc Tai



VIE PRIS WAR ATTU

Huynh Minh Chau



According to the prison execution logs, photographs, biographies, and confessions, over one hundred Vietnamese soldiers were killed at Tuol Sleng, the former Khmer Rouge secret prison then known as “S-21”. One of the very few who survived detention at Tuol Sleng, Van Nath said that he saw Vietnamese prisoners. A former high-ranking Vietnamese soldier has stated that only “a couple of” Vietnamese soldiers were ever arrested by the Khmer Rouge. He added that

the uniforms of the Vietnamese soldiers in the Khmer Rouge’s S-21 photographs were from the 1950s. Were these prisoners Vietnamese, and if so, were they soldiers? The truth can be discovered. Through the use of Tuol Sleng’s internal records, staff of the Documentation Center of Cambodia have already met with the families of 20 Cambodians who perished at Tuol Sleng and of 19 former prison officials who disappeared there, as well as with 19 former prison

Vietnamese Prisoners of War Executed at Tuol Sleng

By Sorya Sim

Tuol Sleng prison between 1975-1979.

Tran Ngoc Tai was one of these 126 alleged soldiers and one of total of at least 488 Vietnamese who were killed at Tuol Sleng prison. According to his Tuol Sleng confession, Tran was arrested on January 24, 1978 on Vai island, off the Cambodian coast. He was sent to Tuol Sleng prison on January 31, 1978 and was executed on May 27, 1978. Tran was born in Thi Tran village, Duong Dong sub-district, Phu Quoc district, Kien Giang province. He was accused of being a Vietnamese soldier holding a rank of a sergeant in platoon 2, company 1, Army of Phu Quoc



officials who have survived and gave interviews. The Documentation Center hopes to be able to find the same for these allegedly Vietnamese soldiers who were also executed at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. As the Vietnamese government is currently seeking the remains of their soldiers who were killed in action in Cambodia, researchers of the Documentation Center would like to share their findings with regard to the fate of the perhaps 126 Vietnamese soldiers murdered at

district. Mr. Tran joined the army on February 3, 1976 and was sent to a political and military school for one month in Phu Quoc district. In one of his political classes, Tran was instructed by Tran Vuc Sy, deputy chief of Phu Quoc district, that the strategic objective of Vietnamese Communist Party had been to form "Indo-China Federation," an original goal of Indo-China Communist Party created by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. **(Continued on page 48)**



A SAMPLING OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE LINKING THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS

By Steve Heder

(Continued)

Nuon and Van were copied in on a Northwest Zone situation report of 6 November 1977, which told of enemy activities that were supposedly the cause of attempts by ordinary people to flee to Thailand. In an apparent reference to arrests and disappearances of ordinary people in the Zone, it declared that the enemy was saying that “if anyone else is taken away”, more would flee the country. This telegram mentioned the arrest of one “contemptible Chheuan who was agitating ordinary people to flee.” It provided assurances that in addition to “going all out to propagandize and re-educate ordinary people so that they will understand with additional clarity what socialist revolution is,” the various sectors of the Northwest Zone were “going all out to find more enemy apparatuses” and were under instructions that their “grassroots and the military must cooperate closely to smash all types of enemies”. Another message from the Northwest Zone, dated 21 December and addressed “Organization 870”, proposed that “Security” (apparently S-21) interrogate one “Hâm, who as in charge of Military Logistics”. Zone Secretary Ruoh

Nheum explained that “the Zone wants this achieved quickly in order to find all the links”.

Ten days later, Nuon and Van were copied in on a message from the Central Committee naval Division 164 Secretary Meah Mut, in which he expressed his determination to defend “the socialist Kampuchean motherland by sweeping cleanly away and without half-measures the undercover elements of the enemy, whether the Yuon or other enemies.”

On 10 January 1978, (new) North Zone Secretary Sæ sent another situationer to “Committee 870”, with Nuon and Van among those copied in, in which he described the measures taken to deal with the activities of armed opposition elements purportedly infiltrated into Preah Vihear and Utdar Meanchey provinces from Thailand and also to deal with “contemptible enemies who deserted from our army and grassroots”.

The measures included strengthening agricultural producer cooperatives by “relying in particular on the basic classes, to sweep undercover enemies and bandits alike cleanly away.” A message the next day from the Secretary of the Northeast Zone, Vi, reported the discovery of “undercover burrowing enemies” who had been

“nurturing traitors by concealing paddy” and “agitating others to flee”, including one “chief of the undercover traitors” named Nou, who had purportedly “been active for a long time”. Another message from Vi, dated 13 January, reported that he had “instructed that there be an internal clean up” following an incident in which four Vietnamese had entered a local military office of the Zone.

Three months later, Sæ reported more problems and purges in the North in a

S-21 prisoner




message to “Committee 870” copied to Nuon and Van. Discussing the “enemy situation along the Thai border”, he said there were still “traitors who are surreptitiously sneaking around to conduct guerilla attacks against us on the Preah Vihear border when our army is on foot in the forest.” One reason for this was supposedly “that our army is not yet internally good, as a result of which secrets are leaked giving the enemy advance information.” However, Sæ said, “we have taken measures with regard to this problem already.” Deeper inside North Zone, there had been “a bandit group of approximately 30 or 40 persons”, but the Zone’s “district and sector armies” had been “combing the forest to find and smash” them and “been able to smash and capture all such bandits one after the other”. In addition, “the henchmen who were surreptitiously providing them with foodstuffs have all been captured by us.” Finally, Sæ spoke of “the situation of undercover enemies burrowing from within.” Such “enemy remnants” had “raised their heads back up and conducted activities of opposition against us”. They had “made contact with [ex-Khmer Republic] police, soldiers and civil servants, all of whom disguised themselves as new people.” However, “after they conducted activities of opposition against us,” the Zone had “clearly recognized their faces” and thus “systematically swept them cleanly away”. Although “a number of soldiers, police and civil servants fled

after we had swept approximately 20 head of them cleanly away,” the Zone was “continuing to take further measures to find and arrest them.” Specifically with regard to “the undercover enemies in Preah Vihear sector, they no long exist after we took and are continuing to take further measures to sweep them cleanly away.”

On 10 April, Sæ again reported that armed Cambodian opposition groups were continuing “to conduct activities to harass us along the border”, but vowed “to attack and smash them”. He claimed that since “the contemptible Hâng” (alias Bou Phat), the Secretary of Sector 103 (Preah Vihear), had been arrested along with his “henchmen”, the opposition was no longer able to utilize such “contemptible traitors” as “back-up” for their activities. Similarly, the “bandit enemies, who the contemptible Hâng had previously organized”, had been “captured and smashed ... one after the other, and we are in the processing of putting into motion a combing of the forest to look for them further.” More generally, the Zone was “in the process of continuing to sweep cleanly away the contemptible remnants one after the other, both those who oppose our revolution overtly and those who do so by covert means.” Sæ explained, “this we are doing by relying more and more solidly on the ordinary people, in particular the ordinary people of the basic classes, who see with more and more crystal clarity who is a friend

and who is an enemy.” The production situation had supposedly improved because the “the ordinary people have ... more and more faith in the collective and the Party leadership” as a result of “the fact that we have purged all the oppositionists one after the other.” In Sector 103 in particular, by putting into motion a clean sweeping away of undercover burrowing enemies, we are also relying on the ordinary people. We are able to put things into motion well, and the enemy is unable to raise his head back up on account of the strength of the popular forces, forces that are



Iron Bars and cuffs used for Tuol Sleng prisoners

applying constant pressure and constantly sweeping cleanly and purging. We have achieved victories over all enemies from the very beginning right up through the present. The ordinary people a maximally happy about the clean sweep of enemies in Sector 103.

Both Nuon and Van were also copied in on a 14 April 1978 message from Central Committee Division 260 proposing that “the Party” agree to “take measures” against district and sector committee members in the East Zone who had refused to obey instructions to remove farm animals to the rear, as a result of which these resources had been seized by Vietnamese troops during border fighting. A week later, Northeast Zone Secretary Vi reported that “with regard to the fashioning of forces” there, “they have been purged”, and that instructions given in the Zone had “silenced a number of elements, some of whom have been flushed out, isolated and cleaned up”. A telegram two days later from the West Zone reported in connection with “the problem of elements inside the Party” that a certain “Comrade Sot, the Chairman of the Repairs Factory”, had been arrested after committing a morals violation with a woman and after being “implicated in the responses of the contemptible traitor Chuon”. The telegram ended, “please help with an opinion as regards this matter: whether to what level he must be held, or should he be sent on.”

After the armed conflict along the DK-Viet Nam border intensified in 1977, Nuon and Van were copied in on an increasing number of battlefield reports, which touched on the disposition of Vietnamese civilians and combatants taken prisoner, and also discussed attacks on Vietnamese civilian targets. A 29 October 1977 telegram from the East Zone, addressed to Office 870, requested “the view of Mo-870 with regard to the problem of those Yuon we were able to capture in the homes of ordinary people in Ta Dev village.” It offered that “if Mo-870 so requires, we will send them to you”, adding that “we are currently holding them and extracting responses from them.” Another telegram from the East Zone, dated 18 November, reported an attack on Truong, a garrison and a market town in Vietnamese territory, during which the attacking DK forces “burned down 94 enemy houses and campsites” and “swept the enemy cleanly out of the market and out from north of the market”, although the message said

“the results in terms of those killed and war booty seized have not yet been obtained”. A telegram of 20 March 1978, apparently from Son Sen, reported the capture of “three head” of Vietnamese, two of whom had been “shot and disposed of” upon attempting to escape, and one of whom had been “presented to 21”, that is, presumably, S-21. A summary report from Division 164 Secretary Mut on 1 April 1978 noted that “the number of Yuon” his unit had “captured and shot to death from 27 March 1978 through 30 March 1978 is 120 head”.

Moreover, since the middle of 1977 Nuon and Van had been copied in on telegrams from the Democratic Kampuchea Ambassador in Viet Nam, Sok Chhean (later purged), reporting then still private Vietnamese protests about alleged Democratic Kampuchea atrocities along the Cambodia-Viet Nam border. On 15 June 1977, Chhean recounted a visit from a Vietnamese official who had lodged a complaint about an attack by Democratic Kampuchea forces on 14 June that the official said had involved “slaughtering” Vietnamese and “torching” their homes and had thus brought “about enormous casualties”. The official added that “the fact that the Kampuchean army committed such transgressions, slaughtering, burning and smashing is not something” the Vietnamese side was “raising according to reports, but something for which there can be clear and irrefutable evidence,” and he offered to make photographic evidence available. In a message dated 20 July, Chhean said the same Vietnamese official had complained in a letter that during three days of shelling earlier in the month, the Kampuchean army had hit “areas heavily populated by ordinary people, with major casualties, including at least 30 dead and 50 wounded, and with “many homes ... burned down”. On 4 August, Chhean reported allegations circulating in Hanoi to the effect that “the Kampuchean army has committed mass killings of 1,000 ordinary Vietnamese people at Ha Tien in Kien Giang province”. At the end of the month, he described another official Vietnamese démarche, which alleged ten more “ordinary people” had been killed in further attacks.

Meanwhile, by late January 1978, messages from the East Zone copied to Nuon and Van...

(Continued)

RAPE

By Jan van der Grinten

Rape is any sexual act involving penetration carried out through violence, coercion or trickery. Rape has been recognized as a form of torture. As such it violates treaty and customary international law prohibitions as set forth in international human rights conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7), and the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Rape also violates provisions of international law which have established a right to nondiscrimination,

personal security, and privacy. For example, as set forth in article 55 (c) of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. “with a view” to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states at article 3, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”, and at article 5, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. These provisions implicitly prohibit rape. Article 17 of the ICCPR similarly states that, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.”

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) implicitly and explicitly prohibits the rape of children and other forms of sexual abuse. The relevant text is provided below:

Article 1, “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”

Article 16.1., “No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attack on his or her honor and reputation.

16.2., “The child has the right of the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Article 19, “States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care or parent (s), legal guardian (s) or any other person who has the care of the child.”

Article 34, States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular



Huot Bophanna

**Date of arrest: 10/12/1976 Date
of smashing: 3/18/1977**

take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:

(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;

a. Rape As a War Crime in Internal Conflicts

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibits the torture and cruel inhuman or degrading treatment of persons taking no active part in hostilities. Similarly, article 4 (2) (e) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”

b. Rape As a Crime Against Humanity

Rape is not defined explicitly as a crime against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter or the Tokyo Charter, although it arguably falls within Article 6 (c) “inhumane acts committed against any civilian population.” Control Council Law No 10 (“CCL 10”) Article II, does explicitly list rape as a crime against humanity. Although CCL 10 is a German law, it is arguably part of “general principles of law” and thus a possible source of international law.

Article 5 (g) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia followed CCL 10 and explicitly identified rape as a crime against humanity when it is “committed as part of a Widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.

c. Rape as Genocide

Rape charges were not brought at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. The only mention of wartime rape in the war crimes trials subsequent to World War II was at the Tokyo Tribunal, where rape received only passing reference, despite the fact that the Japanese forced thousands of women into prostitution for its soldiers.

The legal basis for rape as genocide has been explored in the context of the Yugoslavia tribunals, insofar as rape and forced impregnation were allegedly used as a means to destroy the cultural identity of the Bosnian Muslims. Such a construction is consistent with the definition of genocide as set forth in the genocide Convention, which defines genocide as, *inter alia*, “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in

whole or in part”, “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the (national, ethnic, cultural or religious) group”, and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

10. Sexual Mistreatment

Sexual mistreatment involves a range of sexual abuse involving “physical, psychological and verbal methods, against the person or against persons close to the person, including threats of or sexual assaults on others close to the person, forced nudity and other forms of exposure designed to punish, humiliate, degrade, and intimidate the subject.” Depending upon the severity and nature of the abuse, sexual mistreatment are comparable to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

11. Forced Marriages

The right to marry, the right not to marry, and the right to choose your own spouse are all set forth in international treaties and declarations. (Text is provided below.) Forced marriage may result in sexual mistreatment and /or rape. Forced marriages may also constitute genocide, if condoned or promoted by the state with the intent to destroy the cultural, ethnic or religious group.

According to the Universal Declarations of Human Rights at Article 16:

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free will and full consent of the intending spouses.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads at Article 23:

2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized

3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

Further, at Article 16

States Parties, shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:

a. The same right to enter into marriage;

b. The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.

FOUR WAYS TO PROSECUTE TORTURE COMMITTED IN THE DK-ERA

By Jan van der Grinten

(Continued)

Article 6 of the draft-law on the establishment of the tribunal confirms this notion by stating: “The extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to tribunal all Suspects who committed or ordered the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, such as the following acts against humanity or property protected under provisions of this Convention:

Torture or inhumane treatment

The Conventions will cover some acts of torture committed in the DK-era. The above mentioned limitations (an international armed conflict, protected property or people), of the Convention’s provisions, however, indicate it may not cover them all.

2. Torture as an element of crimes against humanity

There are various ways of defining crimes against humanity. There is a consensus nevertheless on most of the major elements. Crimes against humanity are inhumane acts of a very serious nature committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on political, ethnic or religious grounds (Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes against humanity*, P 274 (London 1999). The acts must involve government action and according to definition as it was after World War Two; they must be committed in the course of an armed conflict. The latter requirement is referred to as “nexus” to an armed conflict in international law.

Widespread or systematic

From an evidentiary point of view, the fact that

torture has been committed is not enough for a conviction under the above definition. Responsibility for “widespread or systematic” torture has to be proven. David Chandler presents evidence that torture in S-21 was committed on command of or with the knowledge and approval of members of the party leadership. At the same time, some have argued that many atrocities lacked direction from the party leadership and amounted effectively to random cruelty. The Report of the Group of Experts states on this point:

“ If, however, governmental nonfeasance in the face of such acts (Khmer Rouge atrocities) were motivated by animosity towards the victim’s political or other status, it would seem equivalent to systematicity.”(Report, P. 20)

The findings of DC-Cam as mentioned in the introduction of this article, however, provide compelling evidence for the assumption that torture in Democratic Kampuchea meets the criteria of “widespread or systematic.”

Nexus to an armed conflict

It’s doubtful whether the requirement of a nexus to an international armed conflict was still in effect in the DK-era. This nexus requirement had its roots in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and has been eliminated in contemporary definitions of crimes against humanity. The Report of Experts suggests that the bond between these crimes and international armed conflict “appears to have been severed in 1975” (Report, P.21). Without a doubt, defendants in a tribunal for the prosecution of crimes committed in DK-era would

raise this point, trying to prove that the requirement of the nexus was still in effect by 1975. If this was accepted by a court, it would mean that individual accountability for torture committed in the period 1975-1979 under the definition of crimes against humanity could only be established in so far as it is related to an armed conflict.

Ratner and Abrams (*Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law*, Oxford 1997, p. 247) assert that historians have not linked the bulk of atrocities of the Khmer Rouge to the international armed conflicts in which it engaged. The authors' conclusion on this subject is that a continued linkage to an armed conflict would insulate many perpetrators from international culpability.

Nonetheless, from a comprehensive study of DC-CAM documents it is submitted that these provide overwhelming evidence in support for a finding of nexus between the crimes against humanity committed under the Khmer Rouge regime against Cambodian citizens, on the one hand, and the existence of armed conflicts in which the regime was engaged during the entire DK-era, on the other (Raymund Johansen, *The Khmer Rouge Communications Documents and the "nexus to armed conflict" requirement for crimes against humanity* (unpublished, PHNP, 1999).

The draft-law for the establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts, mentions crimes against humanity in article 5 as "any acts, committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against any national civilian population, political group, ethnical group, racial group, or religious group, such as:

Torture

That the requirement of the nexus to an armed conflict is not referred to in this definition does not mean however that the requirement is eliminated. If the requirement still existed in 1975, it can not be eliminated retrospectively.

3. Torture as a substantive crime under international law

One of the fundamental principles of criminal law is that no acts are to be punished without a law prohibiting them at the time they were committed. This is the so-called *nullum crimen sine lege*-rule. Prosecution of torture as an independent crime under international law in the DK-era, thus, requires its existence as such by that time.

Whether torture existed as an independent crime under international law by 1975, depends on the evidence that prohibition of torture was a fundamental, peremptory norm in international law, a so-called *jus cogens*-norm. A norm becomes *jus cogens* as it is accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a norm from which no derogation is permitted. If a norm (for example: one should not torture), is considered by a major part of the international community as one of major interest to all states, every single state is bound to that norm, regardless of its approval.

There are strong indications that torture was recognized as such a norm by 1975. There was already general recognition of torture as a crime within the framework of "crimes against humanity" and "war crime". The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force on March 23, 1976) prohibit torture. In its resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975, the General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This was adopted by consensus. Five years later the Convention against torture was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession.

If evidence that torture, at least an emerging norm of international criminality, would be strong enough to prove the existence of a *jus cogens*-norm, this would lessen the burden of proof in a tribunal against those responsible for the commission of torture. (Continued)

Black Paper

THE STRATEGY OF “INDOCHINA FEDERATION” OF THE INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HO CHI MINH

Department of Press and Information of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic
Kampuchea
September 1978

1. The Indochinese Communist Party And Its Political Programme

The Vietnamese Party was founded in 1930, by the name of “Indochinese Communist Party”

First, the name “Indochinese Communist Party” clearly and succinctly means that it is a Party for the three countries of “Indochina”. The choice of the name of a Party has its political significance. Lenin, an eminent internationalist leader, did not give his party the name of “European Communist Party”. Thus, the name given to the Vietnamese Party means that this party is at one and the same time for Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The choice of such a name reveals that the objective of this Party is to

dominate the three countries.

Second, the Statute of the Indochinese Communist Party has stipulated that this party must build up a “totally independent Indochina”. The slogan of this party is to wage a struggle for an independent Indochina in order to create an “Indochina Federation Consequently the strategic political programme of the Vietnamese Party is the “Indochina Federation”. This party has a mission to lead Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam in their struggle against French colonialism to liberate the three countries, build up a federation having an entity in the political, economic and military fields and in other fields. An entity under the leadership of only one

party, the “Indochinese Communist Party”, which means only one country, one people and one army. Since 1930, in order to achieve this strategic political programme, the Vietnamese have prepared their forces and trained their cadres to successively send them to work in Laos and Kampuchea.

2. The Carrying Out of the Vietnamese Strategy of “Indochina Federation” in Kampuchea and The Concrete Situation from 1930 to 1970

a. The Period of 1930 to 1945

During this period of 15 years, the Vietnamese carried out activities in Kampuchea and Laos, but they had a lot of weak points. On the one hand, their cadres were very few and besides they were engaged at home. On the other hand, their country was not united. It was divided into three parts: Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina. The Indochinese Communist Party was the sole and only Vietnamese organization and each of the three parts had a different role. The Vietnamese cadres were then busy with their tasks at home. Furthermore their important center of activities was in the North and especially in Canton (China). In these circumstances they did not have enough cadres to carry out activities in Laos and Kampuchea. It is one of the reasons why their activities during this period achieved no result. Besides, Kampuchea’s people as a whole had no idea about communism and they hated the Vietnamese. Consequently, the Vietnamese did not succeed in infiltrating into Kampuchea. There were indeed Vietnamese nationals in Kampuchea, but they were not influenced by communism either. In brief, their subjective forces were weak and Kampuchea’s people were not receptive to their propaganda.

b. The period of 1945 to 1954

In 1940-1941, the Vietnamese launched their armed struggle near the border with China and they founded the Vietminh front.

On March 9, 1945, the Japanese perpetrated a coup d’état to overthrow the French colonialists. The Vietnamese took this opportunity to increase their influence among their compatriots and they mobilized forces to join the Vietminh. On August 19,

1945, the Vietnamese took advantage of the Japanese defeat to make the “August Revolution” before the return of the French colonialists. Later on, they sent a number of cadres to Cochinchina and Kampuchea.

The Vietminh agents came and militated among the Khmer nationals belonging to the well-to-do and rich classes in Kampuchea Krom. They made contact with Pach Chhoeun, Chau Sen Cocsal, Chhim Tum, You Chhan, Chea Uom....who fled Kampuchea to take refuge in Kampuchea Krom after the Japanese defeat and when Son Ngoc Thanh, prime minister at that time and tool of the Japanese militarists was arrested by the French colonialists.

The Vietminh created a committee of struggle among these Khmers, but later on, the latter came back to Kampuchea and they surrendered themselves to the French colonialists.

Facing the situation, the Vietnamese strove to make contacts with other Khmers in Kampuchea Krom and their nationals living in Kampuchea. Besides, in the Southwestern and Eastern parts of Kampuchea, they kidnapped many Khmer nationals, trained and used them in order to serve their strategy of “Indochina Federation” in Kampuchea.

But the French colonialists also had their policy. They infiltrated their men, intelligence agents, policemen, soldiers into the Vietminh ranks.

Consequently, the first cadres trained by the Vietminh were on the one hand, the people it had kidnapped and on the other hand, the agents infiltrated by the French colonialists into its ranks.

In 1947, the Vietnamese had more and more people with them and their activities progressively spread over the Northwestern part of Kampuchea where they gathered altogether the people left over by the gangs of Dap Chhuon, Keo Rak, Houl Vong Anoupheap and Chhim Tum.

Later on, in order to carry out their activities inside Kampuchea, the Vietnamese organized Kampuchea into territorial zones, including three important zones, namely Southwest, Northwest and East zones. In the Northeastern part, the Vietnamese came and installed their political and military bases in

the Eastern part of Stung Treng province, near Bokeo, for in their own country they had neither territory nor base.

Afterwards, the Vietnamese divided the zones into provinces, districts and communes. They controlled everything. They had their committee to lead and rule Kampuchea, with Nguyen Thanh Son as chairman. This Vietnamese committee controlled and led a Khmer committee called “Moutkeaha”. As for the armed forces even in May-June 1954, that is to say, one month before the Geneva Agreements, they were almost exclusively composed of Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese did and ordered everything. They grasped in their hands the State power and army. The names of the organs were Khmer but the component elements were Vietnamese. Thus, from 1945 to 1954, the first Khmer cadres were made up of the people kidnapped by the Vietnamese. The latter had educated and used them to develop their forces.

c. The period of 1954 to 1970

After the Geneva Accords, the revolutionaries of Kampuchea launched a national movement for independence and neutrality against the SEATO's military pact and mobilized the people's masses to support the 5 principles of peaceful co-existence or Pancha Sila. In Vietnam, Ngo Din Diem slaughtered a big number of the party's members and revolutionaries who had been eliminated at 70 percent in 1957-1958. The committee of the Vietnamese party for South Vietnam was annihilated. After being restored, it was once again annihilated. The Vietnamese revolution lost its control of the situation and was constantly in a defense position. Many Vietnamese revolutionaries then came and took refuge in Kampuchea. The neutral Kampuchea became for the Vietnamese a rear base they used as shelter to hide themselves and also as a point of transit for Hong Kong and Canton in China.

In 1957, Le Duan, the present first secretary of the Vietnamese party also came and took refuge in Phnom Penh and was in transit through Kampuchea. All members of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese party in South Vietnam were arrested

except one who came and took refuge in Phnom Penh at Tuol Tapoung district. It was Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cuc, native of North Vietnam. He is presently a member of the Political bureau of the Vietnamese party. Hay So also came and took refuge in Kampuchea. In the neutral and stable Kampuchea, the Vietnamese could live in security.

Facing their catastrophic situation and in the order to escape from their total annihilation, the Vietnamese decided in 1960 to wage armed struggle again. They came to settle along Kampuchea's border, from Kampong Trach (Svay Rieng Province) up to Snuol (Kratie province). When they met with difficulties, they took refuge in Kampuchea. In 1961 they started to infiltrate into Kampuchea. In 1962 and 1963, they extended more and more their penetration, using corruption if necessary. The Vietcongs had been able to freely and at will travel throughout Kampuchea. It was on the one hand because they corrupted the security agents, policemen and civil servants of the former administration, and on the other hand, because the people considered the Vietnamese as revolutionaries. In 1965, there were 150,000 Vietnamese (Vietcongs) settled in Kampuchea at 2 to 5 kilometers deep from the border since Romeas Hek (Svay Rieng province) up to Ratanakiri, in the region called “Naga's tail” in the Far Northeastern part of Kampuchea. In 1966, this number was up to 200,000 and it still increased in 1967. At that time, the Vietnamese uttered lies everywhere to make the world over believe that they had achieved “brilliant victories”. In reality, they took refuge in the Kampuchea's territory. Those who did not know this reality, thought that the Vietcongs had come and helped the Kampuchea's revolution. In fact, they had no more territory at home, in South Vietnam, because of the Ngo Din Diem's policy of strategic hamlets, for Robert Thompson, basing on his acquired experiences in other countries, set up strategic hamlets all over the territory of South Vietnam so that the Vietcongs had neither land nor population.

The Vietnamese political line on this subject

was wrong. It consisted of “waging the struggle on the spot”. For this purpose, the Vietnamese organized big demonstration from 1960 to 1965. But from 1965, their forces suffered heavy losses because the enemy controlled the population, spread vicious customs and habits among the population, corrupted and depraved them. In the Southern part of Vietnam, the members of the Vietnamese party who lived in the strategic hamlets, were all enlisted in the army of Thieu’s clique. 70 to 80 per cent of the youngsters, members of the Vietnamese party’s organizations, were enlisted in the enemy’s army. The remaining 20 to 30 per cent complied with the enemy and gave up their struggle. There was nobody to lead the struggle of the population who, as a whole, were under the control of the US imperialists and Thieu’s clique.

From 1961 to 1963, the defense belt of Saigon ran to about Gia Dinh. In 1964, it became larger and stretched further beyond Gia Dinh. In 1965-1966, it reached as far as the Kampuchea-Vietnam border. The Vietcong came then into Kampuchea to seek refuge and set up their various services, armed forces, hospitals, artistic groups, transports, commissariat, all their leading organs from the central committee up to provincial and district committees. For instance, the provincial committee of Quang Due was set up at Koh Nhek, in Monduliri province, Kampuchea. In 1970, the figures of the Vietcongs settling in Kampuchea varied between 1.5 and 2 million. There were 80,000 wounded fighters receiving care in the hospitals built up in Kampuchea’s territory.

The Kampuchean revolution and people have been the benefactors of the Vietnamese. They have always granted aid and support to the Vietcongs, given them hiding places and shelters, supplied them with rice and food. They have granted them aid and support since 1955, that is at the time when Ngo Dinh Diem was launching the most violent repression against them. They have granted the Vietnamese aid and support since 1960 at the time when the latter took up the armed struggle. Kampuchea’s revolution and people acted like that, for they considered the Vietnamese as friends and revolutionaries. However,

the Vietnamese, once in Kampuchea, have not forgotten their strategy of swallowing Kampuchea.

Their slogans were “Solidarity among the three countries”, “Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam are inseparable sworn friends fighting against the common enemy”. Kampuchea’s people and revolution believed that they were sincere. Actually, the Vietnamese used these slogans of solidarity in order to cover their activities of division and sabotage and to infiltrate in Kampuchea’s revolutionary movement. They worked up the friendship of Kampuchea’s cadres and population to afterwards introduce them in their organizations. They organized those who had carried out the struggle against the French colonialists and reinstate them into the Indochinese Communist Party. Wherever they went they created troubles and disorders and carried out sabotage and spying activities. From 1967 the people and cadres vigorously opposed all these Vietnamese activities, but the leaders of Kampuchea’s revolution always recommended them to develop solidarity and mutual help with the Vietnamese. As for them, the Vietnamese used that formal solidarity to carry out their strategy of “Indochina Federation” in order to annex and swallow Kampuchea. Thus in spite of the difficult situation they were facing at that time, the Vietnamese did not give up this strategy.

Through their contacts, the Vietnamese tried to see whether there was unity or not with the armed struggle policy of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They dragged towards them all those who had no firm position. They secretly organized and set up a parallel State power. They attacked and ran down the Communist Party of Kampuchea by saying that its policy was wrong, Leftist, adventurous etc.. To the Kampuchean nationals who studied in North Vietnam, they handed out: “Leftism, infantile decease of communism” by Lenin. They intensified their attacks against the Communist Party of Kampuchea when the armed struggle in Kampuchea broke out in 1968. At the same time, they established contacts at the administrative zones’ level in order to spread discord and division within the Communist

Party of Kampuchea. At the same time, they sabotaged Kampuchea's economy. On the one hand, they took to smuggling through black market and on the other hand, they stole food from the population: farm products, pigs, poultry, etc..

All these experiences were very bitter to Kampuchea's people and revolution. From 1965, the struggle between Kampuchea's revolutionaries and the Vietcongs became very arduous and sharp. The Vietnamese came to Kampuchea not only to seek refuges, but also to work for annexing and swallowing her. Although they were in the most difficult situation, the Vietnamese continued to prepare their strategic forces everywhere to overthrow Kampuchea's revolutionary power at the propitious moment.

In the Northeastern part of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese had difficulties in carrying on their strategy because of the presence of the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They tried to get support from the population, but they failed. As the

latter were closely united under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese feared them. They strove to please Kampuchea's revolution. They came and asked for the preliminary authorization of the Communist Party of Kampuchea before establishing their camps, for if ever they had a bone to pick with the population, they would be punished by the latter. If they ran into the population, they would then lose all political and economic advantages. Besides, the region was covered with forests crossed by narrow paths which were perfectly known only to the population. And with traps and other deadly snares set by the population along those paths, the Vietnamese would not be able to run away. The Northeastern population are scarce (30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants) but the Vietnamese feared them very much for this population are very faithful to Kampuchea's revolution.

In the flat open regions, the Vietnamese succeeded in duping some elements among the population and cadres. They got them by corruption,



material baits or through the “Indochinese Communist Party”

In 1970, the figure of Vietcong in Kampuchea reached 1,500,000 to 2,000,000. In the Northeastern region, they were from 200,000 to 300,000. The members of the central committee of the Vietnamese party among them Vo Chi Cong, deputy secretary for South Vietnam and secretary of the central zone of South Vietnam, that is the 5th Vietnamese zone, were living in that Northeast zone of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese army of the 5th zone was dwelling there, too. As for the Vietnamese committee for South Vietnam, it was also installed in Memot, East zone of Kampuchea. The members of this committee were Nguyen Thi Thanh, Pham Hung, Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cuc, Tran Nam Trung, Hay So, Hay Van and Vang Van Thai, Nguyen Chi Thanh, responsible for the army, was an important personality who would probably have replaced Le Duan if he did not die later on.

By coming and settling in Kampuchea like that, what were the role and the situation of the Vietnamese? And what were those of Kampuchea?

Kampuchea's territory became with Laos, the shelter for the Vietnamese. Kampuchea thus supplied the Vietnamese revolution with aids and supports more than any other country in the world. In Laos, the Vietnamese found only shelter. However, in Kampuchea, they enjoyed:

- ◆ Shelters, including that for the committee in charge of the leadership of the revolution is South Vietnam.

- ◆ Economic bases: the Vietnamese totally relied on Kampuchea. They were living thanks to the help given them by the population and the purchase they made through local administration. But moreover, they looted the goods and food of the population.

- ◆ Roads in Northeastern and Eastern regions of Kampuchea linked to those from Laos and Kampong Som seaport. The transports carried from Kampong Som seaport in a month were tantamount to the transport carried by the Laotian paths during three

years.

The blessings given to the Vietnamese by Kampuchea's revolution were immense. Those who have some sense of justice are perfectly aware of this. The Communist Party of Kampuchea had never informed the world of that. But, on the contrary, the Vietnamese have deceived the public world opinion by pretending to have helped Kampuchea in everything.

In brief, from 1930 to 1970, during each period, under any circumstances, the Vietnamese obstinately and constantly carried out activities aiming at annexing and swallowing Kampuchea through their strategy of “Indochina Federation”. From 1930 to 1945 they gained no result. From 1945 to 1954 and up to 1970, thanks to the elements they had infiltrated into the ranks of Kampuchea's revolution, they succeeded in undertaking some activities in some fields. But in the whole, their schemes fell through, for Kampuchea's revolution went on strengthening unceasingly its position of independence and sovereignty in political, ideological and organizational fields. Furthermore, Kampuchea's revolution enjoyed a better position than the Vietnamese revolution which had neither territory nor population, nor economy.

From 1955, Kampuchea's revolution unceasingly went on consolidating its independence thanks to subjective and objective conditions. The objective condition was that, thanks to the Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese were forced to pull back. They could come back to Kampuchea only secretly to take refuge. The subjective condition was that Kampuchea's revolution was led by Kampuchea's revolutionaries themselves, in full independence. So, the revolution could gather together numerous experiences and powerfully develop its capacity and competence. In 1966, the Communist Party of Kampuchea consolidated and strengthened its position of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance, and clearly discerned the true nature of the Vietnamese.

“AMNESTY: THE PRICE OF PEACE IN CAMBODIA?”

By Peter Maguire

(Continued)

When King Sihanouk issued a tersely worded amnesty in 1996, it was unclear whether this was simply an amnesty from the death sentence of the Vietnamese in absentia trials in 1979, or an amnesty from future prosecutions. Prime Minister Hun Sen was quick to remind Western critics that these questions were inherently political and pointed bitterly to America's two-faced relationship with international law: “They did not recognize the 1979 verdict. After he was sentenced in Phnom Penh, he went to New York to deliver speeches. What does that mean? He delivered a speech at the [UN] General Assembly in 1979, 80,81—three years. Why did Interpol or the New York Police not arrest him and send him back to us? What is the reality then? It has to be changed according to the political situation: when there is political demand for support of Ieng Sary, they say Ieng Sary did not commit any crime. Then they say the other way, in different circumstances.”

While American Secretary State Madeline Albright spoke excitedly about capturing and trying Pol Pot, the truth lie with Hun Sen. The sad reality was that the United States had worked against all efforts to punish Khmer Rouge leaders when it counted, during the early 1980s. When America's commitment to the Khmer Rouge was tested publicly in September 1979, after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Carter administration's representative, Cyrus Vance, voted for the deposed

Khmer Rouge to retain their seat in the UN General Assembly. Even as late as the fall of 1980, after the Vietnamese had opened the nation to the media and exposed the horror of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea, the new U.S. representative Edmund Muskie voted in favor of Democratic Kampuchea retaining their seat in the UN.

However, today the situation is very different as the fate of surviving Khmer Rouge leaders Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Ta Mok, Noun Chea, and Brother Duch now rests in the hands of the Cambodian Parliament. After more than a year of negotiations with the United Nations, the Parliament will vote whether or not to hold a UN sanctioned, mixed international tribunal. However Prince Ranariddh's recent statements about the court and the acquittal of Khmer Rouge commander Chhouk Rin by a Cambodian judge invoking the Khmer Rouge amnesty law have cast a large shadow of doubt over the possible trials. Ieng Sary's de facto amnesty and the uncertain fate of the UN's mixed Khmer Rouge tribunal raise a troubling question—is amnesty the price of peace in Cambodia?

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**(Continued)**

Nixon, who inherited this impasse, lacked the human qualities to transcend it, if indeed it was possible to do so. Still, for all his railing against the establishment, he, too, was a product of the “greatest generation.” And he sought to implement what he understood to be the demand of moderate critics for an honorable withdrawal. Starting with the first negotiations with Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho, Nixon offered a timetable for American withdrawal and a variety of formulas to permit the people of South Vietnam a genuine choice. What Nixon would not accept—and what, until the end, Hanoi never ceased demanding—was the forcible imposition of a communist regime on the millions who, relying on the words of our predecessors, had thrown in their lot with the United States.

When a negotiated solution proved unattainable, Nixon proceeded unilaterally to implement his

campaign promise to extricate America from Vietnam. In the process, he reduced U.S. casualties from 1,200 a month at the end of the Johnson administration to 30 a month at the end of Nixon’s first term. And he unilaterally reduced American troops from 550,000 to 30,000.

Many of the stages in this process were highly controversial, and they deserve fuller treatment than this article permits. But it is symptomatic of the schism Vietnam created that so much of the literature focuses on the charge that Nixon needlessly prolonged the war and sacrificed American lives, implying that there was some honorable way out that he refused to take.

The political divide was sharpened by a similar split in the intellectual community. When I was in graduate school, intellectuals rarely achieved high positions in government. If they wanted to affect policy, they had to write lengthy papers on longer-range issues. The Kennedy administration awakened their taste for

political power, and they sought to shape immediate policy discussions first within the government and after Kennedy's assassination from the sidelines. In the process they divided into two groups-job applicants and revolutionaries. The job applicants replicated the debates of policymakers; the revolutionaries, the arguments of the protest movement. In either case, they accentuated America's schisms rather than help overcome them. A balanced judgment on Vietnam remains our challenge-not as a question of historical justice toward individual presidents, but of historical truth about a national tragedy.

VIETNAM'S LEGACY

Vietnam broke the fusion of ideology and strategy that underlay American exceptionalism. Though its principles continue to be affirmed by all sides, its application is now subject to profound dispute. Since the Vietnam War, there have been three main schools among American foreign-policy makers:

Advocates of adapting the cold-war strategy of the 1950s and 1960s to new circumstances.

Members of the Vietnam protest movement, who came to high office in the Clinton administration.

And a new generation that does not remember the Vietnam schism and now faces a world radically different from the one that formed either the cold warriors or the Vietnam protesters. Shaken by the Vietnam experience, many liberals and intellectuals retreated from the field of strategy and redefined exceptionalism in terms of "soft issues" which could be achieved without the use of military power. As a result, traditional American strategy became largely the provenance of conservatives and neoconservatives. Always uncomfortable with commitments on distant battlefields, the American right concentrated on rigorous anti-communism and vigilance in maintaining the strategic balance, especially with respect to arms-control negotiations. And during the Reagan administration, against a Soviet adversary weakened by decades of over-extension, this group achieved great successes.

Yet with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need for a national strategy adapted to the post-cold-war world has baffled many conservatives. In the aftermath of Reagan, some of his disciples continue to emphasize his rhetoric while neglecting the hardheaded

strategy with which he pursued the 1980s equivalent of containment. They seem torn (especially in the neoconservative group) between searching for a new danger to replace the Soviet Union, in opposition to which all foreign policy can be organized, and the redefinition of American exceptionalism as a global crusade for democracy. China is the target for much of this effort. But it is as yet too weak, its ideology too national and its potential danger too distant to allow foreign policy to be organized around it, especially if we wish to bring allies along with us. To be true to itself, America must always stand for democracy; but to shape the world, it also needs to understand both its interests and their limits, and not recoil from defining either.

The conclusions that many in the Clinton administration-and in the liberal community-have drawn from the Vietnam War present a profound challenge to traditional American foreign policy. They treat the cold war as a misunderstanding, if not an American creation. They recoil before the concept of national interest and distrust the use of power unless it can be presented as in the service of some "unselfish" cause-that is to say, as reflecting no specific American national interest. On many occasions and many continents, President Clinton has apologized for actions of his predecessors that stemmed from what he derogatorily describes as cold-war attitudes. But the cold war was not imaginary; profound issues of survival and national purpose were involved. And this denigration-generally quite inaccurate-of the actions of U.S. presidents from Eisenhower to Bush must raise doubts about American constancy, even on the part of the administration offering the apology.

Apologies for 50 years of U.S. history are matched by uneasiness with the use of American power. In Kosovo, for example, the idea that NATO's actions elevated traditional national interest into universal humanitarian principles was invoked by all leaders as the distinguishing feature of the enterprise. But six months later the same leaders recoiled from applying the Kosovo principles to Chechnya-where civilian casualties were far greater-for fear of Russian power. The foreign policy of the self-proclaimed moralists had returned full circle (and with a touch of hypocrisy) to the famous maxim that foreign policy is the art of the possible and the science of the relative.

MOK'S WORK

By Craig Etcheson



Last February, I interviewed Roeung for several hours among the ruins of Sang Prison. He repeatedly insisted that he had never killed anyone, that he was just a clerk. “Lists,” he told me, “All I did was to make lists of the prisoners.” Roeung showed me the foundation of the building where New People were imprisoned, and said there were several hundred prisoners held in this structure at any given time. Every night, the executioners would come and take fifteen or twenty people, march them to killing field one kilometer away, and murder them.

“With so many prisoners here,” I asked Roeung, “how did the killers know which ones to take each night?”

“No problem,” Roeung replied, “they had a list.”

Staring intently at Roeung, I asked him, “And of course this list was made by the clerk?”

Roeung’s nostrils flared and his eyes went wide with fear as he realized he had been trapped. “No! No!” he shouted. “Not that list! I made all the other lists, but not that one!”

“Then who made that list?” I pressed down hard on him.

“Oh,” he said, “That’s a secret.”

Later, I talked to a group of villagers from Trapeang Sva, and asked them what they thought about the former employees of Sang Prison who still live in the village.

“some are not bad, but some we hate,” one man told me.

“Who do you hate?” I asked him.

“We hate Roeung,” he replied.

“Why do you hate Roeung?”

“We hate Roeung because he is the one who made the killing lists.”

Based on what we know about the functioning of the other Khmer Rouge prison, this might be literally true, that Roeung wrote down the names on the killing list. But it is likely that someone of a higher rank actually decided which names would appear on the list

(Continued)

Another employer at Sang Prison was the administrator, Touch Roeung. Roeung has told us how prisoners flowed in and out of Sang Prison. Roeung says that every week or ten days, a large group of prisoners would be brought to the prison, sometimes eighty people, sometimes one hundred, sometimes more. He was responsible for logging all of their names on a list and for keeping track of their biographies. Base People were separated from April 17 people, and the men were segregated from the women. Some prisoners would eventually be transferred to other security centers, such as “Office 15” in Koh Thom Districts; others would die of starvation, and still others would be executed at Sang Prison. None of the prisoners appears to have been released. With the regular flow of prisoners through Sang Prison, the inmate population fluctuated over time, but there were always hundreds of people being held there.

each day, someone such as the prison chief, Mong, or the Region Secretary, Prak, or sometimes perhaps even the Zone Security, Mok.

Mok closely supervised the work of Sang Prison. Many witnesses, including local villagers, surviving prison inmates and members of the prison staff, saw Mok at Sang Prison on a regular basis. One former inmate says he was a frequent visitor, and his visits always meant that people were going to be taken away: “Whenever Ta Mok came, they took them away, but we don’t know where they were going. They put them in cars, but we don’t know where they were being taken. We don’t know if they were taken to be killed or what.” This seems to have happened on a regular basis. “Ta Mok came over every week since 1977.”

Several witnesses recall the purge of Sang Prison chiefs Mong and Meng in late 1978 by Mok. Former inmate Sum Rim remembered the day when Mok replaced the prison leadership: “After they removed the people who were in charge before, A-Mong and A-Meng, Ta Sem took control.” Sang Prison Guard Ngim Him also noted Mok’s brutal methods of controlling personnel under his command. He recalled that when “Ta Mok took over the area [in 1977], the chief of Sang Prison [Kaseh] was killed by another Khmer Rouge group, and some of the cadres were replaced with new ones.” This is how Mong became the prison chief. When Mok decided it was time to replace Mong, according to Ngim Him, “Mong was sought to be killed by Ta Mok’s subordinates.” Working conditions under Mok in the security field did not seem to include health insurance or a retirement plan.

Sum Rim was arrested and put in Sang Prison in July 1977, along with her two youngest children. She

was pregnant at the time, and would give birth while being held prisoner by the Khmer Rouge. Her husband had been arrested in January 1977 on the accusation that he had once been a member of the local commune committee. Under torture at Sang Prison, the list of her husband’s offenses soon grew to include the charge that he was a member of the Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB. One of the guards in charge of the female section of the prison, a woman named Pon, told Rim that her husband was beaten and tortured so severely that he finally could not take it anymore, and he committed suicide.

Tao Sam Oeun was not as lucky as Sum Rim. Early in 1978, Oeun was arrested. Her husband had disappeared into Sang Prison a short while earlier, and like so many others, her crime was to have been married to someone who had been declared an “enemy.” Along with Oeun, her daughter and two sons were also rounded up and brought to Sang Prison. Her children were executed at Sang. Though her life was spared, Oeun was subjected to harsh forced labor, such as cleaning stumps from swamps. Now widowed and old, she lives as a nun in Koh Bunly Pagoda.

Ban Sokheun was also arrested and taken to Sang Prison a few months after her husband had been arrested. During her interrogation at the prison, she says she was starved for days and beaten with a bamboo rod. “When they questioned you and you answered, they won’t hit you. But if you don’t answer, they hit you.” They were forced to sleep on the brick floor, with nothing to cover their bodies. She remembers that there were “a lot” of children at Sang Prison, but “Out of those who taken there, very few survived.”

(Continued)



RECLAIMING CAMBODIAN HISTORY

THE CASE FOR A TRUTH COMMISSION

By Jaya Ramji

(Continued)

THEME 6: Reestablishing Law. A sixth leitmotif was the establishments of rule of law in Cambodia. Two Royal Government of Cambodia officials were particularly adamant on this topic, but it was also brought up, directly or indirectly, by almost everyone interviewed. In June 1997, the National Assembly had not convened for three months. The Constitutional Court had not yet been created, and could only be installed by the Supreme Council of Magistrates. Even more absurdly, the Supreme Council of Magistrates itself had not yet been created. In July 1997, Hun Sen took power through a coup, blatantly defying constitutional methods of changing the government. The co-Prime Minister, Ung Huot, was installed by Hun Sen in an undemocratic fashion. Forty supporters of Ranariddh were killed and twenty member of Parliament allied to him fled during and directly after the coup. While many returned, they face the threat of retaliation from Hun Sen if they step too far out of line.

Elections were held on July 26, 1998, in an attempt to provide a facade of democracy. Predictably, the strongman Hun Sen won the election after a campaign of intimidation of opposition parties, purchasing of votes, and nearly complete media control. Diplomatic, political analysts, and human rights monitors confirmed widespread intimidation, inadequate monitoring of the polls and many opportunities for fraud. Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy, the opposition leaders, continue to protest the results, but their supporters living in the villages bear the brunt of their loss, subject to harassment and threats.

While everyone suffers under such a situation, it is the poor and working classes, the politically disenfranchised, who suffer the most. Uneven application of laws, difficulty in bringing lawsuits, lack of civil rights, and impunity enjoyed by unscrupulous officials prevent the average citizen from living above subsistence level. In a country rich in resources and arable land, this is a travesty. One could argue that a

trial would establish a precedent of legal accountability, and perhaps translate into improvements in the Cambodian legal system. More importantly, it is fairly clear from these circumstances as well as from the opinions of the interviewees that Cambodia is incapable of setting up a fair and impartial trial by itself. Thus, a tribunal or truth commission must be international, and should play a role in helping Cambodia implement a legitimate and functioning legal system.

THEME 7: Education. The final themes that emerged in the interviews is the dire need for formal education and schools. Some interviewees convincingly argued that the high levels of illiteracy and lack of formal education in Cambodia set the return of a similar regime and to repair the damage done by the Khmer Rouge, education should be a top priority.

Until more exhaustive research is done and culpability is legally established, it will continue to be difficult to teach recent Cambodian history in school. Since the 1993 elections, the Khmer Rouge era (1975-1979) has been removed from history books and the curriculum in general in Cambodia. This raises at least two obvious concerns. First, if children are not taught about the atrocities and crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge, this group or another like it might again grasp hold of political power and instigate a new reign of terror. A Cambodia populace that is aware of and understands the reasons for the 1975-79 genocide will be much more capable of preventing the recurrence of such a tragedy. The second potential problem is that a whole generation of Cambodians will not know the powerful history of their own country. Many of the Cambodians interviewed had a great desire to know “the truth” about who was responsible for atrocities committed against their families and friends. It is important for healing purposes that this “truth” be officially accepted and disseminated.

The Khmer Rouge’s nearly complete obliteration of teachers, professors, and schools had left a devastating mark on Cambodian society. As a result of

the elimination of educated classes, teachers themselves are barely educated, usually having only a six-week training session to procure their jobs. Teachers' salaries range from a high of US\$ 25 per month to a low of US\$ 15 per month. Even translated into spending power in the Cambodian economy, this is a paltry sum. This situation forces teachers to take side jobs for pay, including teaching extra classes and tutoring those who can afford it. Thus a "free" education system becomes an inadequate one, as teachers are drawn to better paying jobs, and only those who can pay for it receive a decent education. The constant power struggles in the former coalition government meant that the focus in building new schools was on the showiness of the buildings rather than the quality of its teachers and curriculum. Education is not mandatory in Cambodia, so many children fail to attend school, particularly if parents in economic need require additional income.

Even those who attend school face the problem of inadequate teachers described above, as well as classes that meet sporadically and are often short in duration. This problem exists also at the university level. Private universities tend to attract the best teachers away from the public universities. While most students at the public universities come from wealthy families, any suggestion of charging tuition or fees is roundly dismissed since the parents of these students are generally government ministers. The unfortunate state of education in Cambodia will only serve to widen the already palpable gap between wealthy and poor, leaving the poor illiterate and allowing education for only those who can pay for it.

This situation then becomes "le serpent qui se morde la queue" since it is difficult for people lacking formal democratic education to choose political representatives who will fight for their interests. Indeed




Khmer Rouge Family

as a Royal Government of Cambodia official told me, in one province, citizens elected a representative who was a good singer simply because they like this voice. Further, economic vulnerability can lead to the absence of real political choice. Understandably, indigent people may be more concerned with obtaining food and shelter than with analyzing the political situation in their area, and may be swayed by political candidates who provide them with material benefits in exchange for their votes. Such politicians may not represent the interests of the voters during their tenure in office, and the economic restraints faced by poor people will make it difficult to challenge politicians who fail them. Lack of education reproduces itself through the political process, and should be addressed through reparations.

A TRUTH COMMISSION

“Hatred is not conquered by hatred.”

Buddhist saying



Hatred Day held in Steung Treng Province, 1989

The information from this study suggests that Cambodians lack a shared picture of their history. A shared perspective would be necessary for social consensus and peace (i.e. to repair the harms perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge and to prevent, through education, such atrocities from recurring in the future). A tribunal for Cambodia currently appears imminent; while genocide should not go unpunished, the limitation imposed by the structure of a trial may deny Cambodians access to the full truth about the Khmer Rouge regime. A truth commission could paint a broader picture of Cambodian history from 1975 to 1979, and is therefore a necessary complement to tribunal. Without first creating a full picture of Cambodian history, it may be difficult for Cambodians to determine exactly which members of the Khmer Rouge should be on trial.

In the unique case of Cambodia, it appears that a truth commission is a vital component of any policy to address the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge. First, a truth commission would be far more responsive to Cambodians' desire for information regarding the Khmer Rouge and their chain of command than would a tribunal. Second, “national reconciliation” is an overriding goal for many Cambodians, and is arguably more consistent with Buddhist philosophy than a trial. Third, Cambodia is a country that directly needs development funds in every area of society, so money that would be spent on an international trial of numerous perpetrators may be better allocated towards a limited trial, truth commission, and development projects. While genocide and crimes against humanity must not fester, a trial of top leaders combined with a truth commission could minimize this risk and establish a shared historical memory to enable Cambodians to leave the Khmer Rouge era in the past.

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VOICE FROM THE GRAVE:

TONLE SAP LAKE MASSACRE

By Ronnie Yimsut

(Continued)

The thought of me actually coming face to face with death now terrified me for the first time. I had thought of escaping right then, but could not do it after a lengthy consideration. I didn't have the heart to leave my family, specially my pregnant sister-in-law who was already a week overdue. Besides, where would I go from here? I would eventually be recaptured and killed later on just like my friend, Naive. If I were to die, I preferred to die among my loved ones.

There were plenty of opportunities for me to escape, but I just couldn't do it. So I reluctantly trekked with the rest of the group, with my pregnant sister-in-law, Sa Oum over my right shoulder and a small bag of belongings on my left. Sedum's elderly father was now

bravely walking under his own power. He insists on dying with "dignity." He knew. The wise old man who has been like a grand father to me in the past three years under Angkar knew that our time was very near.

Somehow it seemed ironic: we were knowingly walking toward our deaths just like cattle being herded towards a slaughterhouse. We all knew where we were heading; even the children seemed to know it as well. I still had a little doubt despite everything I had seen and heard thus far. Perhaps it was a faint hope - a hope that these Khmer Rouge soldiers were not the cold heart killers we thought they were. Perhaps.

A few miles before we were to reach the Great Lake, they ordered us to turn off to the west instead of continuing down south as planned. It was a very muddy,

sticky road. My feet seemed to stick in the mud every single time I put them down to go forward. The progress was slow and cumbersome. A few people got stuck there just like in a quicksand bog and the soldiers would go back to them to kick and beat them up. I still don't know if they ever made it. I was busy helping Sa Oum and myself move forward and didn't really care anymore. All that time I was trying to calm myself down and keeping a clear mind.

Sa Oum was beyond help. Her quiet weeping had now become a full-blown scream. She was in a bad shape, physically and emotionally. Mom was nearby trying to ease her pain with encouraging words. I lost track of my dad and little brothers. I was not so sure where they were. It was getting dark, very dark now.

Sa Oum said that she had stomach cramps or was in labor; she wasn't sure. It was to be her first child. She didn't know much about childbirth or contractions, and neither did I. Mom kept telling her not to worry and that she had 10 kids or used to be 10. All that I could do was drag Sa Oum across the muddy flats so the soldiers won't come and beat us to death right there and then. It was simply pathetic.

We were no more than 300 yards off the main road when they asked us to sit down on the edge of a small shallow canal that ran east to west. Both of our legs stretched forward; we had to shut up or they would beat us up. In a matter of minutes a large group of at least 50 people suddenly emerged from a hidden place in the nearby forest. It was really dark by that time, but I could tell from their silhouettes that they were soldiers with AK-47 rifles, carbines, and large Clubbers in their hands.

"Be quiet! Shut up! Shut up now! One of them began to shout loudly at us.

The rest surrounded the group with their rifles, aiming directly at us.

"Start digging this canal with your bare hands now! " They commanded and I heard some kicking and people screamed in pain.

I started to scoop the muddy canal instinctively like others. People began to plea for their lives. The

soldiers screamed for all of us to shut up again and again. More beatings ensued. Rifle's butts met with skin and solid bone to a tune of crashing sound can be heard, followed by people screaming in agony.

"Please, Mith. Please. Do not harm us. Do not harm my family, I beg of you, " a man named Rom next to my family begged for mercy.

"Angkar Leu does not want to harm any of you (they continued to use the term Mith or comrade). Angkar Leu only wished to ask a few questions that was all!" They yelled.

"Please, Mith. Spare us this time. Spare my family for we have helped Angkar during the war with medicine and information. Please spare us," Rom continued to plead.

"When did you help Angkar? Where? Who is your contact?" The commander fired a salvo of questions at Rom who continued to plead for his life.

I was surprised for I did not know Rom was a Khmer Rouge sympathizer during the war. His pleading and revelation about his activities in support of the people who were about to murder him and his family angered me.

"Coward! You should die like a coward. You deserve to die by the same people you had helped," I said quietly in my mind, looking at Rom.

I will die with dignity and not a coward like Rom. It suited Rom right for helping create a monster, as the Khmer Rouge truly was, into power. Rom deserved to die for his part. Coward! He will die as one, a coward.

"This is just an interrogation," the commander assured Rom. "Angkar Leu is suspecting that there are enemies among us. There are Vietnamese agents in this group," he continued, taunting and toying at Rom and the rest.

I knew it was a bogus claim since we all had known each other for many years. It was all a tactic, a dirty trick to keep us calm, weak and under their control. But the tactic had been very effective because all the strong men who could have risen against them were the first ones to go. Those people left in my group were women and children, the sick and the weak.

Angkar Leu had us right where they wanted. It was all a premeditated plan.

A young soldier eagerly walked towards me, yanking away my kroma, a Checkered-Khmer traditional cotton towel, and shredding it into small strips. I was the first one to be tied up tightly with one of the thin strip by bad smelling the soldier. I was stunned and quite terrified. I began to resist a little. After a few blows to the head with his rifle butt, with another joined in with the fun, I screamed out loud with extreme pain in my voice. All could hear for miles away. I could only let them do as they pleased with me. They gagged my mouth shut only after allowing me to scream out loud momentarily. They two then tied me up at both my elbows that stretched way to my back in a very uncomfortable position. If you could only see the fear and the pain in my eyes. My life flashed before my eyes. I knew then that it was the end for the rest and me for sure.

My skeleton head began to bleed from a cut. I was still semi-conscious - I could feel the pain and blood flowing, dripping down on my face. They were using me as example! It said clearly to others that this is what one would get if they got any kind of resistance. They quickly tied the rest of the group without any problems.

At this point in time, it was totally chaotic as people continued to plead for their lives. I was getting dizzy and disoriented as blood continued to drip across my face and into my right eye. It was the first

time that I had tears in my eyes—neither from the blood nor the pain—but fact from the reality that was now setting in. I was completely numb with fear. I momentarily lost a sense of reality. I was confused. I kept telling myself that this isn't real! It just a nightmare, the most terrible one.

I was beyond horrified when I heard the clobbering begins. Somehow, I knew then that this was it. Sa Oum's elderly father who was next to me, his upper torso contracted several times, from the massive blows, before he fell on me. At that same instance, I noticed a small boy, Ahpat, whom I knew well got up and started to call for his mother. Suddenly, there was a warm splash on my face and body. I knew it was definitely not mud. It was the little boy's blood, perhaps his brain tissues that got splattered from the impact of the executioners' fatal blows. The others only let out short but terrifying sputtered sounds. Despite the yelling and screaming and cried for mercy, I could actually hear the breathing stop cold in its tracks.

Everything seemed to happen in a slow motion, like in the movies. It was so unreal. It happened in a matter of seconds, but I can still vividly remember every trifling detail. I closed my eyes; I didn't dare look around, but the horrifying sounds continued to penetrate my ear canals, piercing my eardrums. I was still tied up and gagged, but my eyes and ears could not deny what I was witnessing and hearing at that moment. I was in hell!

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Sy explained that this Indo-China Federation was to be formed after a complete liberation of Indochina from the imperialists. In 1975, Cambodia rejected the idea, but Viet Nam remained intent upon making it a reality. Viet Nam aimed to exercise complete control over Indo-China and its resources by effectively turning it into one country, with Viet Nam as unchallenged leader, thereby eliminating Cambodian independence.

Tran's unit was assigned to guard Phu Quoc district. On January 23, 1978, the chief of his company,

Em Cham Quat, ordered him to conduct espionage on Vai island, where he was subsequently captured. While Tran Ngoc Tai's account must be seen as the product of a forced confession, experience shows that it, and those of the other purported Vietnamese soldiers who perished at Tuol Sleng, can be verified by investigation. A remaining question is whether or not justice will be served and the murderers of these prisoners of war properly charged with war crimes under the Geneva Conventions.

SEARCHING FOR FAMILY MEMBERS

To: Mr. Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia

From: Yat Kamsan, 45, employer of LICADHO Organization based in Battambang Province. Group 13, Kap Ko Thmei Village, O Char Sub-district, Svay Pao District, Battambang Province. Request: Please Mr. Director, publish this account regarding my niece who disappeared during the Pol Pot time in the year 1977. I hope my request will be accepted.

Following is her account:

Name, Nou Pharin, also known as “Ping”. She was born in 1967. During the relocation in 1975, she lived with me in O Ta Ky Sub-district, Battambang District. Late in 1975, she lived with my elder aunt whose residence was in front of the provincial textile factory. In March of 1976, my aunt died. Then she was adopted by a female soldier named Khoeun (who has been said to have originated in Krapeu Village, Phnom Sampeou Sub-district, Battambang Province). After the adoption as a god-sister, she was renamed “Khien”. In 1977, the woman was said to have been transferred by Angkar to Ka Koh Sub-district, Mong Russey District. Since then, no word of my niece has been had.

Her mother’s name is Im Ko Lap, 52. Her father’s name is Nou Phorn (deceased). There are three siblings in her family: Nou Phary, also known as Kao Solina, born 1965; Ping herself, born in 1967; and 3) Nou Phanara, who was known as “Puch” or Kao Solida (deceased).

Battambang, June 22, 2000

Yat Kamsan

FROM HUN SEN LIBRARY, ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF PHNOM PENH

To Mr. Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia

Dear Mr. Director:

On behalf of the rector of the Royal University of Phnom Penh, undergraduates, students as well as average researchers at the Hun Sen Library, I would like to express my profound gratitude to the Documentation Center of Cambodia for its gift of ten copies of the magazine “Searching for the Truth”. The magazine is of significance as it serves as a mirror image of Cambodian history and the political context for the average reader.

Therefore, the library is cataloguing them for public use and hopes that they will be widely read. We intend to ensure that they are preserved as the valuable state property they are, for long-term reference in the interest of national research and education.

Once again, we admire your spirit of assisting in developing the Hun Sen Library. We strongly hope and have faith that Mr. Director will continue with his donations.

Best wishes

Phnom Penh February 16, 2000

Deputy chief of Hun Sen’s Library

Peou Vany

KHMER ROUGE SONG:

WE ARE NEW REVOLUTIONARY WOMEN

Prepared by Sayana Ser

The revolutionary light is glittering like sunrays from all directions throughout the beloved nation. It is really far-out and terrific.

We are women, who used to have no honor and lived meaningless lives. Now we have a chance to see the light and enjoy freedom of movement.

We are equal to men and can become as famous. Angkar upgrades and guides us. Our name is as a fragrance.

We seem to have been reincarnated and comprehend the political context. We have a genuine stance and good morality.

Our ears are able to hear, while our eyes can see things very clear. We are able to listen and read without confusion and also we can observe and carry out brainstorming activities.

We are in loyal solidarity with men in all fields of work. We can be medical practitioners, workers, soldiers, and are absolutely involved in agricultural production.

Our existence is brilliant. We can master all work with stance of self-mastery. We always take responsibility and practice brave attacks for the sake of the revolution.

We suffer pains in all parts of our body and have constant wrath against contemptible imperialists who had oppressed us for decades. We endured utmost hardship.

There can be no comparison between the weight and size of the Himalayan Mountains and the revolution's virtue in freeing women from suffering.

Thus, we are committed to sacrificing flesh, blood and life for building a new effulgent society and defending the nation without hesitation.

**ដើម្បីទប់ទល់ការបោះពុម្ពនិងចែកចាយដោយឥតគិតថ្លៃ ដល់មន្ទីរស្រុក និងឃុំ នៅទូទាំងព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា
ទស្សនាវដ្តីចំនួន១០០០ ក្បាលជារៀងរាល់លេខ និងដាក់លក់តាមបណ្តាញទីរួមខេត្តនិងក្រុង មួយច្បាប់ក្នុងតម្លៃ ៧០០០ រៀល**

ថវិកានៃការបោះពុម្ពផ្សាយទប់ទល់ដោយឥតគិតថ្លៃនិងជួយមនុស្សធម៌នៃក្រសួងការបរទេសនៃរាជរដ្ឋាភិបាលនៃកម្ពុជា មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជាឆ្លងក្រុងដែលរដ្ឋាភិបាល មូលនិធិនានា និង សាធារណជនប្រគល់ជូន សូមជួយទប់ទល់ការបោះពុម្ពផ្សាយទស្សនាវដ្តីនេះទៅតាមលទ្ធភាពដែលអាចធ្វើបាន។ ព័ត៌មានបន្ថែមចំពោះការបោះពុម្ពផ្សាយទស្សនាវដ្តីស្វែងរកការពិត សូមមេត្តាទាក់ទងមកកាន់នាយកមជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជាតាមទូរស័ព្ទលេខ (៨៥៥) ២៣ ២១១ ៨៧៥ ឬ (៨៥៥) ១២ ៩០៥ ៥៥៥។ សូមអរគុណ។

Documentation Center of Cambodia would like to appeal to governments, foundations and individuals for support of the publication of
Searching for the truth. For contribution, please contact (855) 23 211 875 or (855) 12 90 55 95. Thank you.